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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the function of local communities in the 
defence of the late Roman empire along the North-East frontier. The North-East is 
defined as those lands between 37 and 49 degrees longitude east and 42 and 36 degrees 
latitude north, encompassing territories in northern Syria, northern Mesopotamia, 
Armenia, and Georgia. Efforts at controlling this region had to take into account a variety 
of communities and environmental conditions. The diversity of the terrain impeded easy 
unification of the region. Throughout Antiquity attempts were made to overcome these 
barriers through projects which largely revolved around specific urban centres. Such centres 
provided points through which imperial powers controlled the periphery via local agents. 
In order to establish the difficulties faced by both local communities and the late Roman 
government, the successes and failures of previous imperial powers at controlling the region 
shall be surveyed.
During the fourth century a defensive strategy in which the Roman army avoided 
pitched battles and increasingly relied on specialists, the lim itanei, and the subject 
population to keep invaders at bay, was developed in the North-East. The imperial 
government carefully used traditional power structures and local customs to secure the 
loyalty of both provincial leaders and subjects. This can be observed in detailed studies of 
several important frontier settlements. Armenian sources have been used in conjunction with 
Classical literature to create an enriched picture of the North-East.
The Christian hierarchy was central to the late Roman government's control of the 
frontier communities. While they rarely held legitimate military authority, the clergy 
played a tremendous part in bolstering the morale of commanders, troops, and citizens. 
They were called upon to arbitrate judicial cases within the empire, and following this 
development, they acted as intermediaries between imperial courts, opposing armies, and 
mutinous troops. The Church's missionary efforts and communication with Christian 
communities on all sides of the frontier made clerics useful agents for negotiation and a 
valuable source of information. As a consequence, Christianity influenced the development 
of diplomacy in the region and was in turn influenced by political and military matters.
It is debatable whether the late Roman state had developed any sort of "grand 
strategy" in the North-East. Yet the willingness to support local initiative over the course 
of three hundred years suggests that the imperial government consciously followed a 
consistent policy, not unlike that employed during early periods with regards to client 
kings.
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VPreface
Seven years ago, in  the m iddle  of a Virgil lecture, Fr. John Nicholas 
Felton, SJ. explained  to m e w hy  A ncient H istory  w as the  single m ost 
exciting discipline to pursue. That one conversation sent m e on m y way. 
I never h ad  the p leasure of read ing  h istory  w ith  Fr. Felton, b u t had  it not 
been  fo r h im  an d  the  m an y  o th e r in sp ira tio n a l teachers of X avier 
U niversity , I m ight never have come to Scotland. H ere in  St. A ndrew s, I 
am  grateful for the brief tim e I have spent in the Dept, of A ncient H istory. 
Early portions of this thesis w ere read  by  G.E. Rickman, and  I have profited 
from  his m any  k ind  w ords. M. A ustin , J. H arries, and  M ary W hitby have 
alw ays m ade m e feel welcome. Tig and  Lynn have never failed to provide 
so lu tions to every difficulty. G reatest thanks of all is d u e  to M ichael 
W hitby, w ho superv ised  this thesis, and  w ho p u t up  w ith  delays, crises, 
and  m y rid iculous spelling for over tw o years. W ithout his enthusiastic, 
and  occasionally b rood ing , presence, I w ou ld  never have  fin ished  this 
thesis.
In  an  a ttem p t to  u n d e rs ta n d  the  geography  of th e  N orth -E ast 
frontier I visited  eastern  Turkey in  July and  A ugust of 1990, and  June of 
1991. These trip s w ere  graciously  assisted  by  the  the  Russell T rust, St. 
L eonard 's College, and  the A m erican Travel Fund. In addition  to M ichael 
W hitby, help p ro v id ed  by  A. Kettle, F. Q uinault, an d  T.C. Sm out w as 
essential in  securing funds. W hile in  Turkey I enjoyed the  hospitality  of 
the  British Institu te  of A rchaeology, and  the guidance and  tales of D.H. 
French and  E, Ivison, M ost of all, I benefited  from  the com pany of C.S. 
L igh tfoo t, w ho  b ro u g h t th e  fro n tie r to  life, an d  m ad e  m y trave ls  
m em orab le . F u rtherm ore , th e  L ightfoot fam ily  on  several occasions 
prov ided  a safe haven for a w eary  traveller.
Several o ther househo lds have been responsib le  for creating jolly 
respites from  m y academ ic life: the W hitbys, the Rickm ans, the H ookers, 
v a rious folk a t M alborough  R oad, the  Polletts, th e  H oyles, an d  m ost 
especially W illiam , O live, and  Sam D uncan. Because of them  I ne ither
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lacked food nor drink, and  found  m any hom es aw ay from  hom e. M y final 
days in  Scotland w ere m ade  less frantic  by  Fr. C am illus, C.S.B. and  the 
Benedictines of P luscarden, w here I found  som e peace. I shall deeply miss 
the  innum erable characters of St. A ndrew s, and  can only hope to re tu rn  
again.
There are friends on  bo th  sides of the A tlantic w hom  I now  gladly  
m ention. First, there are those w ho kep t m e in— or at least supp lied  m e 
w ith— good spirits: D ave H ansen , Sally Guilfoyle, A llen H agler, R ichard 
H o o k e r, G u id o  L ead b ea te r, P a u l B eddoe, Ju lia  D e lancey , H e len  
R aftopoulos, Robert and  L aura W yer, A ndrew  Pettegree, and , of course 
Clarence, M urphy and Lewis. M oreover, there are those h ardy  souls w ho 
proof-read m y crude chapters: M atthew  Julian "Big Boy" Ram pley, N avina 
K rishna, K athleen D ragoo, and  Shaw n Pollett. Special notes of thanks 
should  go to H ugh  M acnaghten for his com puter and  a low  in terest loan, 
and  Peter M axwell-Stuart, w ho tried  to  find various books and  papers for 
m e in  Cam bridge. Patrick O ' Loughlin jeopardized his health  in obtaining 
w orks unavailable to m e in this country. A nd I am  p erpe tually  thankful 
for Am y Elizabeth Verkest and  her rock from  Rome.
M y fam ily  has alw ays p ro v id ed  m e w ith  the  g rea tes t su p p o rt. 
E ncouraging letters have never ceased arriv ing from  the Faheys in M aine 
an d  the  C arrolls in  Florida. M y bro thers, Sean an d  K evin, have done 
every th ing  in  the ir pow ers to  keep  the ir o lder b ro th er hum ble. M y 
parents have inspired m e at every step of m y education. I t is im possible to 
thank  them  adequately for the p leasant days I spent in Scotland.
W illiam  E dm und  Fahey 
St. A ndrew s 
A pril 16th, 1992 
A.M.D.G.
V l l
A bbreviations
A N R W Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt
A n a tS t Anatolian Studies
BM GS Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies
B SO A S Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies
C A H Cambridge Ancient H istory
CHI Cambridge History of Iran
OIL Corpus Inscriptionum  Latinarum
CSCO Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium
DHGE Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie
ecclésiastique
DOP Dumbarton Oaks Papers
B i d ) The Encyclopedia of Islam (Leyden, 1913-38)
EK2) The Encyclopedia of Islam (London, I960-)
FHG Fragmenta H istoricorum Graecorum
IGLS Inscriptiones grécques et latines de la Syrie
IGR Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes
ILS Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae
JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies
JRS Journal of Roman Studies
R B K Reallexicon zur Byzantinischen Kunst
ZPE Zeitschrift fiir Papyrologie und Epigraphik
V l l l
Maps:
All M aps by W.E. Fahey, 1992.
M ap one: Geographical regions discussed in C hapter One.
Cyrus Region
Upper Highlands
Coastal Region Central Region y
Southern Region
M ap Two: Principal m ountain  ranges and passes. 
(Shaded area represents land  over 1000 m etres)
IX
Caucasus
Zagros
M ap Three: Principal sites m entioned in C hapter Two.
X
Trapezus
TheodosiopolisSatala
Artalesoir
Citharizon
Martyropo;
Amida.
so
XI
M ap Four: O ther im portan t sites on the frontier.
IX
CL,
CO<u
CO-
S o
Introduction
O ver th e  p ast th ree  decades ancien t h isto rians h ave  b eg u n  to 
exam ine  th e ir  o w n  p re su p p o s itio n s  ab o u t th e  effects of an c ien t 
im perialism  from  w hat is though t to be a m ore detached perspective than  
have  ea rlie r  scho lars, w h o  w ere  them se lves m em bers of im p eria l 
so c ie tie s . 1 The resu lts have allow ed for a refresh ing  s tu d y  of m any  
periods. This thesis exam ines one particu lar area of the  Rom an frontier: 
the  N orth-E ast. M uch a tten tion  is focused  on  the  m an n er in  w hich  
in d iv id u a l u rban  com m unities conducted  their defence, an d  the  w ays 
w hich governm ents em ployed local leaders to achieve im perial goals.
Efforts a t controlling this region h ad  to take into account the variety  
of com m unities an d  env ironm en ta l conditions. The d ivers ity  of the  
terra in , especially  in m ounta inous regions, im peded  easy unification  of 
the region. T hroughout A ntiquity  attem pts w ere m ade to overcom e these 
barriers th rough  various projects w hich largely revolved  a round  specific 
u rb an  centres. Such centres p ro v id ed  po in ts th ro u g h  w hich  im peria l 
pow ers controlled the periphery  via local agents. In  order to establish the 
d ifficu lties  faced  by  b o th  local com m unities an d  th e  la te  R om an 
governm ent, I shall su rvey  the  success and  failure of p rev ious im peria l 
pow ers a t controlling the region in  chapter one. I have borrow ed certain 
concepts from  m odern  geopolitical studies to aid m y interpretations.
D iocletian and  C onstan tius II developed  a defensive stra tegy  in  
w h ich  the  arm y avo ided  p itch ed  ba ttles and  increasing ly  re lied  on  
specialists, the lim itanei, and  the  subject popu la tion  to keep invaders at 
bay. For th is system  to  have been  effective, the  im peria l governm ent 
carefully used  trad itional pow er structures and  local custom s to secure the 
loyalty  of bo th  provincial leaders and  subjects. In  chapter tw o I shall 
illustrate  this in  detailed  studies of several im portan t frontier settlem ents.
I believe th a t the C hristian  h ierarchy becam e essential to the late 
Rom an governm ent's control of the  frontier com m unities, and , in chapter 
th ree , I h ave  devo ted  special a tten tio n  to  the  neg lec ted  ro le  w hich
 ^For a discussion and some references see B. Isaac (1990) 1-2.
ecclesiastics p layed in the defences of u rban  centres. W hile they  rarely  held 
legitim ate m ilitary  au thority , the  clergy w ere of trem endous im portance 
in bolstering  the m orale of com m anders, troops, and  citizens. From  the 
early  fou rth  century  C hristian  leaders obtained greater secular privileges 
such as grants of land , endow m ents, and  civic responsibilities. They w ere 
called upon  to arbitrate in judicial cases w ith in  the em pire, and  follow ing 
this developm ent, they  acted as in term ediaries betw een opposing  arm ies, 
im perial courts, and  m utinous troops. The C hurch 's m issionary  efforts 
and  com m unication  betw een  C hristian  com m unities on  all sides of the 
fron tier m ade the  clergy useful agents for nego tia tion  and  a valuab le  
source of in form ation . As a consequence, C hristian ity  in fluenced  the 
developm ent of d iplom acy in  the  reg ion  and  by  partic ipa ting  in these 
affairs w as in  tu rn  influenced by  political and  m ilita ry  m atters. I shall 
discuss these m atters in chapter four.
It is debatable w hether the late Rom an state had  developed any sort 
of "g rand  strategy" in  the N orth-East. In  his recen t book. The Limits of 
Empire, Benjam in Isaac criticised argum ents w hich favour a system atic 
frontier policy. Yet, in m y fifth chapter, I shall argue tha t the w illingness 
to suppo rt local initiative over the  course of three h u n d red  years suggests 
th a t the im peria l governm ent consciously follow ed a consisten t policy, 
n o t un like  th a t em ployed  du rin g  earlier periods w ith  regards to  client 
kings.
A rm en ian  an d  Syriac lite ra tu re  contains n u m ero u s passages of 
historical im portance. I have a ttem pted  to m ake the m ost use possible of 
certain  ancient and  early  m edieval au thors, in the belief th a t add ing  a 
non-w estern  perspective enhances our understand ing  of an area th a t w as 
alw ays, to vary ing  degrees, "oriental". These texts have been difficult to 
obtain, and  are often obscure. H ow ever, I have a ttem pted  to refer to these 
eastern  sources so long as they  can be corroborated or a t least com pared 
w ith  Classical m aterial.
I have tried , w here  and  w hen  possible, to d raw  m y archaeological 
field experience into the thesis, especially w ith  regards to geography and  
exam ination  of fron tie r se ttlem ents. A gain , I m u st apo log ise  for a 
rud im entary  know ledge of the  discipline; since archaeological survey and  
excavation reports of late Rom an occupation in the N orth-E ast are still in 
the form ative period, I have given precedent to textual evidence.
T he Local c o m m u n itie s  A rm en ia , a n d  n o r th e rn  S yria  an d  
M esopotam ia p layed a crucial p a rt in  defending the in terior of Asia M inor 
for over four hu n d red  years, and  as such are a w orthy  subject for scholarly 
investigation .
A Geopolitical Introduction to Ciscaucasia:
§ 1. Introduction:
This chapter is d iv ided  into tw o sections: first, a geographical, and  
second an  h istorical su rvey  of easte rn  A nato lian  an d  C aucasian  lands 
un til the  Sassanian era. The geographical section w ill sketch the m ain 
physical features of the  entire  area, pay ing  attention to regional diversity , 
and  in particu lar, h ighlighting certain features, such as rivers and  passes, 
essential to the developm en t of fron tier defence and  in stitu tions. The 
second section w ill analyse the  evo lu tion  of the  fron tie r reg ion  d u rin g  
four periods: the  U rartian  (14th-7th centuries B.C.), the A chaem enid (6th- 
4 th  B.C.), the  H ellen istic  (4th-2nd B.C.), an d  the  p e rio d  of R om ano- 
Parth ian  w ars (2nd B.C.-A.D. 3rd). This analysis will briefly review  specific 
e v en ts  from  th ese  fo u r  p e rio d s  w h ich  en co u rag e d  so c io p o litica l 
u n if ic a tio n  (c e n tr ip e ta l fo rces) a n d  e le m e n ts  w h ic h  p ro m o te d  
d isin tegration  (centrifugal). Such an  analysis does no t aim  tow ards the  
e s tab lish m en t o f a co m p reh en s iv e  h is to ry , b u t ra th e r  to w a rd s  an  
understand ing  of w hy the region w as a theatre of conflict.
§ 2. Geography:
The geographic area s tud ied  in  th is thesis involves approxim ately  
350,000 sq. km . of land  betw een 37 and  49 degrees longitude east, and  42 
and  36 degrees la titude north. ^  For the sake of consistency and  clarity, this 
en tire  area w ill be referred  to  as C iscaucasia in this chapter; a lthough  this 
designation  em braces lands such  as n o rth ern  M esopotam ia an d  Syria, 
regions no t norm ally  included  u n d er such an appellation. It is necessary 
to avoid  the  am biguity  w ords such as A rm enia or G eorgia m ay  occasion 
d ue  to their fluctuating dual geographic and  political m eanings.^ The area
1 The geographical descriptions in this chapter are derived from a reading of the ancient 
sources, the Victorian travellers Ainsworth, Brant, and Pollington, Journal of the Royal 
Geographic Society 11 (1841), Admiralty Handbooks on Mesopotamia and Turkey, and D. 
Oates (1968) Chp. 1.
 ^See C. Toumanoff (1963) 11-12 on the difficulties of naming this region. The lands within 
Ciscaucasia contain the North-East frontier of this thesis. However, since this chapters
is b o unded  in the north  by the  Black Sea, Pontic A lps and  the  Caucasus 
m ounta ins, in  the  east by  the  C aspian Sea and  the  Zagros range, in  the 
sou th  first by  the T aurus m ountains, and  then  by  the 200mm isohyet, and  
in  the w est the anti-Taurus m ountains. D ue to  the diversity  of terra in  and  
env ironm ent found  w ith in  this area, five m ain regions w ill be described 
in greater detail.
T he C oastal R egion: The Coastal Region of this survey  runs from  
the ancient harbour of Sinope in  the w est to the lands below  the  Caucasus 
R ange ju st sou th  of D ioscurias. In  general the  reg ion  is a rela tive ly  
narrow  strip  of land  lying below  the Paryadres and  M oschi range of the 
E rzurum  h igh lands on  the sou thern  side of the  Black Sea and  below  the 
C aucasus range on the east. This th in  be lt of land  rises sharp ly  to  the 
in land  p la teau  and  is scarred  frequently  w ith  fast flow ing rivulets. Of 
restricted  use agriculturally, the region is densely covered by  pine, w ooded 
thickets, and  in som e places sub-tropical forest, a lthough  sm all h igh land  
pastu res are no t unknow n. M ist and  fog usually  obscure the  shore, as the 
w a rm , m o is t w in d s  m o v in g  in la n d  condense  in  th e  su rro u n d in g  
highlands. This activity leads to heavy precipitation and  cloud cover. The 
region averages one h u n d red  days of rain  a year, and  over th ree  h u n d red  
days of cloudy or overcast skies. Clear w eather is alm ost entirely  confined 
to  the days betw een June and  September.
C y ru s  R eg io n : The C yrus R egion lies ju s t on  th e  n o rth -east 
pe rim ete r of the  ancien t A rm enia  p roper. Its lim its stre tch  from  the 
M oschi M ountains on the border of Colchis in the w est to the C aspian Sea 
in  the east; the core of the region being the Cyrus river valley itself. In  the 
sou th , the  region is separa ted  from  the Araxes Valley by  a h igh  range of 
m ountains and  the north  is contained by  the Caucasus range. The eastern 
th ird  of the region is characterised by  som e of the densest pine-forests of 
the  en tire  Rom an frontier; and  below  the canopy of foliage lie ru g g ed  
h igh lands, a lm ost en tire ly  uncultivab le. C ountless rav ines have been  
carved  o u t by the  su rg ing  tribu taries of the  Cyrus. Follow ing the river 
eastw ard  the  te rra in  becom es m ore subdued , m oving from  u n d u la tin g  
hills to a great p lain  w hich dom inates the further half of the region. Snow
examines the region before Roman jurisdiction it shall simply be referred to as Ciscaucasia 
here.
storm s are frequent, happening  sixty or m ore days a year, and  snow  lies on 
th e  g ro u n d  for ap p ro x im ate ly  seven  m on ths (p e rm an en tly  on  h igh  
m ountains). Rainfall is heavy  near the  coastal zones; these  areas also 
experience light fog cover.
U pper H igh lands Region: The U pper H ighlands of this survey begin 
south-w est of Them iscyra elevated above the  coastal region and  ru n  w est 
beneath  the  Paryadres and  M oschi m ountains into the  valley of the river 
Araxes. In general the w estern  half of the region is rough and  w ind  sw ept, 
though  som e cereal p roduction  is possible as one m oves dow n the Lycus 
river valley. In the  east, h igh land  gives aw ay to a w ide  valley rich in 
p a s tu re  an d  p lo u g h  lan d s . F o re s ta tio n  is on ly  h e av y  a lo n g  the  
m oun ta inous borders, especially along the  M oschi range w hich  is thick 
w ith  evergreens. Sum m ers in the region are m ild, b u t w inters are harsh , 
w ith  tem pera tu res hovering  a round  freezing. C loud  coverage averages 
about tw o h u n d red  days a year, concentrated during  the w in ter m onths. 
Rainfall is frequent, b u t no t heavy, yet snow  falls fifty to sixty days a year 
and  lies on the g ro u n d  for four m onths. These conditions g row  w orse 
w ith  h igher a ltitude , so th a t passes are often  blocked for u p  to e igh t 
m onths of the year.
C en tra l R eg ion  (E astern  A nato lia): In  som e respects the central 
reg ion  is one great p lain  w hich rolls from  the m ountains encircling Lake 
Van dow n to the  Taurus chain near M elitene. It is bo rdered  to the  no rth  
an d  so u th  b y  th e  E rzu ru m  H ig h lan d s and  the  east T au ru s  ran g e  
respectively, and  sp lit by the A rsaninas river. The alluvial soil is optim al 
for all varie ties of ag ricu ltu re , a lthough  the  n o rth  an d  east quad ran ts 
possess som e w asteland  in  the form  of m arshes and  rocky h igh-ground. 
The sou thern  border is lightly  w ooded. In  all seasons the  tem pera tu re  is 
m ild, w ith  less than  one h u n d red  and  fifty days of cloud cover. Snow fall 
is com paratively light, occurring on  few er than  th irty  days a year.
S o u th e rn  R e g io n  (E a s te rn  A n a to lia ) : The so u th e rn  reg io n  
com prises the  b road , u p p e r M esopotam ian  p lain  and  one, a lm ost self- 
con ta ined  area, centring  a round  the  u p p e r Tigris. The M esopotam ian  
p la in  is, for the  m ost p a rt, d ry  a n d  b e re ft of all b u t  ru d im e n ta ry  
agriculture. O n the other hand, the u p p er Tigris w aters a fertile, though  in 
som e places m arshy, plain. The entire  region is the flattest of all sectors 
exam ined in  this survey. Eastern A natolia's climate is affected in several
w ays by  the openness of the region. H ot w inds blow  up  from  Syria and 
raise the tem pera tu re  (ten degrees h igher on  account of the w inds). Thus 
sum m ers are especially  h o t (well in to  the  nineties) and  cloud cover is 
m in im al w ith  less th an  one h u n d red  days of coverage. Rain is heavy  
d u rin g  the  w in ter m onths th roughou t the  region. The area su rro u n d in g  
A m id a  experiences lig h t snow  on  its p la in , b u t  a long  th e  n earb y  
m o u n ta in s  and  passes snow  m ay  b u ry  w hole  v illages an d  seal off 
co m m u n ities .
To the  east of ancient A rm enia lay M edia A tropatene, the w estern  
po rtio n s of w hich  w ere  very  sim ilar to  the  m ore m ou n ta inous of the 
lands ju st described. Yet the  m ounta ins w hich  b o rd ered  A rm enia  d id  
posses one resource its ne ighbour w as sho rt on: gold. W ell in to  late 
an tiq u ity  the  m etal w as p an n ed  from  the  m ounta in  stream s or m ined , 
and  w as accounted a source of w ealth  for the Persians.^
To u n d e rs tan d  the difficulties succeeding im perial pow ers h ad  in 
assim ilating  C iscaucasia into their realm s, one m ust take account of the 
im ped im ents w hich  physical barrie rs  im posed  on un ified  control. N o t 
on ly  w as it im possib le  for any  single reg ion  effectively to dom ina te  
com m unication  w ith  and  control of ou tly ing  areas, b u t m icro-unity  w as 
also re ta rd ed  by  the m yriad  ne tw ork  of valley  com m unities in to  w hich 
Ciscaucasia w as subdivided. M inim al river navigation w as possible in  the 
h ig h lan d  regions.'^ H ow ever the  river valleys d id  foster com m unication 
by  land  routes w hich ran  parallel to  the w ater courses.
The m oun ta ins them selves acted as a physical d e te rren t against 
p o lit ic a l  u n ifica tio n .^  L ofty  ranges sealed  C iscaucasia  from  easy  
assim ilation from  any direction, except along the Black Sea. U nlike the  
open  an d  largely  hom ogenous flat lands to the sou th , ne ither A rm enia 
nor Georgia could be subjugated by  the rap id  deploym ent of cavalry. N or 
w as it a sim ple task to control nodal points in  the region, for there w as no 
n a tu ra l centre  w hich  could  dom ina te  p e rip h e ra l reg ions. U ntil such 
central po in ts are p resen t, un ification  of any  so rt is an  im possibility.^ 
T hus in  the  fo rm ative  p e rio d  of C iscaucasian  h is to ry , th e  physical
 ^Procopius, Wars, 1.15.18; Mai., 18.54.
4 Admiralty Intelligence Division (1942-3) 256; H.A. Manandian (1965) 20-1. 
 ^C. Burney and D. M. Lang (1971) 8.
 ^R. Hartshorne (1964b) 87.
8env ironm en t encouraged the  developm ent of m icro-com m unities, w here  
each tribe  created  custom s, values, and  languages u n ique  to  the ir ow n 
v a l l e y /  This early  isolation w as instrum ental in  the  la ter form ation  of 
A rm en ian  feu d a lism  u n d e r  the  N a x a ra r system , a n d  so is eq u ally  
im p o r ta n t to  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of the  C h ris tian  h ie ra rch y  w h ich  
shadow ed  secular evolu tion . Fortunately , the  developm en t of in te rnal 
and  external h ighw ays saved Ciscaucasia from  ossification; its h isto ry  is 
m arked  by  perennial m igration an d  b lend ing  of races.® For the barriers of 
rivers, m oun ta ins, and  valleys rem ain  so only  un til technology, social 
ch an g e , o r sh eer d e te rm in a tio n  re fo rm s th em  in to  c h an n e ls  of 
c o m m u n ic a tio n s .^  H ence, it is u n d ers tan d ab le  th a t th e  Pontic coast, 
Colchis and  northern  M esopotam ia w ere frequently  annexed or colonised. 
In  each case the open  te rra in , sea, o r lim ited  w ater w ays encouraged  
central com m and of nodal areas. W hen one g roup  m onopolises focal 
points such as na tu ra l harbours, river m ouths, oases, it is no t only feasible, 
b u t a lm ost inev itab le  th a t the ir possessors w ill seek to  influence th e  
hinterland.^®
A casual inspection of any detailed m ap of Ciscaucasia will indicate 
the  abundance  of river valleys. H ow ever these valleys ten d  to  p roh ib it 
m ost m ovem ent due to their to rtuous rock laden courses, w ide  seasonal 
fluctuations in  cu rren t and  w id th , and  su d d en  changes in  a ltitude. The 
m oun ta in  chains w hich traverse the  region follow an  east-w est or sou th ­
east to  n o rth -w es t p a tte rn  increasing  in  a ltitu d e  an d  concen tra tion . 
C onsequently , m ovem ent along a north -sou th  axis is m ore difficult than  
east-west. M ost regions enjoyed access to one another by  m ountain  passes 
w hich w ere narrow , steep, and  easily closed by heavy precipitation. Both 
m oun ta in  passes and  rivers dictate specific areas suitable for crossing by  
m ilitary  highw ays or trade  routes. Thus travel, com m unication, and  any 
so rt of action on  all b u t the  sm allest scale w as strenuous and  alm ost 
entirely  governed by the  conditions of geography. This inform ation m ust 
be kep t in m ind  w hen  app ly ing  physical geography  to historical events, 
especially m ilitary action.
7 C. Toumanoff (1963) 37-8.
®N. Adontz (1970) 305.
9 K. W. Deutch (1964) 110.
1® ibid. 111.
The no rth ern  to rren ts w hich  cut dow n  the Pontic slopes in to  the  
Black Sea m ade coastal land  transporta tion  laborious and  encouraged the 
developm ent of m aritim e rou tes, especially  th ro u g h o u t the  sp ring  and  
early  sum m er w hen  flood ing  cou ld  sw eep  aw ay  b rid g es and  en tire  
settlem ents. Of the rivers of the coastal in terior only the low er course of 
the  A cam psis (Çoruh), from  roughly  the  fortified stronghold  of Ercani to 
the  river's  m ou th  at Batum , w as navigable. W ith  the  exception of the 
C yrus, w hich  for th ree  h u n d red  m iles is nav igable dow nstream  from  
Yevlakh near M ingchaur, the Caucasus rivers are too dangerous.
In respect to the tw o northern  branches of the E uphrates, the upper 
E uphrates (Kara Su) an d  the  A rsanias (M urad), lim ited  nav iga tion  to 
M elitene w as possib le  on  in fla ted  skin  rafts know n as keleks. From  
E rz in can  on  th e  u p p e r  E u p h ra te s , w h e n  th e  w e a th e r  is c lem ent, 
dow nstream  travel is feasible. Sim ilarly, on the A rsanias, a skilled p ilo t 
could m anage the course from  Palu. H ow ever, the bend south  of M elitene 
still p reven ts all b u t the  m ost da ring  travellers, and  could n o t be used  
safely or w ith  regularity  at any po in t du ring  the year. W ith the  exception 
of a handfu l of sm all iso lated  valleys, the course of the  E uphrates from  
M elitene to  Sam osata ran  th rough  deeply  carved banks and  thw arted  the 
establishm ent of all b u t precarious land  routes. N or is it fordable at any 
p o in t un til one reaches Z eugm a, w ith  perhaps the exception at Tille.^i 
Small craft m ay safely begin to navigate  the river after Sam osata, b u t it is 
no t un til reaching D ura Europos th a t one finds conditions suitable for a 
trad ing  post.^^
O n the Tigris from  A m ida east and  south, transporta tion  by kelek is 
w ell a ttested  and  less form idable than  any stretch of the up p er Euphrates. 
H ow ever, after the confluence w ith  the N ym phius, the river w inds into a 
gorge  and  the cu rren t increases. G reat skill w as req u ired  to  m anage 
tran sp o rt from  here until Cizre, w here  the  river again  w idens. W hoever 
controlled  the gorge along th is stretch  h ad  the pow er to im pede, if no t 
entirely  stop, m ovem ent along the  Tigris.
Passage over tlie Caucasus range w as largely restricted  to tw o m ain 
routes: First, one th rough  the central Darial pass and  descending on Tiflis;
D.H. French, J. Moore and H. F. Russell (1982) 161,168-70.
The Roman Euphrates fleet was known to operate above Dura-Europos, but this was only for 
exceptional reasons, see V. Chapot (1907) 145-9 and C. Starr (1960) 125.
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this w as no t the only breach, b u t one of the  few  not perpetually  blocked 
w ith  snow : Second, the  D arbend  pass, less of a pass th an  a corridor
b e tw een  the  m oun ta in s an d  th e  C asp ian  Sea w as b ro ad  en o u g h  for 
considerable m igration. Travel along the eastern Black Sea w as possible, 
b u t a rduous due to the  closeness of the  m ountains to the  sea shore. As 
along the  Pontic coast, rugged  terra in  spu rred  m aritim e com m unications.
Once the  Caucasus m ountains h ad  been negotiated, it w as possible 
to continue onto  the  Iran ian  p la teau  v ia  the  C aspian coast o r the  U rm ia 
basin. The ease of this south-eastern  passage often d istracted  m igrating  
forces from  the only rou te  penetrating  the A rm enian highlands: from  the 
Araxes valley via the Kars p lain and thence east tow ard  E rzurum , or south  
to  the upper Araxes valley.
F rom  th e  Black Sea th ree  ro u te s  in to  e as te rn  A n a to lia  a re  
significant: the  first runs from  the p lain  of Them iscyra near Sam sun up  
the  Lycus (Kelkit) river valley continuing to Bayburt, o r breaking  to the 
so u th -east n ea r Susehiri an d  con tinu ing  to  Erzincan: Second, from
T rapezus th rough  the Z igana pass and  thence south-east v ia  G üm üshane 
to Kelkit or Bayburt: O r finally, from  Batum , then  up  the Acam psis valley 
and  thence to Bayburt connecting w ith  the previous routes.
A long the east-w est axis there  w ere tw o natural routes: one in the 
no rth  w hich crossed the sou thern  slopes of M ount A rarat via Agri to the 
D elibaha pass, thence to E rzurum  and along the  up p er E uphrates tow ard  
Si vas: A no ther, in  the  sou th -east, p assed  the shores of Lake U rm ia 
th ro u g h  the K otur valley, a ro u n d  Lake Van, across the  Mug p lain , and  
dow n the A rsanias valley to  the E uphrates crossings near Melitene. From  
M elitene three routes could be taken west: south w est tow ard  M aras: w est 
to Caesarea: or north-w est to Sebasteia.
From  the sou th  the routes w ere m ore challenging, usually  forcing 
m ost m ovem ent east, below  the  T ur 'A bdin  tow ard  N isibis. O ne ran  
parallel w ith  the Tigris on the east, and  passed  Cizre continuing either to 
Siirt, or to M idyat and  thence H asankeyf; bo th  b rought en try  to  the upper 
Tigris plain. A second rou te  from  Azerbaijan snakes th rough  the H akkari 
m ounta ins along the C ingulsaya river valley to Siirt v ia Sirnak. Once 
w ith in  th e  u p p e r T igris basis, en trance  to  the  A rm en ian  h ig h lan d s 
th rough  the T aurus range could be gained by  either the Bitlis pass, sou th­
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w est of Van, or th rough  the Ergani, north-w est of Amida. A  lesser passage 
via H ani th rough  to Genç is also feasible.
Finally , there  are rou tes em anating  from  n o rth e rn  M esopotam ia 
w hich w ere no t h indered  so m uch by  loom ing m ounta in  ranges or their 
torrents, as by the inhospitable climate, lack of w ater, and  lim ited areas of 
cu ltiv a tio n  an d  se ttlem en t. Tw o m ajor h ighw ays rose  from  low er 
M esopotam ia, bo th  runn ing  paralle l to  the  g rea t rivers. The E uphrates 
land  rou te  began near D ura-Europos, w here river traffic ceases, and  thence 
no rth , astride  the  river to  the  various n a tu ra l or m an-m ade crossings. 
V ery little  w ater tran sp o rt w as u sed  to  m ove n o rth  along  the Tigris, 
certain ly  n o t p as t N ineveh  from  w hence the  rou te  con tinued  alongside 
the Tigris, eventually  cu tting  north -w est along the  u p p er M esopotam ian 
p lain  to Nisibis and  thence west.
§ 3. In troduction to the Historical Section:
There are m any m ethods of w riting  an historical in troduction  to 
the north-eastern  frontier. As this thesis is interested in  studying  the w ays 
in  w hich  the frontier w as m anaged  d u rin g  the late an tique period , it is 
helpfu l to look for recu rring  features of stability  and  instab ility  du ring  
earlier tim e periods. W hy w as the  fron tier w here it w as du ring  the  late 
Rom an period? W hy w as Ciscaucasia the m ain  theatre  of w ar? To w ork  
tow ards an  understand ing , certain  very  sim ple ideas have been  borrow ed 
from  m odern  geopolitical studies.^® First, it is accepted tha t the "prim ary  
and  continuing problem  of every state is how  to b ind  together m ore or less 
sep ara te  an d  d iverse  areas in to  an  effective w h o l e . A  concrete 
defin ition  of the  state  is n o t necessary; any  po lity— foreign  em pire  or 
dom estic confederation— is acceptable. The term  "state", for the purposes 
of this study, does not apply to very broad cultural concepts such as eastern 
M editerranean  society, or for th a t m atter Iranian. W hat determ ines the 
success of a polity  to unify  a reg ion  is the  trium ph  of cen tripetal over 
centrifugal forces. Centrifugal forces tend  to d isrup t territorial un ity  and  
cohesion and  m ay be d iv ided  into tw o parts: physical (m ountains, bodies
See the works of K.W Deutch, O.H.K Spate, and especially R. Hartshorne collected in 
W.A. D. Jackson (1964).
R. Hartshorne (1964b) 86.
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of w ater, distances) and  hum an  (differing socio-cultural levels, political 
system s, philosophies, econom ies, m ilitary  aims). C onversely, centripetal 
forces p rom o te  union . E ssentially , the  u n d erly in g  fea tu re  beh ind  all 
centripetal forces is a sense of belonging to an  organisation, generated  by, 
for instance, national, econom ic, or religious loyalties, o r the  v ision  of a 
king or consular general. O nly certain centripetal and  centrifugal factors 
from  each of the four historical periods will be highlighted. This is no t the 
place for an  exhaustive geopolitical s tu d y  of the  region. H ow ever, it is 
helpfu l to  observe how  C iscaucasia cam e together and  w as pu lled  apart 
th rough  the  ages, bo th  for p u ttin g  th is lim ited frontier s tu d y  in to  a larger 
perspective, and  to  gain  insigh t in to  som e of the  difficulties the  Rom ans 
faced  a n d  h o w  th e  la n d  a n d  h is to ry  of th e  reg io n  e n co u rag e  
adm inistration  on a local level.
§ 4. The U rartian  Period:
The first historical records of organised states in  the frontier region 
com e from  rival civilisations.^® H ittite  annals of the fourteen th  century  
record  the  cam paign of king T udhaliyas III against K arannis, k ing  of the  
H ayasa, a people  w ho occupied  the  area su rround ing  m odern  Erzincan, 
w ith in  m uch of w ha t w ou ld  later becom e Armenia minor. W ithin a few  
generations the  H ittite  royal fam ily becam e blood relatives of the H ayasa 
th rough  aristocratic m arriages. Soon afterw ards central A natolian  culture 
began  penetra tion  of A rm enia and  Caucasia. A  century  later, sou th  of 
Lake Van, the king of Assyria, Shalm eneser I, w aged w ar in  the  country  of 
th e  U ru ra r ti , a d ev e lo p in g  s ta te  su rro u n d in g  Lake V an w h ich  the  
A ssy rian s w o u ld  soon  recogn ise  a n d  call U ra rtu . O ver tim e, the  
assim ilating pow er of w ar and inter-m arriage w ould loosely w eave H ayasa 
and  U rartu  into the ancient polity  of Arm enia.
For over four h u n d red  years (circa 1275-840 B.C.) the  A ssyrians 
p u rsu ed  a ru th less conflict w ith  the N airi, or river land  chieftains, w hose 
sm all realm s em braced the  headw aters of the  upper E uphrates, Tigris and 
Araxes, The m ost pow erful of these kingdom s, U rartu , occupied the banks
A narration of the period and examination of the sources can be found in A.H. Sayce (1925) 
and M. Chahin (1987) 31-200.
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of the A rsanias and the no rthern  and  eastern  shores of Lake Van. U nder 
U rartian  hegem ony, the N airi chieftains form ed a fragile confederation to 
avoid  enslavem ent o r colonisation by  the  A s s y r ia n s .H o w e v e r ,  som e of 
these no rth ern  k ingdom s d id  becom e clients of the A ssyrians, and  also 
enjoyed a stable existence u n d er the  hegem ony of the  sou thern  em pire. 
Two im p o rtan t aspects in the  rela tionsh ip  betw een the  N airi chieftains 
an d  th e ir  n o r th e rn  o r so u th e rn  p a tro n s  sh o u ld  be  noted.^^ First, 
diplom acy and  adm inistration w ere alw ays conducted by  local kings o r by 
ind iv iduals on behalf of the kings; the  relationship  w as n o t one betw een 
secu lar sta tes, b u t be tw een  in d iv id u a ls . Second, th e  d ep lo y m en t of 
garrsions and  the developm ent of civic bu ild ing  projects, such as roads 
and  irrigation  channels increased the  security and econom ic p rosperity  of 
the  region . W hen the  first docum en ted  k ing  of U ra rtu , A ram e, w as 
overw helm ed by  the A ssyrians (circa 856 B.C.), a new  dynasty  arose to lead 
the  U rartian  confederation from  their base a t T ushpa (m odern  Van), In 
reaction  to  or im itation  of reinv igorated  A ssyrian im perialism , the  new  
U rartian  k ingdom  focused resources and  attention on  m ilitary  expansion 
in  all d irections b u t south . By the  end  of the  n in th  cen tu ry  U rartian  
conquests and  consolidation stre tched  w est to east from  near M elitene 
eastw ard  tow ard  Tabriz, and  north  to sou th  from  A ltintepe to Izolu (south 
of Lake U rm ia). C on tinued  expansion  in the  first ha lf of th e  e igh th  
century  w as contained by  the  kingdom  of Q ulha (Colchis) in  the  north , bu t 
the up p er and  m iddle Araxes fell to U rartian  cultivation. In the south, the 
U ra r tia n  c o n fe d e ra tio n  v ir tu a lly  c o n tro lle d  th e  w e s te rn  T au ru s  
m o u n ta in s and  crossed  the  E uph rates in to  n o rth e rn  Syria, d ep riv in g  
Assyria of raw  m aterials and  d isrup ting  east-w est commerce.
U ra rtian  contro l of these  caravans and  m etal tra d e  even tua lly  
provoked  revolu tion  in  Assyria. The m ilitary  u su rp er T iglath-pileser III 
assessed  the  situa tion  and  m oved  to retake the  strategically  im portan t 
E uphrates crossing a t K archem ish, regain ing  the trade  routes. From  the 
m id-eighth  century, the A ssyrians aim ed a t rem oving U rartu  entirely  as a 
n ear easte rn  rival, d ra in in g  th e  resources of the  tw o  sta tes th ro u g h
C. Toumanoff (1963) 52.
See J.N. Postgate (1992) 254-6 for a discussion of relationships between client kings and their 
overlords during this period.
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increasingly am bitious m ilitary  projects.^® The U rartian  king Rusas I (725- 
13 B.C.) a ttem p ted  to  consolidate  and  fu rth er enhance his position  by  
cam paigning against the Caucasian tribes. This w as his undoing , for apart 
from  com m itting  his forces on  severa l fron ts , he  so w eak en ed  his 
n o rth ern  buffer, th a t w hen  the  nom adic C im m erians b u rs t th ro u g h  the  
D arial pass, U rartian  forces w ere annih ilated  and their no rthern  holdings 
stripped . The resolve of the U rartian  confederation began to  d isin tegrate  
u n d er the  w eight of m ilitary failure, and  by  the beginning of the seventh 
cen tu ry  it w as largely im p o te n t .E x h a u s te d  by w ars and  the  p reda to ry  
raids of the C im m erians, bo th  A ssyria and  U rartu  w ere em asculated in the 
sixth century  w hen  the B abylonian-M edian em pire, in alliance w ith  the  
Scyths, ano ther nom adic tribe w hich h ad  p o u red  th rough  the  w eakened 
C aucasian states, crushed them .
D uring  the U rartian  period , centripetal and  centrifugal forces w ere 
in itiated  largely by  external stimuli: the N airi confederated in  response to 
A ssyrian  aggression, and  de terio ra ted  w hen, u n d er U rartian  leadersh ip , 
they  failed  to defend their territories, especially the  C aucasus passes. A 
palace revolt flared up , supported  by the  Hyassa; m any principalities, only 
unified  to U rartu  linguistically or culturally  in part, defected, tak ing  w ith  
them  m ilitary  and  m aterial resources. W ith the ebb of U rartian  pow er, 
the region soon passed  into M edian and  Persian hands.
§ 5. The A chaem enid Period:
N ear the close of the seven th  century , an Indo-E uropean  people, 
soon  to  be  id en tif ie d  as th e  A rm en ian s, m ad e  th e ir  f irs t  k n o w n  
appearance in  eastern  A natolia, w here  they  appear to have am algam ated  
w ith  the  H yassa. Taking advantage of the  decline of U rartu , they forced 
p a rts  of th e  ancien t p o pu lace  o u t of the  riv er valleys an d  in to  the  
h igh lands or eastw ard  along the Araxes. In  the w ake of the  Scythian and  
C im m erian d isrup tions the A rm enians w ere able to im pose their lordship  
over the indigenous and  recently m igrated  peoples. Yet they  reta ined  the
IS A.K. Grayson (1991) 74-77.
M. Chahin (1987) 82-91 and 93-7 perceives an moderate Urartian recovery, but as A.H. Sayce 
(1925) 180-3 and A.K. Grayson (1991) 93-97 indicate, the confederacy was permanently 
damaged and Urartu became increasingly less influential in the region.
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w alled  cities, irrig a tio n  system s, o rchards and  elem ents of U ra rtian  
statecraft, architectural know ledge, and  literature, in short the  stabilising 
in fluences of the  earlie r c iv ilisation , even  if in  a w eakened  form .^s 
H ow ever, the old confederation h ad  either deteriorated  to such an extent, 
or refu sed  to  su p p o rt the  A rm en ian  ascendancy, th a t even  w ith  the  
advantages of U rartian  culture, they  w ere no t able to  achieve the sam e 
level of independence, and  fell subject to first the  M edian and  la ter the 
A chaem enid em pire. U nder M edian suzerainty , the U rartian  h ighlanders 
conducted perennial raids against the low land A rm enians, and  it w as only 
at the behest of Cyrus the G reat that a fragile peace w as im posed upon  the 
reg ion  in  th e  m id-six th  cen tu ry  B,C..^^ Persia  d rew  tribu te  from  the 
A rm enians and  safeguarded the  interests of the  U rartians, or A larodians, 
as they  w ere now  called. In re tu rn  the  highlanders agreed to cease their 
banditry , share up land  pastures, and  ren t ou t low land fields. But a tension 
betw een the low  and  h igh land  cultures continued to exist, w itnessed  by  
the  m ountain  castles w hich deterred  fu rther A rm enian e x p a n s i o n . ^ ^
A ny effort by  a state to im prove lines of com m unication w ill resu lt 
in  the  p rom otion  of centripetal forces w hich  b ring  together the  diverse 
elem ents of a society. The ability of the A chaem enids to m aintain  a Royal 
road , the  m ain  branches of w hich  ran  from  Sardis and  Colchis to Susa, 
encouraged the fu rther bonding  of A natolian and  Caucasian society. N ot 
only w as a fortified corridor necessary to sp u r in ternational comm erce and  
facilitate m ilitary deploym ent in  the  p u rsu it of im perial security, b u t also 
the  g u aran tee  of safe passage  encouraged  local econom ies in  adjacent 
regions w here  benefits w ou ld  follow  w ith  the developm ent of capillary  
rou tes rad ia ting  from  the m ain  h ighw ay,23 Likewise, lesser dynasts and  
landow ners, w ho stood to profit by  the expansion of trade  found it in  their 
interests to  protect routes and  discourage d isruptive elem ents w ith in  their 
dom ain .
20 C. Bumey and D.M. Lang (1971) 173-80.
2t Xen., Cyrop.f 32; H.A. Manandian (1965) 26-7.
22 Herod., 3.94; C, Bumey (1957) 37-54.
23 Herod., 5.52; H.A. Manandian (1965) 23-25.
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D a riu s ' reo rg a n isa tio n  o f h is n o r th e rn  p ro v in ces b e tray s  the  
d ifficu lties he  encoun tered  in  con tro lling  the  r e g i o n . 2 4  Four separa te  
sa trap ies w ere devised  to adm in ister eastern  A natolia and  the Caucasus. 
The th ir tee n th  sa trap y  co n ta ined  the  A rm enians, the  P ac tyans, an d  
"people beyond  as far as the Euxine Sea". The A larodians and  the proto- 
G eorgian M atieni and  Saspeiri com prised  the eighteenth . Five separate  
tribes w hich dw elt along the coastal strip  betw een the Black Sea and  Pontic 
A lps w ere grouped  as the nineteenth. Equally num erous w ere those tribes 
along the  C aspian  shores and  in  A zerbaijan g rouped  together u n d er the  
eleventh. O ver each province was im posed  a Persian or native satrap, b u t 
local governm ent, by  and  large, w as assigned to village chieftains. These 
chieftains, w ere g rea t land  ow ners an d  w ere  personally  responsib le  for 
levying troops and  paying  tribu te  to  the Persian king. The satrapal office 
w as hered ita ry , b u t o therw ise  the  responsib ilites of each leader varied  
w idely  and  allow ed a large am oun t of local initiative.25 H erodo tus and  
X enophon bo th  ind icate  th a t the  C iscaucasia w as e thnically  m ixed  and  
only tenuously  unified. The th irteen th  sa trapy  represen ted  the  A rm enian 
sphere  of control, located in  the headw ater valleys of the  E uphrates and  
Tigris; w hereas the  e ighteenth , in  the  m ountains east an d  sou th  of Van, 
in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  o ld e r  U ra r tia n  o r A la ro d ian  d o m ain  rem a in e d  
unassim ilated . N um erous and  recalcitran t tribes below  the C aspians fell 
in to  th e  n in e teen th  an d  eleventh . In  D ariu s ' tim e they  p a id  tr ib u te  
collectively, b u t if the  ancien t com m entators on  lingu istic  h is to ry  are 
be lieved , they  w ere  h igh ly  d iv ers ified .26 The C olchians, beyond  any 
satrapal pale, offered only gifts to the  G reat King. By X enophon 's day  the 
un ity  of m any sectors w as even w eaker. In the Zagros ranges betw een the 
A rm enians and  the A larodians, the K ardouchi carved o u t an  independen t 
kingdom , later to becom e the G ordyene of the Rom an period . Efforts by  
th e  P ersians to  con tro l th is  m o u n ta in o u s  locality  cost th e  k ing  one 
h u n d red  an d  tw enty  thousand  m en. H ow ever, the satrap  w ho  controlled 
the  encom passing plains w as able to p ressure  the K ardouchi in to  a m ore
24 On Darius' reorganisation of the Achaemenid empire see Herod., 3.89-94; C. Bumey and D.M. 
Lang (1971) 180-5; and J.M. Cook (1983) 77-90.
25 J.M. Cook (1983) 171-82.
26 J.M. Cook (1982) 257.
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peaceful co-existence.27 But the years of w arfare betw een h igh lander and  
low lander h ad  left the  valley a round  the Centrites river an  un inhabitable 
zone. N o rth  of the  river, the  C haldeans, ano ther b ranch  of the  o ld  
U rartian  populace are also sta ted  as being  free and  belligerent. A rm enia 
itself, v iew ed as one geographical district by  Xenophon, is still d iv ided  into 
tw o zones of control: the old  A larodian under Orontes, a son-in-law  to the 
P ersian  king, and  the m atu ring  w estern  A rm enia u n d e r the  k ing 's ally 
T irib azu s.2 8  T h ro u g h o u t the  P on tic  A lps appear peo p le  effectively  
independen t of Persian  control: the  Phasians, Chalybes, and  Taochi. Yet 
the latter tw o, though  n o t subjects of A rm enia, are found  as m ercenaries 
a m o n g s t T irib azu s ' troops.29 A long the  coast itself som e unbow ed  
M acrones, Scytheni, D rilae m ing led  w ith  expand ing  G reek colonies to 
fo rm  fu rth e r  sep ara te  po lities , w h ile  o thers fiercely  cherished  the ir 
freedom .
The m ain  centripetal factor of the  A chaem enid period , the  Royal 
road  system , im proved  the m aterial w ell-being of Ciscaucasia, Increased 
contact w ith  pow ers to the south  transm itted  ideas of centralisation. To a 
lim ited  extent, the  A chaem enid  sa trap ies d irectly  in troduced  m easures 
such as taxation and troop  levying w hich encouraged a h igher degree of 
social organisation. H ow ever, evidence indicates tha t C iscaucasia was still 
too  e thn ica lly  m ixed to  form  a single cohesive society. The tension  
betw een  h igh land  and  low land  often resu lted  in arm ed conflict, and  the 
apparen t absence of flourishing civic centres p revented  long term  stability 
or political un ity  from  appearing.
§ 6. The Hellenistic Period:
In the final years of A chaem enid pow er both  the Royal road  system  
and  the in ternal security of the em pire began to deteriorate. A lthough the 
M acedonians, and  in  particu lar the  Seleucids, w ere unable  to re-establish 
fully a garrisoned corridor along the entire old road  system ,50 the need to
27 Xen., Cyrop., 3.5.
25 Xen., Anah., 4.4; see also Herod., 3.89-90; and J.M. Cook (1983) 197.
29 Xen., Anah., 4.4.
50 W.W. Tarn and G.T. Griffith (1952) 130, 243-44; Rostovtzeff (1928) 174-5; Musti (1984) 
184.
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The trad e  rou tes w hich  led  u p  th ro u g h  M edia A tropatene  in to  
A lbania, Iberia, and  Colchis w ere a lready w ell-established by  the  tim e of 
th e  M acedon ian  co nquest. F u rth e rm o re , C olchis h a d  lo n g  been  
furn ish ing  the w estern  Greeks w ith  fish, m etals, raw  m aterials, precious 
m erchandise , and  s l a v e s . 5 9  Phasis and  D ioscurias, the m ain  em poria on 
the east coast of the  Black Sea, h ad  already  developed civic institu tions 
along Greek lines. C onsequently their economics and  socio-political order 
h a d  reached  a m ore soph istica ted  stage th an  Iberia  or A lbania. The 
d ev e lo p m en t of n o rth e rn  M esopo tam ian  trad e  ro u tes  increased , the  
im portance  of Colchis lessened  in  certain  com m odities such  as luxu ry  
goods and  grain. H ow ever, m ilitary activities dem anded a constant supply  
of m etals ensuring  continued foreign investm ent into the  region.^o Hence 
the  Black Sea had  becom e less of barrie r than  a p o in t of contact w ith  
external pow ers,
C iscaucasian  po litica l p o w ers d e riv ed  su b s ta n tia lly  in creased  
political m obility w ith  the destruction of the A chaem enid em pire, and  the 
reluctance of the Seleucid ru lers to interfere in lands no rth  of the Taurus 
range.^ t W ith the enervation of the satrapal system  in  the  north , form er 
governors w ere able to declare them selves kings and undertake  territorial 
expansion , w hich  w as to a degree p roh ib ited  u n d er the  A chaem enids. 
Such w as the case w ith  the  hered itary  A rm enian Satrap, O rontes II, w ho, 
in spite of supporting  D arius a t G augam ela, retu rned  to G reater A rm enia 
w here  he asserted  his au thority  as self-styled king of A r m e n i a . ^ z  O rontes 
w as succeeded  by  his son  M ith ranes, w ho  h ad  loyally  se rved  the  
M acedonian w ar effort and  received an appo in tm ent to  govern  A rm enia 
for A l e x a n d e r . 4 5  H ow ever, this office resu lted  in nom inal fealty, and  the 
O ron tids ru led  A rm enia suffering brief Seleucid in terference un til their 
deposition  not by  Greeks, b u t by  their in ternal rivals the A rtaxiads, in the 
early second century.
59 M. Rostovtzeff (1941) 586.
40 M. Rostovtzeff (1941) 586-87.
41 D. Musa (1984) 188.
42 Arrian, Anab., 3.8.5; C. Toumanoff (1963) 289; W.W. Tarn (1953) 464. 
45 Arrian, Anab., 1.17.3; 3.16.5.
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Increased political freedom  effected under the O rontids d id  m uch to 
p rom o te  the  territo ria l unification  of C i s c a u c a s i a . 4 4  The o ld  satrapy  of 
w e s te rn  A rm en ia  h a d  e x p an d e d  its  p o w er a t th e  expense  of the  
A larodians. Their overlo rdsh ip  w as justified  partia lly  by  p u re  m ilitary  
aggression, b u t m ore im portan tly  by  the  com bined au tho rity  of the claim  
to A chaem enid descent and  a renew ed sanction from  A lexander. Further, 
O rontid  A rm enia soon gained control of the budd ing  trade  cities. For tw o 
decades after the death  of A lexander, the successor states v irtually  ignored 
sovereign  A rm enia , u n til in  301 nom inal suzera in ty  w as im posed  by 
Seleucus 1.45 H ow ever this was no t achieved w ithout the assistance of the 
new ly  form ed k ingdom  of Iberia, regional opponen t of A r m e n i a . 4 6  Like 
A rm enia , Iberia , w here  th e  va rious tribes of the  C yrus valley  fused  
together under the  hegem ony of the  Pharnabasids, enjoyed a brief period  
of unchecked expansion.
F urtherm ore , em u la tion  of H ellen istic  cities, a n d  b y  association  
their cu ltu re, institu tions, and  technical skill, also stim u la ted  unification 
an d  stab ility  of the  region. In  som e respects ju s t as th e  flou rish ing  
m unicipalities th ro u g h o u t the Seleucid period  w ere as m uch  a re tu rn  to 
the form er urban  m ight of the ancient N ear East as they w ere  a novelty, so 
too the g row th  of cities in A rm enia w as a restoration  of U rartian  g l o r y . 47 
N um erous tow ns appear betw een  the  late th ird  and  early  first century , 
m any of w hich w ere organised and  adorned  in  Hellenistic style. For their 
b e au ty , som e elic ited  the  com m ents of classical au th o rs . W hat is 
im p o rtan t here  is th a t such cities bo th  un ified  the  reg ion  a n d  acted as 
po in ts of d issem ination  for H ellenistic values. The cities, especially the 
Royal capitals, b rought the aristocracy aw ay from  their d isparate  tow ns and  
en tw ined  them  in  the increasingly centralised bureaucracy  of developing 
C iscaucasian polities. O bviously the m ajor stim uli for A rm enia rad ia ted  
from  the  south-w est. H ow ever, the  pro to-G eorgian  com m unities w ere 
influenced largely by  the Greek presence along the Black Sea, in particu lar 
by  M ilesian colonisers. The ind igenous Colchian popu la tion  seem ed to 
h av e  ra p id ly  am alg am ated  w ith  G reek  se ttle rs , an d  to w n s qu ick ly
44 C. Toumanoff (1963) 71-74; 277-351.
45 D. Musti (1984) 183-4.
46 C. Toumanoff (1963) 80-81.
47 A.L. Oppenheim (1964) 74-142; C. Bumey and D. Lang (1971) 188.
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appeared  on the coast and  in  the  interior.48 Yet the  w estern  m ountains 
an d  m alaria l te rra in  lim ited  g row th  and  little  is know n  of th e ir early  
po litica l s tru c tu re .49 In  general, Iberians m oved dow n from  the craggy 
se ttlem ents to fo und  w ell fo rtified  centers along  river b a n k s . I f  the  
legend  p reserved  in  the  G eorgian annals contains elem ents of tru th  in 
a ttribu ting  the social, political, and  m ilitary reorganisation of early Georgia 
to  A lexander th e  G reat, then  p e rh ap s  Iberia  u n d e rw en t a process of 
centralisation sim ilar to Armenia.51
G row ing  cen tra lisation  a n d  te rrito ria l conso lida tion  resu lted  in 
in c reased  lin g u is tic  an d  cu ltu ra l h o m o g en e ity  b o th  in  Ib eria  an d  
A r m e n i a . 52 A lthough  these  tw o  larger areas rem ained  lingu istica lly  
d iv id e d  th ro u g h  th e ir h is to ry , each ach ieved  lin g u is tic  dom inance  
am ongst the  m ajority  of their ow n  popu lace  by  the  beg inn ing  of the  
second  cen tu ry  B.C.. The penetra tion  of the G reek language am ongst 
C aucasian aristocrats d rew  the  pow ers fu rther in to  the  th o u g h t w orld  of 
the  w est. In add ition  to the  presence of H ellenistic litterati, it w as no t 
uncom m on to find the perform ance of Greek plays or even original w orks 
in the royal courts.55
O n the other hand , facets of H ellenism  also destabilised the  region; 
and  these elem ents of destabilisation  p roved  greater than  the  centripetal 
forces. A lthough it has been claim ed th a t A lexander set ou t to establish a 
un ited  em pire of Greeks and  Iran ian  bro thers, the end  resu lt, as seen in 
succeeding H ellenistic k ingdom s, betrays naked im perialism  fully im bued 
w ith  an ti-eastern  p r e ju d ic e s .^4 Betw een 334-24  B.C., A lexander and  his 
successors b rough t the d isparate  com m unities of the A chaem enid em pire 
u n d e r at least nom inal G reek suzerain ty . A lthough  A lexander m ixed 
Iran ian  custom s w ith  his ow n, and  Iran ian  peoples am ongst his noble 
fam ilies, arm y, and  bureaucracy, it w as only philosophers w ho vocalised a 
coherent concept of w orld  citizenship, a concept w hich w as never pu rsued
45 o.D , Lortkipanidze (1966) 49-79.
49 c. Toumanoff (1963) 84-5,
50 C. Bumey and D. Lang (1971) 194.
51 C.Burney and D. Lang (1971) 195-6.
52 C. Toumanoff (1963) 74.
53 Plutarch, Crassus 33; S. Der Nersessian (1969) 80-81.
54 E. Badian (1958) 425-41 and A.B. Bosworth (1980).
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by his successors. This is no t to  suggest that a cosm opolitan culture  does 
n o t em erge am ong sectors of the  popu lation . But it is n o t a p lan n ed  
culture. In  fact, m ore often than  not, several factors p reven ted  b lend ing  
betw een  East and  W est. The M acedonian  com m unities th ro u g h o u t the  
east w ere  there  to carve o u t a p ro fitab le  existence for them selves as 
conquerors, n o t liberators or m issionaries. G reek artistic influences, for 
exam ple, are  h a rd  to  find  ou tside  the  archaeological rem ains of cities. 
These M acedonian establishm ents w ere for the m ost p a rt bu ilt as a bastion 
of H e llen ism  a g a in s t th e  en g u lfin g  flood  of a lien  cu ltu res . T he 
M acedonians th ro u g h o u t the  period  im posed  a cu ltu ral iso lation  upo n  
them selves, largely to  filter o u t undesirab le  or contrary influences. Those 
w ho d id  pass th rough  this screen predom inantly  belonged to tw o groups: 
the  in d ep en d en t ru lers and  the conquered  local m agnates. The form er 
"w ent G reek" for the sake of advancem ent in a w orld  w here the  outlets of 
p o w er fell increasing ly  in to  the  h an d s of the  M acedonians an d  th e ir 
descendan ts. The la tte r chose to co llaborate  w ith  th e ir overlo rds by 
u tilising  their talen ts as in te rp re ters  so essential to the  adm in istra tion  of 
the  G reek em pires. W hen and  w here there  w as an infusion  of cu lture it 
h appened  for pragm atic reasons. Greek, for exam ple, w as adop ted  as the 
com m on to n g u e  to  fac ilita te  d ip lo m acy  and  econom ic in te rch an g e . 
D em ographically  and  ethnically  am ong the low er s tra ta  of society there  
w as m ore interchange, b u t collectively the low er classes w ere shunned  for 
social reasons by those elites w ho w ould  later m ost influence the Rom an 
v ision  of the  East. A t the  centre of these  H ellenistic  islands w as the  
educational system . Largely consistent across the  conquered  territories, 
a n d  like m ost co lonial in s titu tio n s , a crysta lised  m icrocosm  of the  
m o therland , the  G ym nasium  w as the  p ro p er g ro u n d  to be  n u rsed  on 
H ellenic i d e a l s . 5 5  This m echanism  of education existed and  functioned in 
face of a hostile w orld , perhaps literally in spite of it. It aim ed to produce 
cu ltu red  ind iv iduals bold ly  distinct from  the  su rro und ing  barbarians. A 
g roup  striving for pow er inevitably attem pts to com pel those w ho w ish to 
partic ipate  in  the  com m and of a society into adopting  habits, institu tions, 
and  m odes of com m unication sim ilar to their ow n if no t h o m o g e n o u s . 5 6
550n Greek and subsequent Roman educational practices see H.I. Marrou (1977); on Greek 
education as a citadel against eastern barbarism see P. Green (1990) 319ff.
56 K.W. Deutsch (1964b) 117.
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The very  process of unification m ay endanger a region if the  u p p er strata 
of society  a lienate  them selves from  the  d issen ting  or po litically  non- 
p a rtic ip a to ry  classes. In p e rp e tu a tin g  a largely  exclusive cu ltu re , the  
Seleucids effectively m arg inalised  C iscaucasia from  g rea ter un ion  w ith  
Syria  o r M esopo tam ia . S im ilarly , b y  ad o p tin g  G reek  h ab its , the  
Ciscaucasian aristocracy in troduced a new  tool w hich could be used  against 
them  to divide just as effectively as to  unite  society.
§ 7. The Rom an Period:
Rom an conquest and  consolidation of the East ow ed  m uch  to  the 
ideas and  efforts of P o m p e y . 5 7  The Ciscausian kingdom s w ere at the centre 
of h is o rganisation  of the East, and  successive Rom an leaders continued 
his policy of developing  a p ro tec to ra te  over these clients in  the  face of 
com petition  from  bo th  the  P arth ian  an d  Sasanian P e r s i a n s , 5 5  Lines of 
co m m u n ica tio n  a n d  cen tres o f co n tro l w ere  b o th  d e v e lo p ed  a n d  
im p ro v ed  in  the  long-se ttled  Seleucid ho ld ings, b u t also expanded  in 
u n d erd ev e lo p ed  areas of C iscaucasia, Just as the  Seleucid ru lers h ad  
adop ted  the  A chaem enid road  system  to m eet their needs, so too d id  the 
Rom ans; b u t pre-R om an rou tes w ere only a foundation  for an endu ring  
and  elaborate  system  w hich o u tstripped  its predecessors in  its ability  to 
ch an n e l reso u rces  th ro u g h o u t th e  r e g i o n . 5 9  U nder the  F lavians a 
com prehensive period  of m ilitary  construction w as undertaken , w hich is 
w o rth y  of special attention.60 W ith the annexation of Com m agene, the 
r iv e r crossing  a t S am osata  cam e u n d e r  d irec t R om an  ju risd ic tio n . 
L egionary  fortresses w ere  estab lished  along the tw o n a tu ra l east-w est 
routes in to  A rm enia a t M elitene and  Satala. A single fortified road  system  
fo llow ed  from  T rapezus to  n o rth e rn  Syria. This im p ro v e d  line  of 
com m unication bo th  p u t an end  to serious logistical problem s posed  to
57 A nan'ation of the period and examination of the sources can be found in M.L. Chaumont 
(1976) 71-94.
55 On Pompey's strategy see A.N. Sherwin-White (1984) 195-203. E. Dabrowa (1989) and E.W. 
Gray (1973) 33ff., both stress Pompey's importance in shaping Rome's policy in Ciscaucasia 
throughout the high and late empire.
59 d .H. French (1980) 698-729, (1988) 71-101; A. Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 24-47, for 
Pontic roads.
50 For the monumental remains see T.B. Mitford (1980) 1183-94.
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operations in  the area and  allow ed Rom an troops, w hich w ould  facilitate 
easy diplom atic m ilitary pressure  to  be  applied  to Ciscaucasian kingdom s, 
to  be dep loyed  in  - positions along the  E uphrates. C on tem porary  w ith  
construction  aside the  E uphrates , are a num ber of fo rtified  harbou rs 
be tw een  T rapezus and D ioscurias, se t a t intervals of one d ay 's  cruise.51 
W ith  C appadocia  and  the  Black Sea rou tes u n d er d irec t superv ision , 
law lessness w as curbed  and  local econom ies improved.52 Furtherm ore, 
pub lic  construction  w as u n d e rtak en  in  the  heart of th e  C iscaucasian 
kingdoms.53 A fort at G orneae near the A rm enian capital of A rtaxata w as 
bu ilt in A.D. 51, w ith  a re-installation in  A.D. 76, and  another garrison was 
in s ta lled  a t H arm ozica . G orneae  co m m an d ed  th e  A raxes va lley , 
H arm ozica guarded  the D arial pass and  the upper Cyrus. O ther bu ild ing  
projects are also indicated  by  bo th  archaeological and  tex tual evidence.54 
Som e scholars have v iew ed north -eastern  construction as a response to 
the A rm enian w ars under N ero, or a desire for a secure frontier.55 Rom an 
efforts w ere expansionist, bu t it is still debatable w hether they w ere sim ply 
opportunistic  or p a rt of a "grand  strategy".55 The scale of Flavian and  later 
developm ent, both  civic and  m ilitary, is too w idespread to suppo rt a thesis 
w hich  offers p e rso n al g reed  as th e  p rim ary  m over b e h in d  im p eria l 
po licies.57 In the East, city foundation  appears to be lim ited, and  is taken 
by  som e as ind ica tive  of the  m eanness of im peria l ad m in is tra to rs , 
adm in istrators w ho stuck to m ilitary  investm ent and  sh irked  the b u rd en  
of u rb an  developm ent.55 H ow ever, th is in terpretation  view s the East in 
iso la tion  from  the res t of the  em pire. W hereas city deve lopm en t in 
w estern  provinces w as m assive, the East required  red istribution  of w ealth  
a n d  p e r ip h e r a l  d ev e lo p m en t.5 9  The g rea t cities of th e  eas te rn
51 T.B. Mitford (1980) 1192-4; B. Isaac 46-50.
52 F. Cumont (1923) 109-227; Bosworth (1976) 73; D.C. Braund (1989) 38-9.
53 T.B. Mitford (1980) 1192-4; B. Isaac (1990)46-50.
54 T.B. Mitford (1980) ibid.
55 See B. Isaac (1990) 50, nn. 205 and 206.
56 B. Isaac (1990) 51; 372-3. I shall return to this question in chapter five.
57 G.W. Bowersock (1973) 133-40.
65 B. Isaac (1990) 333-71. However, it is understandable, given the urban development of 
the East, that the military would establish a presence in the cities, see N. Hodgson (1989) 
178-81.
59 p. Garnsey and R. Sailer (1987) 32; M. Fulford (1992) 302.
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M editerranean  w ere a lready  h igh ly  developed; public  expend itu re  w as 
m et by  the Liturgical system /o  This institu tion  perm itted  city m agistrates 
to  com pete  via  the  deve lopm en t of th e ir ow n com m unity . For the 
im peria l governm ent to  in terfere w ou ld  have ru ined  pre-existing pow er 
structures, raised  taxes, and  w eakened local economies.^i Far from  being 
m iserly , the  im perial governm ent w as sim ply  n u rtu rin g  civic structures 
in  such  a w ay  as to  m axim ize  overa ll econom ic benefits  w ith o u t 
d isrup ting  the essentially localised and  h ighly  differentiated econom ies of 
the  empire.72
In add ition  to caring for m onum ental structures along the frontier, 
it w as equally , if n o t m ore im portan t, for Rom an leaders to cu ltivate 
pow er struc tu res beyond  the Euphrates.73 A ssuring the  success of pro- 
R om an ru le rs  in A rm enia  w as essen tia l to R om e's im peria l policy in  
Ciscaucasia. Such suppo rt results in  an  inevitable bond ing  betw een elites 
at the center and  their peripheral counter parts. Relations of this sort w ere 
b ond  to take on  a personal tone, and  the  success or failu re  of the  one 
p a rtn e r effected the  status of the other. O bviously, the rela tionship  w as 
m ean t to  benefit bo th  parties , ye t create a dependency  on  the  Rom an 
patron . This can be seen th roughou t R om e's involvem ent in  Ciscaucasia. 
For instance, after Pom pey obtained  the captivity of the young  Tigran and 
the  d isso lu tion  of his k ingdom  in Sophene, the elder T igran w as placed 
back on the th rone of G reater Arm enia. So long as he  rem ained steadfast 
in  his loyalty  to Rom e, h is d isru p tiv e  son w o u ld  be absen t from  the  
r e g i o n . 7 4  H ow ever, the c lien t/p a tro n  relationship w as no t one sided. For 
exam ple, in  rem ain ing  beho lden  to C rassus or A nthony , the  k ings of 
A rm en ia  p in n ed  the ir hopes to  R om an successes w h ich  w o u ld  allow  
them  to exert the ir ow n political influence over ne ighbouring  rivals in 
A lbania or M e d i a . 7 5  U nfortunately, bo th  cases ended  in  failure. W ithout 
rew ards , the  client w o u ld  seek a new  pa tron , and  in  these  tw o  cases 
A rm enia shifted allegiance to Parthia. H ow ever, such set-backs could not
70 A.H.M. Jones (1940).
71 P. Garnsey and R. Sailer (1987) 32-4; G.Woolf (1992) 283-93.
72 p. Garnsey (1974).
73 D.C. Braund (1984) 75-85.
74 Appian, M ith., 105.
75 Plutarch, Pompey 36.
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d is ru p t the  con tinued  cu ltivation  of p e rip h era l elites. So long  as pro- 
R om an e lem ents ex isted  in  C iscaucasia, there  w o u ld  be a sharing  of 
in terests betw een som e eastern and  w estern  nobles. The practice of taking 
hostages w as aim ed a t perpe tuating  a supp ly  of pro-Rom an supporters to 
export into foreign kingdom s, or sim ply to  be used  as a threat.76
The policies of leg ionary recru itm en t and  veteran  settlem ent w ere 
fu rther contributions to  regional stability. Legionary recru itm ent w as an 
essential feature in Rom an territorial consolidation, hav ing  as its p rim ary  
aim  the rem oval of potentially  dangerous elem ents from  society and their 
tra n s fo rm a tio n  in to  a lo yal a rm  of im p e ria l in s t i tu tio n s .77 The 
con tribu tion  of such m anpow er n o t only lessened local b rigandage, b u t 
strengthened  the ties betw een the  various peripheral areas of the  empire.75 
By the  m idd le  of the first century  soldiers w ere already  being  recru ited  
a long  th e  E uph ra tes fro n tie r, and  th ro u g h o u t the  second  an d  th ird  
centuries the  presence of such eastern  recruits is docum ented as far w est as 
V indobono (Vienna) and  as far south  as Nicopolis.79 Twenty-five years of 
serv ice actively  su p p o rtin g  th e  u rb an  n e tw o rk  of Rom e m u st have  
im b u ed  th e  ran k  and  file w ith  a sense of affiliation, if n o t to  civic 
in s titu tio n s , th a n  a t lea s t to  th e  em p ero r an d  h is army.50 Those 
leg ionaries w ho re tu rn e d  to  th e ir hom es cou ld  look  fo rw ard  to an 
increased  social and  econom ic position  in  the ir c o m m u n i t i e s .E v e n  
w hen  veterans w ere n o t colonised en bloc, w hich does no t seem  to be the 
case along the E uphrates, the in tegration  of ind iv iduals from  the frontier 
in to  im p e ria l s tru c tu re s  c rea ted  a c lien t-p a tro n  re la tio n sh ip  w hich  
co n tin u ed  to  be  cu ltiv a ted  w hen  th e  re tired  so ld ie r re tu rn e d  to a 
p rom inen t place in his com m unity. The eastern  cam paigns of Verus and  
Severus re su lted  in  n u m ero u s  colonies beyond  the  E uph ra tes . The 
v e te ran  settlem ents of M esopotam ia developed  in the  cities along the 
central rou te  from  A ntioch to  Nisibis.52 Even if the theory  th a t colonies
75 A.D. Lee (1991b) 366-8; D.C. Braund (1984) 12-16.
77 B. Isaac (1990) 59.
75 M.P. Speidel (1980) 730-744.
79 ibid.
50 B.D. Shaw (1983) 14-8.
51 R. MacMullen (1963) chp. 5; J.B. Cambell (1984) 181ff.
52 A.H.M. Jones (1971) 221-22.
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such as these w ere no t p a rt of a conscious defensive p o l i c y , ® ^  veterans and  
their fam ilies supported  local governm ent, cultivated the land , pa id  taxes, 
and  often prov ided  sons for m ilitary s e r v i c e . 5 4
R om an activ ities in  the  East d id  n o t alw ays re su lt in  reg ional 
stab ility , even if they  d id  p rom ote  certain  centripetal factors as in  the  
resu lting  unification  of A rm enia u n d e r the  A rsacids. The R om an sta te  
h ad  clearly established strong d iplom atic contacts in  the East, as well as 
g a in ed  leg itim acy  in  th e  m inds of H ellen istic  m onarchs.55 Initially , 
Rom e's friendship  d id  m uch to stabilise the pow er struggles in the  east, as 
w hen  P tolem aios IV en tru s ted  his son  to L epidus for p ro tec tion  and  
education, so countering Seleucid advances against Egypt. T hrough such 
clients and  friends Rome w as d raw n  into the East, learned  eastern  w ays, 
a n d  in  tu rn  d o m in a ted  the  H ellen is tic  world.55 But the  long-term  
am bition of Rome was no t to provide stability or create a balance of pow er 
for the  H ellenistic or eastern  m onarchies, b u t to sap their streng th  one by 
one and  conquer them.57 W ith rare  exception this aim  can be illustra ted  
in Rom an actions th roughou t C iscaucasia from  the period  of their arrival 
un til the rise of the Sasanians. It m ust be kep t in m ind  th a t instability  in 
Ciscaucasia m ay have resu lted  in  security for the Rom an provinces, and  it 
certain ly  increased  the  o p p o rtu n ity  for fu rther conquest. Yet in  m any 
respects the pu rsu it of such a policy ensured  that continued and  increased 
com m itm ent w ould  be necessary along the A rm enian frontier.
Rom e exercised a policy of dep loym ent aggressive in  in tent, even 
du ring  periods of apparen t peace. The th ird  w ar against M ithridates is a 
case in  point.55 D enied w estw ard  expansion, Pontus tu rn ed  tow ard  the  
C rim ea, w hile  Rom e bu ilt u p  a strong  m ilitary  p resence in  Cilicia and  
C a p p ad o c ia , g a in in g  co n tro l of th e  passes w h ich  led  in  P o n tu s . 
M ith rida tes’ suspicions w ere  fu rther fueled  w hen  the  senate  refused  to 
ratify  Sulla 's agreem ent no t to in tervene  in  Pontic affairs. The resu lt of 
th is escalation w as five years of w arfare  w hich, in  the end, sp illed  into
53 As is held by numerous scholars, but questioned in B. Isaac (1990) 310-32.
54 p. Garnsey and R. Sailer (1987) 77 and 124; B. Isaac 332.
55 A.N. Sherwin-White (1984) 58-79.
56 D.C. Braund (1984) 9ff; F.W. Walbank (1984), esp. 66-71.
57 Polyb., 3.32.7; P.S. Derow (1979); contra F.W. Walbank (1963).
55 For a treatment of Roman and Pontic escaltion up see D.G. Glew (1981).
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A rm enia. Furtherm ore, an offensive stance w as clearly u sed  to  d issuade 
the  Parth ians and  their allies from  supporting  their ow n clients. In  spite 
of P a rth ia 's  en treaties for a peaceful so lu tion . R epublican com m anders 
carefully u sed  treatises backed by  hostile  deploym ent to in tim idate  their 
r i v a l .  5 9  Later du ring  the  principate, w hen  M ithridates, an Iberian client of 
T iberius, m oved to take possession of the  A rm enian th rone, the Syrian 
g o v e rn o r n e u tra lise d  P a rth ia n  co u n te r-m easu res by  ad v an c in g  firs t 
against the  E uphrates, and  then  in to  no rthern  M esopotam ia. Battle w as 
never m et, ye t the  belligeren t stance cow ed A rm enia  an d  Iberia  in to  
peacefu l subm ission , w h ile  P a rth ia n  o p p o sitio n  e v ap o ra te d . Such 
in tim id a tio n  co n tin u ed  u n d e r C lau d iu s w ith  the  construc tion  of the  
garrison  a t G orneae, and  the  in sta lm en t of an entire legion a t Zeugm a. 
Increased m ilitarisation of the  region precip ita ted  a Parth ian  response. In 
o rder to sustain  Parth ian  credibility, Vologaeses seized the tw o great cities 
of T igranocerta and  A rtaxata, aim ing to install his young brother. Initially 
Parth ia  failed, b u t after tw o m ore years of w ar and  diplom acy a Parth ian  
client w as installed. So the  cycle w as renew ed. For over a decade Rome 
and  P arth ia  w restled  over the  C iscaucasian  k ingdom s, u n til C orbulo  
sought to establish a detente w ith  Vologaeses at Rhandeia. But C orbulo 's 
peaceful so lu tion  of a P arth ian  ru ler u n d er Rom an suzera in ty  shou ld  be 
taken neither as indicative of the em peror's w ishes, nor typical of Rom an 
id e o lo g y .90 N ero  en te rta in ed  im pressive  p lans for R om an expansion  
th roug hou t the Caucasian lands.9t The Flavian build -up  has already been 
d iscussed in  so far as the stabilising effects it had  on the region. H ow ever, 
the  overall schem e of Rom an positions indicates one w hich  p lanned  for 
fu rther a g g r e s s i o n . 9 2  Clearly, T rajan 's A rm enian and  Parth ian  cam paigns 
illu stra te  the  ease w ith  w hich  a R om an com m ander could  launch  an 
attack. In  the  m idd le  of the second cen tury  Parth ia  again  a ttem pted  to 
reassert su p p o rt for her clients in  A rm enia, and  m ade  ra ids across the  
Syrian border, b u t achieved little. N either Rome nor Persia could  brook 
any lasting  presence of the o ther in  A rm enia or n o rth ern  M esopotam ia.
59 For a discussion of the use and abuse of treaties by Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey see A. 
Keaveney (1981) and (1982).
90 M. Hammond (1934).
91 B.W. Henderson (1903) 226-8; A.B. Bosworth (1976) 73-75; M. Griffin (1984) 228.
92 B. Isaac (1990) 41.
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Each em pire strove to w rest suprem acy from  the other. H ow ever, Parth ia  
d id  n o t ap p ea r to have  the  m ateria l resources to  u n d e rtak e  m ilita ry  
dep loym en t on the  sam e scale as Rome. Instead , she took recourse  to 
d esu lto ry  ra id s  w h ich  never h a d  any  real te rrito ria l aims.93 Rom an 
leaders, on the o ther hand , consistently em barked on en larged  conquests 
beyond  the E uphrates, w here and  w hen  possible.94 As such, stability was 
dificult to m aintain  in the region. The Ciscaucasian kingdom s w ere ever 
the  goal of Rom an im perialism . As long as there w as any  resistance to 
R om an in tegration , sooner or later, it w as m et w ith  a m ilitary  response, 
Parth ia  w as confined largely to  p reda to ry  attacks w hen the  Rom an g uard  
w as dow n. By the end  of the  second and  beginning of the th ird  century  
the  Rom an response w as to  term inate  the  P arth ian  th rea t entirely. The 
p lundering  of C tesiphon (A.D. 198) and expedition of Caracalla (A.D. 215- 
17) ultim ately  left southern  M esopotam ia sufficiently destabilized to allow  
the rise of the Sasanians.
The territorial advances undertaken  by  Trajan (A.D, 114-117), Verus 
(A.D. 163-6), an d  Severus (A.D, 197-9) w ere m ade  possib le , in d eed  
anticipated  by Flavian preparations.95 A lthough the annexation of G reater 
A rm enia w as abandoned, the  ease w ith  w hich the country w as overrun  in 
A.D. 114 and  again in 163 underlines the successful deploym ent of Rom an 
troops and  the  facility bo th  for exerting p ressure  on the  h in te rland  and  
expelling Parth ian  supporters. Both Trajan and  Severus clearly in tended  
to  seal off en try  into A rm enia via the  Zagros range and  deprive Parth ia  of 
all influence in  Ciscaucasia.96 Severus' developm ent of the  tow ns and  
colonies in no rthern  M esopotam ia in su red  th a t the region w ou ld  require  
continual attention. If A rm enia w as to be absorbed along traditional lines 
Iran ian  access w ou ld  have to be lim ited. Rom an in terests in  the lands 
no rth  of the T aurus m ountains depended  on a steady  sou thern  bulw ark . 
Thus pro-R om an elem ents th ro u g h o u t C iscaucasia w ere  tied  together 
politically, econom ically, and  m ilitarily in  regional security.
93 B. Isaac (1990) 21-2; 50-2.
94 B. Isaac (1990) 19-53.
95 A.B. Bosworth (1976) 78.
96 C.S. Lightfoot (1990) 118.
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§ 8. Conclusions:
Each successive pow er in  C iscaucasia inherited  no t on ly  m any of 
the  benefits , b u t often  the  p rob lem s of fo rm er ru lers. G eographical 
conditions d ictated  settlem ent pa tte rn s and  channels of com m unication. 
The ru g g ed  te rra in  of the  reg ion  im p ed ed  easy consolidation , and  the  
n u m ero u s m o u n ta in  valleys en co u rag ed  the  d ev e lo p m en t of h igh ly  
localised econom ies and cultures. Efforts a t controlling and  adm inistering 
Ciscaucasia had  to take in to  account the variety  of people, settlem ents, and  
environm ental conditions. In  exam ining the centrifugal and  centripetal 
factors a t play in  the N orth-East, several general observations can be m ade. 
F irst, ad m in is tra tio n , an d  o ften  d ip lom acy , w ere conducted  via local 
represen tatives of a foreign pow er. Each im perial sta te  em ployed  client 
ru lers d raw n  from  regional nobility. Friendly  satraps or form er hostages 
w ere at the top  of local adm inistration, and  consequently defence. Second, 
bu ild ing  projects and  im proved  lines of com m unication b ro u g h t greater 
un ifica tion  and  econom ic p ro sp e rity  to  C iscaucasia. In each period , 
fron tier security  w as obtained  w hen  governm ents constructed  new  roads 
o r irr ig a tio n  system s, in tro d u c ed  coinage, estab lished  g arrisons , or, 
dev e lo p ed  u rb an  centres. T h ird , tax a tio n  and  rec ru itm en t polic ies 
encou raged  a h igher degree  of social o rgan isation , an d  b ro u g h t large  
portions of the popu la tion  in to  contact w ith  respective im peria l system s. 
In  these early  periods, effective contro l of p rovinces or sa trap ies w as 
ob tained  w hen  the  m ost w as m ade of local rulers. In the  next chapter, I 
shall exam ine how  such effective local m anagem ent con tinued  along an 
im portan t section of the  north-east frontier, and  in  particu lar, how  local 
com m unities w ere responsible for defending their im m ediate  region.
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The Defences and  Settlem ents of the A rm enian frontier
§ 1, Introduction:
This chapter exam ines the  m ost p rom inent Rom an settlem ents and  
fortifications sou th  of Colchis and  no rth  of the  T ur 'A bdin . It is n o t an 
a ttem p t to  form  an  exhaustive  gazeteer of all R om an sites a long  the 
A rm enian  frontier, b u t instead  exam ines the  h istories o f im portan t sites 
in  order to understand  how  the frontier w as defended on a local level and  
w hat role frontier cities p layed  in  protecting the interests of the em pire.
§ 2. The upper Tigris basin: M artyropolis and  Am ida:
M arty ro p o lis , m o d e rn  S ilvan , lies ap p ro x im ate ly  seven ty -five  
kilom etres north-east of A m ida along the old Diyarbakir-Bitlis road .I The 
fortress-city w as w ell-placed to m onitor the  m ain rou tes from  A m ida into 
A rm enia, and  east-w est traffic w ith in  the  lim its of the T aurus range and  
the  T ur 'A bdin. M artyropolis is located on the southernm ost slope of the 
H azro  range, overlooking the  u n d u la tin g  p la in  of the u p p e r Tigris, a t a 
site blessed w ith  a good w ater supply. The Farkin-Su cuts just to the west, 
ru sh in g  tw e lv e  m iles to  th e  so u th -e as t u n til i t  m eets the  an c ien t 
N y m p h iu s  (B atm an-Su), th e  riv e r w h ich  d iv id e d  R om an -con tro lled  
S ophanene from  Persian  A rzanene. The city 's fertile su rro u n d in g s are 
n ou rished  by  num erous springs. The various m oun ta in  stream s w hich 
d ra in  from  the T aurus in to  the N ym phius allow ed for the  developm ent 
of several routes from  the no rth  w hich converge near M artyropolis.2 Two 
routes descend from  the  northw est near Mug, follow ing the valleys of the 
K ulp Çay and  A ydinlik  Çay. N orthw est of M artyropolis, a th ird  rou te  
traverses the  m ountains near Geng and  m oves south  to Lice, thence bends 
sou th -east along the  u p p e r w aters of the  N ym ph ius b eh in d  the  H azro  
hills. Finally, the city lies along the m ain route to the Bitlis pass, the least
•-vj
lEI (2) 928 for the topography of the site.
2 H.A. Manandian (1965) 24-25,62, 102-3 for a discussion of the important strategic and 
trade routes that passed through or near Martyropolis.
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difficult entrance from  the upper Tigris basin in to  the A rm enian plateau.3 
T w enty-five m iles to  the  sou th  flow s the  T igris, beside  w hich , in  the  
A ch ae m en id  p e r io d , th e  R oyal ro a d  ra n  e a s t th e n  so u th  in to  
M esopotam ia.
There has been long debate as to w hether the  site of M artyropolis is 
a lso  th e  site  of th e  an c ien t A rm en ian  cap ita l of T ig ra n o ce rta .4 
M artyropolis w as the central city of the district of Sophanene, or Cop'k ' 
Mec in A rm enian  sources. Sophanene h ad  been contro lled  by  a Rom an 
clien t since the  re ig n  of D iocletian , after the  th e  P ersians fo rm ally  
relinqu ished  the territo ry  u n d e r the Peace of N isibis of A.D. 298.^ For a 
tim e, the  hered ita ry  A rm enian  Satraps of Sophanene he ld  considerable 
autonom y. Rom an troops m ay have been  p resen t in  Sophanene, b u t an 
A rm enian  never com m anded them . H ow ever, Satraps w ere en titled  to 
w age w ars w ith  their ow n forces independen t of im perial jurisdiction.^ In 
the  m idd le  of the follow ing century , the  Satrap of Sophanene suppo rted  
the  R om ans d u rin g  the  peace of A.D. 363, w hen  the  N ym ph ius w as 
selected as the border betw een Rom an and  Persian spheres of control; b u t 
th is  choice w as v iew ed  by  co n tem poraries  as d e v ia tio n  from  the 
trad itional pro-eastern  sym pathies of the district.7 In the  fifth century, the 
em peror Zeno increased the checks placed on the A rm enian Satraps after 
th ey  h ad  len t su p p o rt to the  rebels L eontius and  Illus. H ered ita ry  
S atrap ies w ere  p u t to  an  end , an d  the  office becam e one solely by  
a p p o in t m e n t .5 H ow ever, these  ru le rs  w ere  still n o t p e rm itte d  to 
com m and Rom an garrisons. D uring  tim es of invasion  th is d iv ision  of 
civil and  m ilita ry  au th o rity  p roved  d isastrous. In  A.D. 536 Justin ian  
abolished the  Satrapy of Sophanene and  com bined it w ith  other districts 
in to  the  province of Armenia IV .^  Shortly before this date , in  A.D. 527,
3L.M. Whitby (1983) 205.
4EI (2) 928-9 provides a bibliography of the previous scholarship concerning the location of 
Tigranocerta.
5 Peter the Patrician, Leg. ad. gen., 3.
6 Procopius, Buildings, 3.1.24.
7 Faust. Buz., 4.1.
8 Procopius, Buildings, 3.1.26.
9 Nov., 31; Procopius, Buildings, 3.1.27-9.
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M artyropolis m ust have becom e a key m ilitary  po in t, w ith  the seat of a 
D ux Armeniae, and  received the  upg raded  defences still v i s i b l e .  10
The fo u n d a tio n  of M arty ropo lis  as a cen tre  of im portance  to 
Rom ans and  C hristians dates to  the early fifth century , w hen  trad itional 
A rm enian com m and structures w ere beginning to be lim ited. Both Greek 
an d  Sem itic sources a ttrib u te  the  c ity 's estab lishm ent to  an  A rm enian  
b ish o p  n am ed  M a ru th a , w h o  cam e from  th e  h ig h la n d s  n o rth  of 
M a rty ro p o lis .44 W hile b ishop he enjoyed im perial favour, and  betw een 
A.D. 399 and  408 he w as sen t on  severa l d ip lom atic  m issions to the 
Persians. D uring  these m issions, he so im pressed  king Y ezdegerd by  his 
p iety  and know ledge of m edicine, th a t the Persian developed a respect for 
C h ristian ity  an d  assisted  M aru tha  in  his evangelical effo rts.42 Bishop 
M aru tha  effected an accord betw een  the tw o ru lers, w ho in re tu rn  jointly 
helped  to aggrandize the old A rm enian  city of N p 'e rk e rt w ith  relics and  
funds for constructions. Y ezdegerd ordered  his M agi to su rrender to the 
b ishop  the  rem ains of those  C hristians m arty red  in  Persia , an d  sen t 
M aru tha  off w ith  gold  for the fu tu re  basilica of the  city. T heodosius II 
m atched these offerings by  sending  fu rther reliquaries and  o rdering  that 
som e of the  best ag ricu ltu ra l lan d s in  Sophanene be assigned  to  the  
episcopacy at M artyropolis. 45
In  A rm en ia  th e  C h ris tian  ch u rch  h ad  a d o p te d  m an y  of the  
struc tu res of the feudal principalities.44 As a consequence, ecclesiastical 
pow er w as initially  based  on fam ily hold ings in the country , no t u rban  
centres, and  the granting  of estates to M arutha by Theodosius m ay indicate 
th a t the  w est w as honou ring  an  A rm enian  noble in  trad itiona l m anner. 
Like the ir p ag an  predecessors, the largely  h e red ita ry  A rm enian  clergy 
effectively becam e secular lords by  such benefits, yet lords beholden to the 
im perial m etropolitan  b ishop of A m ida.45 Also, these rew ards m ay have
10 Mal., 18.5 and 18.4-6.
11 The story of Marutha's origins is preserved in the Arab authors discussed in El (2) 928.
12 For Marutha's diplomatic activities and the success v^hich allowed him to found 
Martyropolis see Soc,, 7.8; the Nestorian and Syrian histories of later tradition are 
translated in R. Marcus (1932) 50-54; as is the late sixth-century Life of Marutha of 
Maipherkat, especially 23-31.
13 Life of Marutha of Maipherkat, 30-31.
14 C  Toumanoff (1963) 138-9.
15 N. Adontz (1970) 284.
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facilitated  the  fu rther reduc tion  in the pow er of secular nobles. By the  
early  sixth century, C hristian  b ishops held  the sam e sta tus as A rm enian 
princes. Thus it is quite possible tha t the episcopacy of M artyropolis came 
to  assum e duties traditionally  held  by  client rulers.
T here  can be little  d o u b t ab o u t the  s tra teg ic  im p o rtan ce  of 
M arty ropo lis in  fron tie r conflict. If Persia  w as to  su p p o rt clients in  
A rm enia, it w as essen tia l th a t the  lands below  the Bitlis pass rem ain  
secure, w ith  the resu lt th a t the Persian  Satrapy of A rzanene, east of the  
N ym phius, w as p rized  b y  bo th  contenders,!^ A Rom an presence so close 
endangered  Persian com m unication northw ard . In  bo th  A.D. 502 and  531 
Persian forces m oved to  take M artyropolis. In A.D. 502 the  Persian king 
K avadh  trave lled  u p  the  A raxes valley  in to  the  A rm en ian  h igh lands 
w here he accepted the subm ission of Theodosiopolis. O n his m arch south 
to A m ida he tu rn ed  against M artyropolis. The poor fortifications offered 
l it t le  h o p e  fo r re s is tan c e  a n d  th e  p ro -R o m an  sa tra p , T h eo d o re , 
su rren d ered  the  city and  tw o  years ' tr ibu te  to  the  Persians. H e w as 
fo rg iv e n  b y  A n a s ta s iu s , w h o  a cc ep ted  th e  w e a k e n e d  s ta te  of 
M artyropolis. 17 Both A nastasius and  Justinian took m easures to im prove 
the defences of the city, b u t it w as Justinian w ho transform ed the site into 
a im p re ss iv e  m ilita ry  ou tpost.15  in  the  late  sum m er of A.D. 531 
M artyropolis w as again  besieged. 19 This tim e the city p u t u p  a sp irited  
fight, ignoring  the  d ea th  of its b ishop , N onnus, and  the  pessim ism  of 
som e of th e  officers. By th e ir  reso lv e  an d  so lid  defences th e  
M arty ro p o litan s th w a rte d  th is  second  assault.20 From  the  m id^sixth 
century  onw ards, M artyropolis becam e not only a defensive po in t for the 
reg ion , b u t a base for fo rw ard  o p e ra tio n s .21 In  conjunction w ith  the
16 L.M. Whitby (1983) 265.
17 For the A.D. 502 campaign in Sophene see Procopius, Buildings, 3.2.3-8; for the A.D 531 
campaign see Wars, 1.21,4-28.
18 Mai., 399.15-17 and 427.14-7; L.M. Whitby (1985) 724.
19 For the A.D. 531 siege see Procopius, Wars, 1.21.4-16, 23-28; Zach. Mit., 9.6; and Mai., 
18.66.
20 L.M. Whitby (1984) 181 criticises the account in Wars which emphasises the appearance 
of the Huns for the city’s victory.
21 Zach. Mit., 9.6; L.M. Whitby (1985) 727-8. In A.D. 503, the Roman general, Celer, 
invaded Arzanene from Sophene, Procopius, Wars, 1.7.21-2; however, this invasion could 
not have involved the use of Martyropolis as a base for it was in the hands of the Persians.
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fortified  positions in  the  T ur 'A bdin, Rom an forces in Sophanene, under 
the  direction of the dux Armeniae, sought to isolate A rzanene and  assault 
Persian  ho ld ings fu rth er east. These m easures caused  the  reg ion  to 
undergo  a rap id  m ilitarisation on bo th  sides of the N ym phius, yet w ere 
largely  responsib le  for the  rem arkab le  success of R om an forces in  the  
reg ion  d u rin g  th e  la te r six th  century.22 in  the sp ring  of A.D, 589 the 
Persians captured  M artyropolis, b u t only th rough  treachery. The precious 
city w as heavily  garrisoned by  the Persians, and  the  Rom an com m ander 
w ho failed to retake it w as s tripped  of his rank.23 H ow ever, in  A.D. 591 
K husro resto red  M artyropolis to the  em peror M aurice in exchange for 
m ilitary  suppo rt needed  to defeat his rival, Baram.24 The city w as again 
seized by the Persians in  A.D. 604, and  w as no t retaken by  H eraclius until 
A.D. 625. Fifteen years later the city w as perm anently  lost to  the Arabs.
The s truc tu ra l rem ains of the  city, though  now  nearly  van ished , 
confirm  the  im portance  w hich  M arty ropo lis receives in  the  h isto rical 
narratives. The late Rom an walls of the city, still visible on all four sides, 
are la id  o u t in a rec tangu lar p lan  approxim ately  six h u n d red  by  five 
h u n d re d  m e tre s .25 The pre-Justin ian ic  defences w ere  ex trem ely  
vu lnerab le  to  attack due  to  insufficient size.26 Justin ian  expanded  the 
structure  by m ore than  tw ice its original dim ensions w ith  ashlar facing on 
bo th  sides. Lai'ge tow ers punc tua ted  the  wall approxim ately  every fifty 
m etres, and  the m ain  circuit possessed a fore-w all w hich appears to  have 
incorporated archer tu rrets every tw enty-five m etres. The entire city w as 
su rrounded  by  a m oat. According to C hristian legends, p reserved  in  Arab 
geographers, M artyropolis boasted  e igh t gates.27 The tow ers are m ostly  
rectangular, w ith  exceptions along the  east wall. M ost of the construction 
is Arabic, although the foundation  is late Roman.
22 L.M. Whitby (1986a) 727-9; and (1983) 207-10.
23 Th. Sim., 3.5.11-16; Evag., 4.13-14.
24 Th. Sim., 4.13.24.
25 See L.M Whitby (1984) and T.A. Sinclair (1989) 289 for a description of the fortifications.
26 Procopius, Buildings, 3.2.10-14. On the width, Whitby (1986a) 734; on height, Procopius, 
Buildings, 3.2.10.
27 El (2) 829 and 931, but originally H.F Amedroz (1902), 785-812.
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A basilica w as constructed in the centre of the city by  M arutha in the 
early fifth century w ith  funds p rovided  by  Theodosius II and  Y e z d e g e r d . 2 8  
Taylor claim ed to have seen the  ru ins of a g ran d  bu ild ing  rising above 
"the vile hovels th a t com pose the  m odern  t o w n " . 2 9  H e com pared  the  
spacious s tru c tu re  to the C hurch  of Jacob of N isibis, rem ark ing  on  its 
h igh ly  ornam ental colum ns. The capitals d isp layed  an  e laborate  lattice 
p a tte rn  of c lustered  g rapes an d  foliage. The G reat C hu rch  has since 
d isappeared . Sinclair rem arked  th a t in  1983 there  w ere several blocks 
from  "the sixth cen tury  basilica" in  the courtyard  of the  U lu  C am i.50 If 
th is stone w ork  is of the  sixth cen tury  then  it is p robably  p a rt of a later 
expansion of the  G reat Church.
Christian legends also m ention several other ecclesiastical build ings 
w hich have no t survived. W ithin the  w alls of the city itself sm all altars 
w ere constructed  in to  w hich  w ere  p laced  relics of the  Persian  m artyrs. 
H ow ever, the  A rm enian  life of M aru tha  states th a t the  b ishop bu ilt the  
reliquaries in to  the w alls of the G reat Church.51 A  convent dedicated  to 
SS. Peter and  Paul w as bu ilt du ring  fifth-century expansion, as w ere three 
o ther churches, founded  by  im perial officers. Finally, w ith in  the  sou th ­
east corner of M artyropolis there is a structure know n as the C hurch of the 
Virgin. Little now  rem ains to  be seen, b u t an edifice, described by  Bell as a 
dom ed church, w as probably the sam e build ing constructed by  Khusro II as 
a gesture of thanks for the aid p rov ided  by em peror M a u r i c e . 3 2
O utside of the city, in a nearby ravine, Taylor no ted  the rem nants of 
the  m onastery  of Hosea. Ind iv idual cham bers w ere apparen tly  cut into 
the sides of the gorge, allow ing the ascetics to live a partially  solitary life. 
N earb y  stood  the  co n v en tu a l chu rch , in  w h ich  w as an  in sc rip tio n  
describing repairs m ade in  A.D. 861. Taylor's gorge should  presum ably be 
in  the  H azro  foothills no rth -east of the  city, a long his rou te  of travel. 
Twelve m iles to the w est lay the  m onastery of the p rophet John, destroyed 
by  the Persians in the late sixth century .55
28 Life of Marutha of Maipherkat, 26 for Theodosius, 32 for Yezdegerd.
29 J.G. Taylor (1865) 24.
30 T.A. Sinclair (1989) 291.
31 Life of Marutha of Maipherkat, 31.
32 El (2) 929.
33 Th. Sim., 1.14.7-8.
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From  these descriptions of M artyropolis, several general features of 
local defence can be d istinguished. Frontier loyalties w ere strengthened  
w hen  fron tier inhab itan ts believed  they  w ere p a rt of an  em pire  w hich 
som ehow  could help  them . The old  satrapal system  w as fundam entally  
flaw ed: loyalties cou ld  never be stro n g  in  a system  w hich  w as to rn  
betw een  eastern  trad itions and  w estern  fealty. Im perial investm ent in 
churches and  the construction  of a m arty rium  so close to the  fron tier 
began  to anchor the M artyropolitans’ faith, bo th  religious and  secular, in 
the  w est. H ow ever, un til secure m eans could be p ro v id ed  fo r , resisting  
a rm e d  a g g re ss io n , in c id en ts  like  T h eo d o re 's  su r re n d e r  w ere  n o t 
surprising . C onsolidation  occured only w ith  the adm in istra tive  reform s 
a n d  m ilita ry  c o n s tru c tio n  u n d e r  Ju s tin ian . C o n tin u e d  im p e ria l 
investm ent in civic and  ecclesiastical projects cem ented these successes.
A m ida lies on  the  w est bank  of the  Tigris a t the  site  of m odern  
D iyarbakir, ninety-tw o kilom etres north  of M ardin. The site of the old  city 
is situated  on a hillock overlooking a bend  in the Tigris shortly  before th a t 
river tu rn s east across the  u p p e r p lains no rth  of the  T ur 'A bdin. The 
earliest R om an presence a t A m ida is d ifficu lt to  p inpo in t. P rim itive  
settlem ent developed around  the  hill on w hich the p resen t citadel stands, 
benefitting  from  the  traffic on the  Royal h igh  w a y . 3  4  The region  cam e 
increasing ly  w ith in  the  R om an sphere  of influence in  the  second and  
th ird  centuries, b u t no t until the peace of A.D. 298 d id  Sophanene becom e 
ten a b le  as a R om an  p r o v i n c e . 3 5  The im p eria l g o v e rn m e n t h a d  
envisioned the  city as a w ell-fortified refuge for the  su rround ing  region, 
w hich, because of the proxim ity of the neighbouring  lands to the frontier, 
w as the  con tinual object of low -in tensity  ra ids by  P ersian  b r i g a n d s . 5 6  
H ow ever, in A.D. 336 N arses, b ro th er of k ing  Sapor II, p lu n d ered  the 
v icin ity  and  briefly  cap tu red  the  city, revealing  the  need  for a m ore 
im pressive construction. The follow ing year, C onstantins took m easures 
to  augm en t the  defences of A m i d a . 3 7  W alls and  tow ers w ere bu ilt to
34 A.H. Manandian (1965) 24-5; see also RBK (1966) 133 for pre-Roman settlement.
35 A.H.M. Jones (1971) 225. It is possible that there were temporary garrisons throughout 
northern Mesopotamia from the middle of the second century onward; see B. Isaac (1990) 30, 
399-400.
36 Amm. Marc., 18.9.1, and The History of Jacob the Recluse, 7.1-5.
37 For the campaign of Narses see Theoph., 20.22-26.
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im pressive d im ensions, and  artille ry  tu rre ts  com plem ented  the  system . 
Yet A m ida  w as by  no  m eans th e  fo rem ost fo rtre ss  of C o n stan tin s ' 
M esopotam ia. The city w as norm ally garrisoned by legio V  Parthica and a 
de tachm ent of local horse;5S this sm aller force should  be com pared  w ith  
tw o legions at Singara, or the  three a t Bezabde. Indeed, by  the early fifth 
cen tu ry , on ly  the  so lita ry  équités ducatores Illyricani w ere  sta tioned  at 
Amida.39
As an  econom ic and  cultu ral base, A m ida su rpassed  m ore active 
m ilita ry  cen tres in  n o r th e rn  M esopo tam ia . P rio r  to  th e  R om an 
expansion, A m ida's position  along the  A chaem enid Royal road  connected 
the  city w ith  the w ealthy  econom ic zones of Asia M inor, M esopotam ia, 
and  I r a n . 4 0  Com bined w ith  the fact that the Tigris bend  near the city w as 
one of the  first safe launches for boats, the  site w as a no d a l p o in t for 
com m unications in all d irections.4 t The earliest reference to  A m ida 
d u rin g  the  R om an p e rio d  is in  John M alalas, w ho  reco rds th a t the 
em peror Trajan m ade A m ida a m etropolis in A.D. 115, g ran ting  the city 
bo th  a governor and  lands previously  belonging to O s r h o e n e . 4 2  A lthough 
there  is no corroboration, it is likely th a t this em peror began  to develop 
the  settlem ent as a focal po in t for his new  conquests on  the upper Tigris, 
w hile he him self co-ordinated activities from  E d e s s a . 4 3  H ow ever, it w as 
no t un til D iocletian firm ly established control in  the reg ion  th a t A m ida 
becam e one of the  fo rem ost cities w ith in  the five fo rm er A rm enian  
satrapies of Ingilene, Sophene, A rzanene, Zabdicene, and  C o r d u e n e . 4 4  As 
the  p rincipal u rban  centre of Sophanene, A m ida w ou ld  have controlled  
an d  collected the  revenues from  outly ing  territories, and  o rgan ised  both  
local recruiting for the arm y and  the collection and  redistribu tion  of grain
38 Amm. Marc., 18.9.3.
39 N o t Dig., Or. 36.18.
40 H.A. Manandian (1965) 24-25.
41 El (1) 982.
42 Mai., 11.6-7.
43 F.A. Lepper (1948) 120-5, and C.S. Lightfoot (1990) 117-18. The Romans were eager to 
extend their municipal sytem in areas of conquest as rapidly as possible. Even if Amida 
were only a large village at the time, it is possible that the administration may have 
granted it the status of municipium, see F. Abbot and A. Johnson (1926) 23-4.
44 F.A. Lepper (1948) 114-5, and S. Williams (1985) 84-86.
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and  o ther g o o d s .C o n s t a n t in s  w as said to have favoured  A m ida as the 
m ajor settlem ent of the  u p p er Tigris, and  under its jurisdiction he placed 
A rzan en e  and  Corduene.'^^ G iven such pow ers, A m ida w o u ld  have 
co n tro lled  an  exce llen t g ra in -p ro d u c in g  reg io n  in  M e s o p o t a m i a . ' ^  ^  
H ow ever, as a m ilitary  site, A m ida rem ained  secondary , w ith  the  d u x  
Mesopotamiae sta tioned  in Nisibis.^^
The brief notice in A m m ianus given to the  city 's annual fair also 
d istingu ishes A m ida as a p rinc ipal centre of ad m in is tra tio n , cu ltu ra l 
hegem ony , an d  exchange w ith  ru ra l settlem ents.^^ In add ition  to the 
barte r or sale of everyday  com m odities, annual fairs p ro v id ed  occasions 
for d istrict elections, gam es, and  m ajor religious services. The m agnates of 
the  city spen t a great deal of m oney to  em phasise their regional control, 
and  only  the  m ost significant cities could boast such  celebrations. To 
su p p o rt these  occasions, A m ida m u st have  possessed  superio r public  
facilities: a large m arket area  for stalls, p lay ing  fields, tem ples, public  
stables and  other service am enities. W e know  from  the sources that by  the 
end  of the fifth century, an am phitheatre  existed w ith in  the  city, as w ell as 
an open-air m arket, w here trad ing  continued du ring  the Rom an siege of 
A.D. 503/4.50 W hen A nastasius learned that A m ida had  been recovered by 
the  Rom ans he sen t gifts, res to red  public  bu ild ings, an d  constructed  a 
g ran a ry ,5 i p roof of the  city 's im portance in  im perial eyes. Earlier, the  
em peror Zeno had  personally  patron ised  an abbot of the M onastery of the 
Edessenes, placing considerable lands in  Ingilene u nder the control of this 
A m id en e  convent.52 A fte rw ard s , a com m unity  a t C o n stan tin o p le , 
com posed of A m idenes w ho had  succeeded in  the larger em pire, lavished 
m oney on  their hom etow n, as d id  the Patriarch of Antioch.53
45 F. Abbott and A. Johnson (1926) 23-28, and 73-4 on the powers of major urban centres.
46 The History of Jacob the Recluse, 7.1-5.
47 J. Matthews (1989a) 52-54.
48 Amm. Marc., 19.9.6.
49 Amm. Marc., 18.8.13-14. For discussion of the role of fairs, festivals, and markets see R. 
MacMullen (1970).
50 Chron, Josh., 66.
51 For amphitheatre and market, see Chron. Josh., 75, and 66; for Anastasian development 
see Procopius, Wars, 1.7.35, and Chron. Josh., 81.
52 J. Eph., Lives, 557-8.
53 Chron. Josh., 81.
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Tw o A rm enian  sources also ind icate  th a t A m ida w as a th riv ing  
settlem ent w hich controlled m any  of the  neighbouring  estates. Faustus 
B uw zand, describing contem porary  A m ida of the  late fourth  century  calls 
the city a k'alak', or 'w alled-city ', a specific term  used  by Faustus to denote 
m ajor u rb an  centres.54 O utside the  borders of A rm enia, renow ed Graeco- 
Rom an cities such as A thens, N isibis, Edessa, Caeserea, and  others receive 
the  title, w hile in A rm enia only A rtashat, A rsakaw an, T igranocerta, and  
V alashapat are described in  such a m anner. The fifth-century  A rm enian 
h isto rian , A gathangelos, states th a t A m ida w as the  residence of a g rea t 
bdeashkh, w ho controlled the  su rround ing  lands w est of the  Tigris.55 The 
A rm enian  designation  of hdeashkh describes a figure w ho possessed the  
au thority  sim ilar to a Persian marzpan; or marcher-lord.56 This reference 
m ig h t reflect th e  p resence  o f th e  com tem porary  R om an g o v ern o r, 
com m ander of the  équités ducatores Illyricani,^'^ bu t, as the  text claim s to 
describe the late th ird  century, A gathangelos could equally refer to a m inor 
Rom an client. In any case, the  im portance of the city as an econom ic and 
adm inistrative centre is em phasised by bo th  Faustus and  Agathangelos.
A m ida becam e an  established  centre of C hristianity . The vicinity  
w as said to have been associated w ith  the p rophet Jonah, and  w as one of 
the  fecund areas for monasticism.58 Furtherm ore, the city w as intim ately 
connected  w ith  th e  sp re ad  of C h ristian ity  n o rth w ard . G regory  the  
Illum inato r, w ho  h a d  rela tives in  the  city, v isited  A m ida in  the  early  
fou rth  cen tury  w hile  evangelizing Armenia.59 In  the sixth century  m any 
o f the  local A rm enian  b ishops, and  even  the  b ishop  of M artyropolis 
him self, w ere p laced  u n d e r the  au tho rity  of the  see of Amida.^^ After 
Jovian su rrendered  N isibis in  A.D. 363, relics of the b lessed b ishop Jacob 
w here  b rough t and  stored  in the  new  extended portion  of A m ida, w here 
the  cu lt rem ained  popular.^! T hereafter, C hristian  evangelization  m ust
54 Faust, Buz., 3.10. See the discussion of this term in N. Garsoian (1989) 535-40,
55 Agathangelos, 795. Bdeashkh is rendered vitaxata in Latin, as in Amm. Marc., 23.6.14.
56 For a discussion of the title Bdeashkh and relevant literature, see N. Garsoian (1989) 
516-17.
57 Not. Dig., Or., 36.18.
58 Soz., 3.14, and A. Voobus (1960) 15-16,231-33.
59 Agathangelos, 842.
60 N. Adontz (1970) 284.
61 Faust. Buz., 3.10; and Theod., Hist. Retig., 14; see Fiey (1977) 35-36.
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have accelerated in the  region. Soon the upper Tigris w as renow ned  for 
its m any  and  prosperous religious establishments.^^ By the end  of the fifth 
century , w ith in  the  city lim its alone, A m ida could boast five m onasteries, 
nu m ero u s p riv a te  chapels and  churches, no t coun ting  ru ra l convents, 
herm itages, and  ecclesiastical houses under the central ju risd iction  of the  
city. A s ig n ifican t p e rc en ta g e  of th e  C h ris tia n  p o p u la tio n  w as 
M onophysite , w hich  caused  som e tension  w ith in  the  city and  region. 
H o w ev e r, th e ir  lo y a lty  w as ra re ly  q u e s tio n e d  b y  th e  im p e ria l 
C halcedonian governm ent, and  as there are no incidents of treason w hich 
m ight shape ou r understand ing  of local defence, w e shall no t explore the 
religious dynam ics of the city.63
The structural rem ains of the city have been adm irably discussed by 
o t h e r s . I n  short, the  im pressive six k ilom etres of b lack basa lt w all 
follow , and  often im itate, the design  of the  late an tique  w alls, a lthough  
m uch  of w h a t is now  visible is m edieval repairs. A n aqueduc t to  the 
n o rth  w as dem olished  in  the m id d le  of this century . W ith in  the  city 
w alls, there are no civil or ecclesiastical rem ains w hich date  from  the th ird  
to seventh centuries, apart from  the chancel and  apse of the sixth-century 
C hurch of the Virgin in  the  south-w est quarter. O rnate friezes, colum ns, 
and  Capitols can be seen in the courtyard  of the U lu Cami, and  are possibly 
the  rem ains of the C hurch of St. Thom as bu ilt by  the em peror H eraclius 
after the Rom an recovery of the city from  Persia in A.D. 628.
To understand  the role tha t A m ida p layed in local defence, it is best 
to exam ine the  principal sieges w hich the city endured . In A.D. 359, the  
Persian  king. Sapor, de te rred  from  crossing the E uphrates by  reports of 
flooding, tu rn ed  no rth  tow ards A m ida, w here his su d d en  arrival caught 
the  R om an forces largely  o f f - g u a r d . ^ 5  A m ida w as crow ded w ith  rustic  
dependents w ho had  m ade their w ay to the city for an  annual m arket. Six
62 A. Voobus (1960)231.
63 For a discussions of the Christian communities in Amida see A. Voobus (1960), esp. 321-37, 
and S.A. Harvey (1990) esp. 57-75. However, note important remarks on Monophysite 
loyalties in L.M. Whitby (1988) 213-15.
64 The most detailed accounts may be found in DHGE, 1237-49; A. Gabriel (1940) 175-82, 
RBK (1966) 133-7, and T.A. Sinclair (1989)164-95.
65 The primary source for the invasion of A.D. 359 is Amm. Marc., 18.4-19.9; for differing 
discussions of both Roman and Persian strategy, see J. Matthews (1989a) 50-67, and R.C. 
Blockley (1988),
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fu rth e r  leg ions h a d  been  b ivouacked  w ith in  the  w all, en la rg ing  the 
garrison . A ltogether tw en ty  th ousand  ind iv idua ls  w ere confined in  an 
area  m ean t to  su p p o rt pe rhaps half th a t amount.^^ Just as the Rom ans 
h ad  no t expected tha t the  m ight of Persia w ould  be focused upon  A m ida, 
Sapor, if w e are to  tru s t A m m ianus, d id  no t expect to invest tim e in a 
pro tracted  siege. H e hoped  the city w ould, like the nearby fortified villages 
of Rem an and  Busan, quickly capitulate before a Persian display of force.^^ 
It w as still his in ten tion  to  ford  the  E uphrates no rth  of Sam osata, and  
thence strike sou th  in to  Syria.^® Even after the  initial insu lt of being  shot 
at. Sapor w as p e rsu ad e d  b y  m ilita ry  adv isers th a t th e  city  cou ld  be 
sum m oned to subm ission. The second day  of defiance b rough t the  death  
of th e  son of the  C hion ite  k ing , G rum bates, an  even t critical in  the 
decision to attack A m ida, for to keep him  loyal Sapor agreed to besiege the 
city.
This siege of A m ida illum inates bo th  the  ro le  such  a city w as 
expected to p lay  in protecting the frontier, and  the problem s faced by local 
defence initiative.^^ In  add ition  to  tw ice refusing  the  sum m ons of the 
P ersian  k ing, the  defenders fo rcefu lly  expressed  th e ir de te rm ina tion . 
W ith  ap p aren t p ride , A m m ianus recalled "the obstinacy show n by bo th  
sides" as "m en w atched th rough  the n igh t w ithout laying aside their arm s, 
an d  the  hills re-echoed w ith  the  shouts w hich rose on  either hand. O ur 
m en m en extolled the prow ess of C onstantins Caesar, 'L ord of all things 
an d  of th e  w o rld ,' w hile  the  Persians hailed  Sapor as Saanshah  and  
P e ro z ...." ^ o  M otivation  ap p ea rs  to  rem ain  h ig h  in  th e  accoun t of 
A m m ian u s, w h e re  th e  d e fe n d e rs  re s is te d  "w ith  m o re  fu ry  th an  
d iscretion". In  the early stages of the siege fighting w as often w aged in 
p itched  battles before the w a l l s . B u t  w ith in  a short tim e Persian siege
66 Amm. Marc., 18.8.19-9.4.
67 For the raid against the forts at Reman and Busan see Amm. Marc., 18.10.1-4; for the 
expected submission of Amida see 19.1.1-5.
68 This intention was a slight revison of the initial Persian strategy which aimed at 
rapidly passing through Mesopotamia, and crossing the river somewhere between Zeugma 
and Samosata, Amm. Marc., 18.5.7., and 18.6.8-11. However, see R.C. Blockley (1988) for 
recent criticisms of the accuracy of Ammianus in reporting Sapor's intentions.
69 The sole source for the siege is Amm. Marc., 19.1.1-8.4.
70 Amm. Marc., 19.2.10-11.
71 Amm. Marc., 19.2.12-14.
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w orks and  early  casualties seem ed to have forced the  Rom ans to  fight 
from  the ram parts. This p laced the Rom ans in  an aw kw ard  position, for 
m any  of the troops, m ost notably  tw o legions freshly arrived  from  Gaul, 
w ere  only  tra in ed  in  field  w arfare . A m m ianus notes th a t th ey  w ere 
useless apart from  som e "senseless sallies" w hich h ad  as m uch effect as "a 
one-arm ed m an sprink ling  w ater on a c o n f l a g r a t i o n ." I n  their attacks 
they  "suffered  losses equal to  those they  afflicted".73 Late in  the siege, 
w hen  R om an captives from  the fortress of Z iata w ere p a rad ed  before the 
w all, these  G allic troops a lm ost m u tin ied  in an  a ttem p t a t g lo rious 
r e v e n g e .7 4  The Protectores overseeing the  resistance w ere  com pelled to 
perm it a n ight attack on  the  Persian siege-works. This strike, w hich nearly  
resu lted  in  the capture or m u rd er of Sapor, in  the end  only provoked the 
Persians into doubling their efforts, and  no further battles took place in  the 
open .
The com peten t em p lo y m en t of a rtille ry  a n d  en g in eerin g  skill 
greatly  benefitted the defenders. A part from  the few  pitched engagem ents 
and  final hand -to -hand  struggle, m ost battle  casualties w ere p robably  a 
resu lt of the constant volley and  counter-volley. Sim ilarly, the  advantages 
of ballistics w ere n o t lost on  the  Persians w ho su rro u n d ed  the city w ith  
m an tle ts and  tow ers arm ed w ith  catapu lts, w hile  slingers an d  archers 
constantly  directed 'sm all arm s fire' against the w alls.75 The Persian host 
had  cap tu red  various pieces of R om an siege equ ipm ent a t S ingara, and  
p o u red  m issiles in to  the  city .76 W hen an  u n d e rg ro u n d  passage  w as 
revealed  to the  Persians and  a tow er tem porarily  occupied  by  a force of 
archers, superior Rom an artillery resecured the wall. The effective use of 
such engines gave the defenders a high degree of confidence.77 The very 
noise of the  R om an artillery  w as used  on  tw o occasions to shatter the 
nerves of the assailants. In the  incident of the cap tu red  tow er, the d in  of 
the  engines d rove  crack-troops of the  king to h u rl them selves from  the 
bastions, w hile  the  d ischarge  of u n lo ad ed  ballistae  p ro v id ed  illusory
72 Amm. Marc., 19.5.2.
73 Amm. Marc., 19.6.4.
74 For the final Gallic raid and its results see Amm. Marc., 19.6-7.1.
75 Amm. Marc., 19.5.1.
76 Amm. Marc., 19,2.8.
77 Amm. Marc., 19.5.7.
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'covering-fire ' for the retreating  G au ls/8  H ow ever, artillery d id  fail to halt 
the  erection  of tw o  ram ps w hich  the  Persians ra ised  for s to rm ing  the  
fortress. In  response, the  defenders constructed  an  earthw ork  to allow  
them  to  challenge th e  P ersians.79 O n several occasions the  Rom ans 
enacted  the  delicate m anoeuvre of shifting entire pieces of artillery across 
the  city to concentrate their fire.^® In  the m em ory of A m m ianus, Rom an 
m orale  rem ained  h igh  th ro u g h o u t the  crisis. Even in  the  final struggle  
atop the earthen ram parts, the defenders are depicted as displaying "death- 
defy ing" and  "un rem itting  courage."®^ O n the seven ty-th ird  day  of the 
strugg le , on ly  the  un foreseeab le  co llapse  of these  ram p arts  a n d  the  
subsequent form ation of a causew ay from  the debris allow ed the Persians 
to  flood in  and  butcher the inhabitants.
By the  late  fifth cen tu ry  the  v ig ilan t defensive system  of A m ida 
appears to have fallen into disarray. This was no t the resu lt of a decline in 
w ealth  or m ilitary spirit; rather, w ith  the  division of A rm enia in A.D. 387, 
hostilities betw een east and  w est subsided , and  the R om ans shifted  their 
strategic resources elsew here. Peace and  prosperity  h ad  blessed the city 
w ith  short-term  security, an d  a garrison  w as deem ed unnecessary. Thus, 
w hen  K avadh invaded  in  A.D. 502, the  A m idenes found  th a t they  w ere 
cut off w ithou t im perial troops. K avadh 's w in ter attack follow ed a rap id  
p lu n d e r in g  e x p e d itio n  in  A rm e n ia , a n d  w as u n fo re s e e n  a n d  
u n h e r a l d e d . 33 i t  is likely th a t the  im perial governm ent realised too late 
the danger K avadh posed  to the frontier, and  was pow erless to respond  in 
force. W hen the em peror received inform ation  of Persian  troops being 
m assed for m ilitary  operations he sen t an em bassy to the  king; if K avadh 
had  not yet crossed into Rom an territory  the am bassador w as to offer him  
m oney, in  re tu rn  for w hich the Persians w ould  d raw  a w a y .3 4  The strategy 
of K avadh indicates th a t the Persians perceived the w eakened state of the 
frontier: the cam paign co-ordinated a southern  attack b y  A rab auxiliaries
78 Amm. Marc., 19.5.6, and 19.6.10.
79 Amm. Marc., 19.6.5-6.
80 See in particular Amm. Marc., 19.5.6-7, and 19.7.6.
81 Amm. Marc., 19.8.2.
82 Amm. Marc., 19.8.2-4,
83 Procopius, Wars, 1.7.4,
84 Chron. Josh., 50.
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w hile  the  m ain  P ersian  h o s t m oved  quickly  th ro u g h  A rm en ia  and  
Sophanene before strik ing  sou th  at A m id a /s  G iven th e  confidence of 
K avadh, it  is n o t su rp rising  th a t the  Rom an am bassador, R ufinus, w as 
taken  hostage.
The A m idenes' faith in  the  apparen t security of a p rosperous peace 
m ay  be seen in  no tew orthy  ex tra-m ural establishm ents. A ccording to 
John of Ephesus, the  m onastery  of M ar Sam uel w as constructed  a round  
the  p illa r of the fo u n d er on  the  ou tside  of the city wall.36 Sim ilarly, 
outside the north  w all rose the m onastery  of M ar John, a convent of som e 
four hun d red  m onks, and  du ring  the siege of A.D. 502, these ascetics w ere 
forced to seek refuge in a school w ith in  Am ida. These constructions entail 
confidence on  th e  p a rt of the  A m idenes th a t th e ir im m ed ia te  reg ion  
w ould  suffer from  no significant brigandage, a lthough the  city gates w ere 
still b a rred  a t n ight. A n unstab le  countryside d id  n o t p u sh  m onastic  
institu tions nearer to u rban  establishm ents. Indiv iduals such as Jacob the 
Recluse suggest th a t ru ra l ascetics w ere still p resen t in  the  country  and  
could  successfully cope w ith  bo th  daily  and  ex trao rd inary  tribulations. 
Jacob, no t the city-bound m onasteries, created a refugee centre in a tim e of 
crisis .37 The peacetim e construction of m onasteries on  the  exterior of the 
city defences indicates th a t the  A m idenes perceived  no  serious m ilitary  
th rea t to their section of the frontier. It is no t the  case th a t increased 
dangers led  m onks to seek pro tection  near the w alls of the  city, no r that 
th e  E ph tha lite  H u n s so te rrified  the  co un try side  as to p u rg e  it  of 
in h ab itan ts .33 The u p p e r Tigris suppo rted  num erous ru ra l m onasteries, 
the  largest being in villages som e distance from  the city .39 Furtherm ore, 
the  E phthalite H uns dw elt far from  Sophanene, and  w ere  norm ally  allies 
of the  im perial forces, only  dam aging  Rom an territories w hen recru ited  
in to  the  Persian army.90 In spite of the presence of such m aurauders, the
85 Chron. Josh., 50-51.
86 J. Eph., Lives, 562-3.
87 Procopius, Wars, 1.7.5-11.
88 This is the impression left by S.A. Harvey (1990) 57-75.
89 A. Voobus (1960) 231-7.
90 Procopius, Wars, 1.3.4.; see also the discussion in A. Vasilev (1950) 315-17. In the two 
cases Harvey sights the Huns do no harm whatsoever to ascetics apart from a good fright, 
66-5; more problems seemed to be caused by the monks' frenzied visions and public 
harangues.
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civic authorities w ere n o t so alarm ed as to take em ergency m easures. In 
the  tale of the  o d d  m onastic practices of T heophilus and  M aria, John of 
Ephesus recounts how  he stalked the  tw o th rough  the city and  on top of 
the  east w all, w here  he d iscovered  th a t the siblings n igh tly  perfo rm ed  
their un ique  acts of w orship , falling on  the faces and  th en  arising  or ans. 
N ever once d id  e ither John or the  couple encounter a sentry , a lthough  
M aria ind icated  th a t the ir ritua l m ust alw ays end  by  daw n  lest they  be 
spo tted  by  townsfolk.91 Clearly, there w ould  appear to be no n igh t w atch, 
at least along the perim eter of the city wall.
Yet the defences w ere of sufficient strength  to convince the citizens 
tha t resistance w as a viable option in  A.D. 502, and  w e should  no t belittle 
the  im pressive condition of the  circuit w all itself w hich foiled K avadh 's 
em p loym en t of rams.^^ John M alalas described A m ida in  the  tim e of 
A nastasius as "an extrem ely strong m etropolis", though  his opin ion  m ay 
have been shaded  by  the restorations of Justinian.93 Furtherm ore, w hen 
h ig h -ran k in g  hostages w ere  re tu rn e d  to  the  R om ans, the  m a g iste r  
m ilitum  w as furious w ith  the  governor of A m ida for w h a t he perceived 
as a be trayal of a city  w hich  the  Persians them selves ad m itted  w as 
im pregnable. The death  sentence w as r e c o m m e n d e d .9 4  Even after the city 
had  fallen, w orn  dow n by  an eighty-day assault, the Rom an force sent to 
reclaim  A m ida chose no t to sto rm  the  still form idable w a lls .95 Clearly, 
bo th  citizen and  governm en t th o u g h t A m ida a m atch  for the  Persian  
attack. Perhaps the citizens w ere encouraged that the w inter season w as in 
their favour. W hatever the  case, the  A m idenes im m ediately  exhibited an 
unyield ing  nature  by  choosing to resist.
T h ro u g h o u t th e  a ssa u lt, th e  b esieg ed  d isp la y e d  d e te rm in e d  
ingenuity  in thw arting  their assailants.96 Battering ram s w ere shattered by 
tim bers h u rled  from  the parapets; an  artificial m ound  w as underm ined ; 
an engine christened "the crusher" w as bu ilt to hurl th ree-hundred  pound
91 J. Eph., HE., 514-17.
92 Procopius, Wars, 1.7.13.
93 Mai., 16.9.
94 Chron. Josh., 80.
95 Procopius, Wars, 1.8.7.
96 The two primary accounts of the siege are Procopius, Wars, 1.7.4-32, and Chron. Josh., 50- 
53.
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stones in to  the  P ersian  m an tle ts  an d  pen thouses; an d  m an y  sm aller 
ballistic devices w ere b rough t in to  effect. It could be said  th a t A m ida fell, 
no t from  any lack of resolve, b u t ra ther due to overconfidence. For w hen 
the  k ing  began  to raise  the siege, the citizens took to the ram parts and  
jeered  at their opponen ts, and  courtesans d isp layed  them selves lew dly. 
This la tte r event the  M agi in te rp re ted  as an om en th a t an  en trance  to 
A m ida w ould  soon be revealed. The siege w as renew ed. H ow ever, the 
level of confidence rem ained  h igh  w ith in  the city, too h igh  according to 
contem porary  observers attem pting  to rationalise the  disgrace. Joshua the 
Stylite states quite clearly, "the  A m idenes becam e overconfident in their 
victory, and  fell in to  careless w ays, and  d id  not g u a rd  the w all w ith  the 
sam e diligence as before." The sector of the  w all against w hich  the  
m onaste ry  of M ar Sam uel h ad  been  constructed  w as g u a rd ed  by the  
m onks of th a t place. The Persian arm y had  leveled the m onastery  w hile 
constructing their g rea t m ou n d .97  It is no t clear w hether this m aterial w as 
carted -o ff to  a n o th e r section  of th e  w all, o r w h e th e r  th e  m o u n d  
in co rp o ra ted  th e  conven t itself. E ither case w o u ld  ind ica te  in tense  
fighting  a round  the sector charged to the  m onks. H ow ever, the  m onks 
felt sufficiently at ease to  celebrate a religious feast on the ten th  of January, 
A.D. 503. A  sm all, poorly  blocked, underg round  passage led  th rough  the 
w all into the m onks' tow er. Com bining this en try  and  scaling ladders, the 
Persians seized the tow er and  slaughtered  its groggy w ardens. Still, the 
A m idenes held  the ir g round . A n alarm  w as raised  an d  the  cap tu red  
section iso lated . H ad  it n o t been  for the  persona l appearance  and  
invectives of the  Persian  king, the  th rea t m ay have been  overth row n. 
After holding ou t for eighty days, A m ida fell, its gates still sealed and  walls 
intact.
The A.D. 359 and  502/3  sieges pose a problem  for our understand ing  
of local defence. In bo th  cases, confidence in the defenders ' ow n abilities 
and  in the  condition of the  battlem ents w as extrem ely high. In  neither 
case d id  the A m idenes a ttem pt to buy  their freedom  either th rough  bribes 
o r sym bolic fealty , a lthough  bo th  Sapor and  K avadh  seem ed to have 
expected this reaction. In  both  cases A m ida delayed the Persian host to the 
detrim ent of a p lanned  w ider invasion of Rom an territory. W hy then  d id
97 J. Eph., Lives, 563.
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A m ida tw ice fall, w hen  o ther cities w ith  less de te rm ina tion  w ithstood  
assau lt, and  how  m uch do these  capitu lations de tract from  a successful 
defensive policy?
A m ida w as in te n d ed  to  act as a focal p o in t for co -o rd ina ting  
cam paigns and  a haven in  tim es of crisis. The role envisioned for A m ida 
by  the Romans w as one of localised defence, a form idable stronghold, b u t a 
refuge  nonetheless.93 This role continued into the late  fou rth  century  as 
bo th  Jovian and  Valens increased  the  size of the  city and  its defences. 
In itially , th is increase seem s to have  been  in response  to  the  influx of 
civilians transp lan ted  from  N isibis. These refugees w ere  established  in  a 
v illage w est of the  o ld  city, an d  a w all w as ra ised  to jo in  th e  tw o  
settlem ents.99 W ith N isibis in  Persian hands, the em peror Valens realised 
the  g rea ter im portance  A m ida m ig h t have as a reg ional she lte r and  
base.^30 n  w as du ring  his reign th a t the line of defences, upon  w hich the 
p resent walls now  stand, w as designed, as an inscription above the H arpu t 
g a te  attests.131 H ow ever th e  cavalry  garrison  fo u n d  in  th e  N o titia  
D ignitatum  indicates bo th  a decrease in  the num ber of troops stationed in 
A m ida since A m m ianus' day, and  also a change in the function of the  site. 
By the tu rn  of the fifth century , the im perial au thorities v iew ed A m ida 
and  C onstantina as centres from  w hich to launch attacks against the Arabs, 
hence  the  necessity  of co n stru c tin g  D ara  w hen  ren ew ed  hostilitie s  
requ ired  a base for operating  against the  Persians.^®^ D uring  the reign of 
Justin ian , A m ida appears to have  acted as headquarte rs  for som e low - 
in tensity  cam paigns against Persian bandits, b u t little more.^33 Procopius 
is brief in  his descriptions of Justinianic im provem ents to the  city.^04 Both 
the m ain  circuit w all and  the  forew all w ere repaired, o r replaced w ith  new  
s tru c tu re s . U n d o u b te d ly , th e  o ld  fo u rth -c e n tu ry  w o rk s  n e e d e d  
refurbishm ent. But given the stalw art resistance in the siege of A.D, 502/3, 
and  the  hesitancy of the Rom ans to storm  A m ida in the  follow ing year, it
98 Amm. Marc., 18.9.1.
99 Zos., 3.34, and CP, p. 552; see map in RBK 135 for western expansion.
100 J. Matthews (1989a) 66.
101 Transcription of inscription is found in J. Matthews (1989a) 489.
102 Chron. Josh., 90.
103 Mai., 18.65.
104 Procopius, Buildings, 2.3.27-8.
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is likely  th a t P rocop ius exaggerates the  poor cond ition  of th e  w alls. 
N onetheless, im provem ents w ere  m ade bo th  to A m ida and  subord inate  
fo rts, an d  the  em pero r sen t the  pa tric ian  P lato  to  oversee the  p ro p er 
m anagem ent of the d e f e n c e s . i ^ s  Procopius reveals little about these nearby 
forts, save th a t they  had  been m ade of m u d  bricks. O nly tw o are nam ed: 
A p an d as an d  th e  fo rtified  v illage of V irthon; ap p aren tly  there  w ere  
o t h e r s . ^ 3 6  Such stockades w ere  p a r t  of a local defence  system  in  
conjunction w ith  A m ida, b u t how  they  functioned  is no t clear. M ajor 
m ilitary  strongholds lay fu rther n o rth  and  east. The duces Armeniae had  
their seats in  C itharizon, A rtaleson and  M artyropolis, w hile  the magister 
m ilitum  per Armeniam  w as based  a t Theodosiopolis. In  the  sp rin g  of 
A.D. 586, the Rom an general, Philippicus, chose to  m eet Persian envoys in 
A m ida to negotiate  a t r e a t y . p- seem s reasonable to  surm ise th a t the 
defences of A m ida w ere  th o u g h t fo rm idable enough  to  in tim ida te  the 
em bassy. A  few  m onths later, w hen  the cam paign to seize the Persian 
fortress of C hlom aron failed, it w as to  A m ida tha t Philippicus r e t r e a t e d . ^ ^ s  
Thus, A m ida appears never to have been classified as the  p rem ier bu lw ark  
of the east.
Exam ining these sieges, one can identify four problem s w hich beset 
A m ida. A lth o u g h  they  are  all significant, none of them  u ltim ate ly  
underm ined  the effectiveness of local defence. First, in  bo th  sieges, A m ida 
w as su rp rised  by  the  arrival of the  Persian  host. Poor surveillance and  
com m unication  p rev en ted  the  Rom ans from  an tic ipa ting  P ersian  aim s. 
This seem s to  be a typ ical lim ita tion  of Rom an arm y  i n t e l l i g e n c e . !  ^ 9  
Second, the city also suffered the  inevitable m ixed loyalties of a frontier 
se ttlem ent. In  the  A.D. 359 siege the  city alm ost fell w hen  a Persian  
sym path ize r revealed  the  secret sta irw ell in to  a t o w e r . ! I n  the sixth 
century  local m erchants h ad  few  difficulties selling goods and  p rovender
105 Mai., 18.26; 18.76, briefly mentions that the fortifications of Amida received some 
refurbishment.
106 Procopius, Buildings, 2.4.19-21.
107 Th. Sim., 1.15.1-13.
108 Th. Sim., 2.9.16.
109 B. Isaac (1990) 401-8, gives the impression that military surveillance was weak along 
the entire length of the eastern frontier. However, note obsevations below in Chp. 5 § 6.
110 Amm. Marc. 19.5.5.
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to  th e  P e rsian  g a rriso n  d u rin g  the  R om an cam paign  to  rec ap tu re  
A m ida.!!! Stories of the abuses of Rom an soldiers against the inhabitants 
w ere accepted w ith  little question.!!^ By and large, how ever, disaffection 
w as no t a critical factor in the  h istory  of Am ida. Third, either th rough  the 
confinem ents of space, poor supp ly  system , or the inevitable filth of battle, 
A m ida  su ffered  from  a lack of san ita tion  d u rin g  these  crises. The 
ep idem ic  n a rra ted  by  A m m ianus rem inds the  m o d ern  read er of the  
difficulties p laced before late antique defenders in  an env ironm ent w hich 
only fostered, infection and  disease.!!^ Similar problem s beset the Persian 
garrison  in  the  sixth century. Even though  they  h ad  stocked the  city 
storeroom s, and  orig inally  w ere  able to continue trad e  w ith  the  locals, 
starvation  eventually  gripped  the city and  som e resorted  to cannibalism.!!^ 
C learly, the  m anagem ent of supplies and  the m ain tenance of discipline 
am ongst the civilian popu la tion  w ere  essential to  successful resistance. 
Finally, in the fourth  century the  co-ordination of defences often relied on 
the talents of specialists and  an  elite corps to oversee operations. Even 
regu lars in  the  im peria l field arm y do  n o t seem  to  have  been  tra in ed  
specifically for endu ring  long sieges.ü^ The Gallic legions typify the late 
R om an soldier, w ho m ay be a fierce and  even disciplined opponen t in  a 
p itched  engagem ent, b u t lacks the capacity to  undertake engineering duties 
useful in a siege. The im pression left by  A m m ianus' account is tha t only a 
sm all p a rt of the  R om an force knew  how  to  co-ord inate  artillery  and  
design counter-m easures against the Persians assault.!!6 In  the end. Sapor 
to o k  care  to  h u n t  d o w n  a n d  cruc ify  th e  R om an  o fficers w ho  
m asterm inded  the  resistance.!!7 Therefore, one m ay conclude tha t only a 
sm all num ber of specialists w ould  be necessary to superv ise  the  runn ing  
of siege engines and  counter-w orks. As long as an  arsenal w as kept, the 
em pire  could  free itself of the  need  for large troops in  fron tier cities.
111 Procopius, Wars, 1.9.5, and Chron. Josh. 66.
112 Procopius, Wars, 1.9.7.
113 Amm. Marc., 19.4.1-8. W.E. Kaegi (1991) discusses some of the problems the environment 
created for combatants.
114 Chron. Josh., 76-77
115 For a discussion of tlie widening gap of talent between officers such as Ammianus and the 
rank and file soldiers see de Jonge (1982) 84-5.
116 J. Matthews (1989a) 64-5.
117 Amm. Marc., 19.9.2.
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prov ided  tha t citizen m orale rem ained high. Indeed, by the sixth century, 
a large garrison  is no t p resen t in  the  city, w hich m ay indicate a shift in 
im perial policy aw ay from  the h ighly  m ilitarised fron tier of C onstantins, 
to  a m ore econom ic use  of force. In  sum , it w ould  appear tha t it w as no t 
the du ty  of A m ida to act as a perm anent shield for the w ealthy lands to the 
w est, b u t to ham per and  delay a Persian advance until a Rom an field arm y 
cou ld  arrive  an d  figh t the  P ersians in  a p itch ed  ba ttle . From  one 
perspective, the success of the  system  in  ho ld ing  large arm ies for u p  to 
three m onths m ay have led im perial forces to a slow er responses; or, from  
another, m ay have allow ed them  to free troops for im portan t operations 
in o ther areas. In the end, the policy pu rsu ed  by A nastasius and  Justinian 
of m u ltip ly in g  th e  n u m b er an d  ex ten t of fo rtifications succeeded  in  
exhausting Persian w ar efforts.
§ 3. The M iddle Euphrates: C itharizon, A rtaleson, and  Melitene:
Prior to the late fifth century  the  defence of the frontier sector along 
the  A rsan ias river w as devo lved  to the  local A rm en ian  sa traps, w ho 
m u s te re d  th e ir  o w n  forces a n d  p ro v id e d  a lin k  b e tw een  R om an 
installations in  the w est along the  Euphrates, and  in the  sou th  th roughou t 
M e s o p o t a m i a . !!3 Like m any of the  satrapies w hich len t su p p o rt to the 
rebels Illus and  Leontinus, their hered itary  rights w ere stripped  aw ay by  
Zeno; the  exception w as the satraps of Balabitine w ho reta ined  full pow ers 
un til Justin ian 's reform s. The m ost pow erfu l fam ily in  th is reg ion  was 
th e  K am inakan  H ouse, a b ran ch  of the  fo rm er A rsac id  d y n asts  of 
A rm enia, w hich ru led  from  the  territo ry  of H asteank, o r A sthianene as it 
w as know  to the Rom ans, and  continued to have g rea t influence un til the 
se v e n th  c e n t u r y . ! !9 A sth ian en e  p rese rv ed  its in d ep e n d en c e  u n til 
Ju stin ian ic  leg isla tion  in co rp o ra ted  the  reg ion  in to  Armenia IV , the  
sa trap a l system  n o t hav ing  p ro v ed  sa tisfactory  for g ro w in g  fron tie r 
p r e s s u r e s . !  70 A t the sam e tim e, the  em peror rep laced  the  sa traps in
118 Procopius, Buildings, 3.1.24-29; J.D. Howard-Johiiston (1989) 213.
119 N. Garsoian (1989) 382 and C. Toumanoff (1963) 172, 192, and 193 for the sources and 
history of the Kaminakani.
120 Cf, 1.29.5; Nov., 31.
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A sth ian en e  a n d  C h o rzan e  w ith  duces w hom  h e  e s tab lish ed , w ith  
fortifications and  regular garrisons, a t C itharizon and A rta leson /^ i
The location of tw o  ducal seats of the  reg ion  can be identified . 
C itharizon lies approxim ately  forty  kilom etres north -east of Bingol in the 
foothills, overlooking  the  A rsanias r iv e r . !72 The rem ains of the fortress 
rest atop a horn-shaped hillock w hich b lends in to  the  su rround ing  terrain. 
N u m ero u s  im p o rta n t ro u tes  m ay  be m o n ito red  from  th is  position . 
N o rth -ea s te rn  m ov em en t from  E rzu ru m  m u st d escen d  th ro u g h  the  
Çobantas pass along the  G oynuk river valley, w hile traffic from  Van and  
central A rm enia em erges from  the Buglan pass to the  east. Both routes, 
now  follow ed by  m odern  roads, m eet w est of C itharizon and  follow  the 
A rsanias to M elitene and  the w est. Finally, m ovem ent over the T aurus 
pass either rises from  o r descends onto the Bingol p lain , also observable 
from  C itharizon . The precise  location  for A rtaleson  is still d ebated , 
a lthough  I su p p o rt S inclair's suggestion  of Kigi, a site w hich  has the 
rem ains of a citadel and  an A rm enian settlem ent, b u t w hich sits a long a 
m ore  circuitous rou te  to  E rzu rum .!73 H ow ard-Johnston  w as unable  to 
find  suitable rem ains in  the countryside betw een Cat and  Karliova, and  it 
is less likely to have been  in  th is area. The sa trapy  of C horzane, in  the  
m iddle  of w hich stood A rtaleson, centred around  the Peri Suyu v a l l e y . ! 74 
If A rtaleson is placed anyw here along the  w aters of the  Peri Suyu betw een 
Kigi and  V iransehir, it  w ou ld  have  s tradd led  a m ain  h ighw ay  halfw ay 
b e tw een  E rzu ru m  a n d  C itha rizon , hav ing  access to  m inor east-w est 
rou tes. F rom  th is location  one could  track  a force w hich  so u g h t to 
circum vent the Seytan D aglari range and  outflank C itharizon.
A sth ianene and  the w estern  territo ry  of Balabitine w ere probably  
n o t ceded to  Rom e w ith  o ther satrap ies of the Syrian M arch u n d e r the 
Peace of A.D. 298, b u t w ere added  in  the later fourth  century.!7S Christian 
influence in  the  area of A sth ianene took an early  ro o t an d  h a d  a long
121 Procopius, Buildings, 3.1.28-9.
122 J.D. Howard-Johnston (1989) 203-11 for the topography and brief history of Citharizon.
123 T.A. Sinclair (1989) 142-43.
124 N. Adontz (1970) 15-6.
125 Territories gained under the Peace of Nisibis are mentioned in Peter the Patrician, Leg. 
ad gen., 3; later additions are discussed in E. Stein (1949) 298, and C. Toumanoff (1963) 131, 
171-2.
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history . O ne of the  first m entions of A sth ianene refers to King T rdat 
su p p o rtin g  G regory the  Illum inato r's sending  of a b ishop into the area, 
and  one of the last is the m ention of bishop M arianos of C itharizon at the 
C ouncil in  T rullo  of A.D. 692.176 the  valley  be low  the n o rth e rn  
escarpm en t of C itharizon  are  rem ains of a w ell-constructed  cruciform  
church  sim ilar to  th a t a t S a t a l a . i 7 7  P erhaps the  c iv ilian  se ttlem en t 
expanded around the stream  below  the fortress.
R om an defences n o rth  of the  T aurus m ay  have been  developed  
d u rin g  A nastasius' reign , b u t their existence does no t becom e ap p aren t 
until the second quarter of the  sixth c e n t u r y .! 78 Shortly after his arrival in 
the w inter of A.D. 531/2 , the dux  of C itharizon led the garrison  in its first 
engagem ent. A  large band  of Sabir H uns, retreating  after au tum n  raids, 
m oved  from  the sou th-east tow ard  the T aurus passes w here  they  w ere 
challenged  and  re p u lse d  on  the  u p p e r  T igris p la in  by  th e  d u x  of 
M artyropolis. W ith d raw in g  across the  T aurus m o u n ta in s , the  H uns 
sacrificed a significant force in assaulting Citharizon, so tha t a second body 
could e sc a p e .!7 9
O n several occasions C itharizon  acted as an  assem bly p o in t for 
Rom an m anoeuvres beyond the frontier. It is possible th a t the  city saw  
the gathering  of im perial arm s for the ill-fated cam paign of A.D. 528-9.!30 
W hen the  Rom ans in v ad ed  P ersarm enia  in  A.D. 543, M artin , m agister 
m ilitum , and  tw o of his subord inate  generals d rew  their forces a round  
the city.!3! A nd  in  the w in ter of A.D. 577/8 , M aurice, magister m ilitum  
per Orientem et comes foederatorum, encam ped  and  tra in ed  his forces 
a round  C itharizon, positioned so as to react quickly to Persian advances 
against either A rm enia o r M esopotamia.!32 It w as n o t un til M aurice w as 
d raw n  aw ay  from  th is  p o sitio n  by  th e  offensive of M ahbodh , th a t 
T am khusro w as able to pass C itharizon, cross the  T aurus m ountains, and
126 Sources for Gregory are examined in N. Garsoian (1989) 468; the sources for Marianos are 
given in N. Adontz (1970) 474 n. 69.
127 This basilica was visited by C.S. Lightfoot and myself in June 1991.
128 J.D. Howard-Johnston (1989) 215-20 for the probability of pre-Justinianic construction.
129 Zach. Mit., 9.6.
130 As is argued in J.D. Howard-Johnston (1989) 220.
131 Procopius, Wars, 2.24.13.
132 J. Eph., HE, 6.14. L.M. Whitby (1988) 268-9 discusses the role of Citharizon during tliis 
campaign.
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ra id  th e  te rr ito r ie s  su rro u n d in g  A m i d a / 3 3  Finally , the  cap tu re  of 
C itharizon w as a p rim ary  objective in the Persian offensive of A.D. 607, 
b u t after this capitulation the city w as probably retu rned  under the Peace of 
A.D. 629/34
A rtaleson w as created in  the early  sixth century  to  tigh ten  Rom an 
control in the  region of Xorjayn, know n later to the Rom ans as Chorzane, 
w h ic h  w as t ra v e rs e d  b y  th e  R om an  ro a d  fro m  C ith a r iz o n  to  
T h e o d o s i o p o l i s . ! 3 5  C horzane is n o t m entioned  in  e ither Classical o r
A rm enian sources prio r to the late fifth c e n t u r y . i 3 6  The inhabitants of the 
region, d istinguished as subjects of the  tw o great em pires b u t no t d iv ided  
by  geographical features, w ere  u n ited  in  o ther respects. They d id  no t 
construct strongho lds or w illingly  ra id  each o th er’s land; fam ilies w ere  
linked th rough  in term arriage, m arket tow ns shared, and  large settlem ents 
w ere  a d j a c e n t . ! 3 7  This posed  enorm ous problem s for Rom ans. W ithout 
d e lin ea tin g  R om an from  non-R om an, the  im peria l go v ern m en t cou ld  
never d ep en d  on the  loyalty  of the  area, no r could  th is section of the 
frontier serve to defend o ther Rom an territories from  attack, as w as m ade 
evident in  K avadh's A.D. 502 cam paign.
In  re sp o n se  to  th ese  d ifficu ltie s , th e  im p e ria l g o v e rn m e n t 
constructed  the  fortress-city of A rtaleson. A  centrally located A rm enian  
tow n w as su rrounded  w ith  a strong w all and  given a perm anen t garrison, 
u n d e r the com m and of a The ancient A rm enian sa trapal seat of
C horzane w as located at the fortress of Koloberd, identified  w ith  the site of 
m odern  Kigi; this city w as undoub ted ly  the tow n chosen by  the im perial 
g o v e rn m e n t to  a d m in is te r  th e  area.!39 P re su m a b ly , A rta le so n 's  
aug m en ted  im portance  as th e  u rb an  centre of C horzane  a llow ed  the
133 Th. Sim., 3.15.13-15; Men. Prot., 23.6; J. Eph., HE., 6.14.
134 On the capture of Citharizon see Sebeos 23, and Stephen of Taron 61. The terms of the 
Peace of A.D. 629 discussed in the 724 Chronicle, 108,114, state the surrounding territory 
remained in Persian hands. But given the instability in Persia it is likely that the region 
returned to Roman jurisdiction.
135 For Chorzane see N. Adontz (1970) 14-16,19-20,39,43,182,307.
136 C. Toumanoff (1963) 457-8 and 442.
137 Procopius, Buildings, 3.3.9-14 is our fullest discussion of Chorzane and its inhabitants, 
which is described and discussed in N. Adontz (1970) 14-17.
138 Procopius, Buildings, 3.3.13-14.
139 See N. Adontz (1970) 379-8 n.26 for the identification of Koloberd.
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Rom ans to control econom ic and  cultural transactions, as well as religious 
festivals, and  to decrease the overlap betw een Rom an and  Persian spheres
of influence/40
Brief m ention should  be m ade of the  sm aller sites w hich supported  
C itharizon and A rtaleson, o r acted in  conjunction w ith  them . First, to  the 
w est of b o th  C itharizon  and  A rtaleson , g u a rd in g  m ajor fo rds of the 
A rsanias tributaries, stood lesser fortified sites.^^i Second, those travelling 
from  P e rsa rm en ia  to  R om an M esopo tam ia , h a d  f irs t to  slip  p a s t  
C itharizon to the A rsanias crossing near Genç. O n the no rth  bank atop a 
h igh  b luff overlooking the  river are the  rem ains of a fortified  p o s t / 42 
A fter fo rd ing  the river one rap id ly  ascended the Illyrisis, the w estern  of 
the tw o Taurus passes. A  eastern rou te  through the Saphcae pass crossed 
th e  T au rus from  M uç v ia  the  K ulp  Ç ay valley , em erg ing  n o rth  of 
M a r t y r o p o l i s . ! 43 D uring  the  early  sixth century  the Rom ans garrisoned  
bo th  passes and  placed a large fort a t Pheison, for observing the Illyrisis 
en trance  to  th e  m o u n ta in s an d  th e  u p p e r T igris p la in  from  h ig h er 
ground.!44
Two features of the  sites in  A sthianene and  C horzanene disp lay  the 
h igh ly  localised  n a tu re  of R om an defences. F irst, fortifications and  
settlem ents w ere situated  to com m and specific areas: passes w ere bottled  
and  river fords m onitored . Second, as assem bly po in ts , the  sites w ere 
usually  directed against the  interests of a specific area. In the consolidation 
of fron tier lands, the  Rom ans increased  their ho ld  over settlem ents by  
carefu lly  de linea ting  R om an an d  non-R om an th ro u g h  the  changes in  
law s, m arriag e  custom s, sep a ra tio n  o f com m unities, a n d  con tro l of 
religious, cultural, and  econom ic centres.
M elitene stands on  the  w est side  of the E uphrates, approxim ately  
ten  kilom etres no rth  of m odern  Malatya.!45 To the east of the city flows
140 Such activities were assumed by cities hosting markets in a region, R. MacMullen (1970).
141 See J.D. Howard-Johnston (1989) 221-23 for a discussion of these fortifications.
142 T.A. Sinclair (1989) 132.
143 L.M. Whitby (1985) 201.
144 Procopius, Buildings, 3.3.1-6; Taylor (1865) 39 noted the massive ruins of well-cut stone 
spread out on the slopes; see also Dakyanus Kale in T.A. Sinclair (1989) 272-3.
145 For a concise account of the remains, topography and history of the site see A. Gabriel 
(1940) 263-8; T.B. Mitford (1980) 1186; J. Crow (1989) 93-102; T.A. Sinclair (1989) 8-10; El (2) 
230-1.
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one of the  E u p h ra tes  trib u ta rie s . The site com m ands access to  an 
im p o rtan t ford  over the  E uphrates near Tom isa w here  the  A chaem enid 
R oyal ro ad  m eets th e  n o rth -so u th  h ig h w ay  lea d in g  e v en tu a lly  to  
Trapezus.!46 Control of this sector had  been granted  to  C appadocian kings 
du ring  the Republic. A n older C appadocian fortress p receded the Rom an 
estab lishm ent in the  general vicinity , b u t little  is know  ap art from  its 
nam e, Sham iran.!47 U ntil the  reign  of Tiberius, the E uphrates crossing 
near M elitene h ad  been  u n d er the  guard iansh ip  of client auxiliaries.! 48 
P erm anen t occupation  w aited  un til A.D. 70, w hen  legio X II Fulminata 
shifted north  to M elitene after Jerusalem  w as secured, and  rem ained  there 
th ro u g h o u t the  u n it 's  history.!49 O ver the  next few  decades the  civil 
popu la tion  increased. The em peror Trajan, w ho  h ad  u sed  the site as a 
base for his A rm enian  cam paign of A.D. 114, elevated  the  settlem ent to 
the  ran k  of city and  M elitene becam e m etropolis of Cappadocia.!50 A 
n u m b er of aux iliary  forts w ere  e stab lished  in  th e  second  a n d  th ird  
centuries along the  E uphrates to  m ark  Rom an control and  to facilitate 
defence and  com m unication.!^!
D u rin g  S a p o r 's  A .D . 359 in v a s io n , M e liten e  b ecam e  th e  
headquarters for U rsicinus' beleaguered c o m m a n d . !57 H ow ever, this was a 
tem porary  arrangem ent. The forw ard  line of defences rad ia ted  around  the 
M esopo tam ian  cities u n d e r the  ju risd ic tion  of th e  dux Mesopotmniae, 
w hile  the defence of the  E uphrates w as co-ordinated from  the  sou thern  
cities of Sam osata, Z eugm a, o r in  the  A.D. 359 assau lt, E d e s s a .!5 3  The 
original w alls of the  city w ere  unable  to contain the  civil expansion  of 
M elitene. O utside the fortifications tem ples, legal courts, theatres, baths
146 B. Isaac (1990) 11; H.A. Manandian (1965) 24-5,
147 Pliny, Nat. h ist, 6.8.
148 Tac., Annals, 12.49; T.B. Mitford (1980)1173-4.
149 Joseph,, Bell. Jud., 7.1.3; Not. Dig, Or. 38.14.
150 Joseph., Bell. Jud., 7.1.3; Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.15-17; A.H.M. Jones (1971) 179; D. 
Magie (1950) 1436,1464; B. Isaac (1990) 139, 281-2.
151 These sites are discussed in T.B. Mitford (1980) 1187-92.
152 Amm. Marc., 19.8.12; R.C. Blockley (1988) 254.
153 Sabinianus, as magister equitum per Orientem kept the majority of his force centred in 
this district, Amm. Marc., 18.7; R.C. Blockley (1988) 254-55; Ursicinus, as d u x  
M esopotamiae normally co-ordinated operations from Nisibis, Amm. Marc., 19.9.6; J. 
Matthews (1989a) 41, and 52.
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and  stoas all appeared  as the city 's cultural and economic pow er increased. 
The m arket of M elitene w as large enough  to  a ttrac t agents for Persian  
t r a d e . ! 5 4  By the late  fifth  cen tu ry  the  m ajority  of the  settlem ent w as 
unprotected. Like m any cities after the incursions of A.D. 515, A nastasius 
p ro v id ed  M elitene w ith  a c ircu it w all; the  w ork  w as left incom plete, 
how ever, u n til a fter h is death.^55 The m assive ru in ed  ram p arts  of 
M elitene d a te  from  th is p e r io d .! 5 6  The city d id  n o t have a forew all, 
a lthough  a m oat encircles the site. Square, circular, and  prow -face tow ers 
a re  p re sen t a long  the  irreg u la rly  sh ap ed  p erim eter. L ittle  civil o r 
ecclesiastical architecture has survived.
The rem ain d e r of M elitene 's  h is to ry  in  la te  a n tiq u ity  m ay  be 
sum m arized  briefly. W hen, in  A.D. 503 a detachm ent of K avadh 's arm y 
w as assau lting  the  te rrito ry  of C onstan tina , E ugenius, d u x  of M elitene 
jo ined  forces w ith  O lym pius, dux  of C onstantina, an  apparen tly  senior 
o f f i c e r . ! 5 7  In itia lly , th e  R om ans succeeded  in  lim itin g  P e rsian  
m an o eu v res , b u t  d u rin g  a n ig h t b a ttle  received  h eav y  casualties. 
H ow ever, E ugenius' force w as sufficient to  m arch  n o rth  and  defeat the 
P ersian  garrison  a t T h e o d o s i o p o l i s . ! 5 8  i n  January A.D. 503 the  Rom an 
general Patricius em barked from  M elitene on his cam paign to recap tu re  
Am ida. The city had  been his w in ter headquarters and  Patricius m ay have 
su p p lied  h is force w ith  goods a n d  civilian  expertise  from  t h e r e . ! 59 
T hrough the sixth century  M elitene rem ained  an attractive and  pow erfu l 
city, w hose interests w ere served by  im perial patrons. Dom itian, a relative 
of the em peror M aurice and  one of the  m ost active frontier b ishops, w as 
g ran te d  th e  see of M elitene, w h ich  in the  late  six th  cen tu ry  h a d  a
154 J. Eph., Lives, 31; Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.18.
155 Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.19-20; Mai., 16.17; C. Capizzi (1969) 207; B. Croke and J. Crow 
(1983) 146 have argued that Justinian's contribution has been inflated; however, see reply 
in L.M. Whitby (1987) 101.
156 T.B. Mitford (1980) 1186; however see J. Crow (1986) 84-6 for a medieval dating of the 
w alls.
157 Chron. Josh., 41. Olympias gives the orders to assemble the army after their victory.
158 Chron. Josh., 42. Possibly, Eugenius had withdrawn his troops prior to the night battle.
159 Chron. Josh., 66; and 87: Patricius returns to the city when Kavadh quit his campaign.
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ce leb ra ted  c h u r c h / 6 0  an d  M aurice him self w as bo rn  a t A rabissus, in 
C appadocia, to the  east of M elitene/^! O ne final incident of im portance is 
know n about the region before the A rab invasions. After a severe defeat 
du ring  his A.D. 576 A rm enian cam paign, K husro m oved to the Euphrates 
crossing near M elitene. The city w as caught w ithou t a garrison. Before 
the approaching  im perial arm y could confront them , the  Persians storm ed 
the  city and  b u rn ed  m any of its finer bu ild ings, before re trea ting  in to
Arzanene.!^7
Like sites to  the  east, M elitene con tro lled  a specific area: the  
E uphrates crossings opposite  Tomisa. But because of its central location 
along m ajor h ighw ays, the city w as also a perpe tual focus of cam paign 
assem bly , co -o rd ina tion , an d  re trea t. In  p a rticu la r, M elitene d raw s 
atten tion  to the  ability of an in tially  m ilitary  com m unity  to p rov ide  the  
ca ta ly st for p ro v in c ia l deve lopm en t. N a tiv e  life rev o lv ed  a ro u n d  
M elitene as the  m etropolis of the  region. As a m etropo litan  centre, the 
city perpetually  enjoyed the lavish rew ards of im perial patronage.
§ 4. The A rm enian h ighlands and  the U pper Euphrates: Theodosiopolis
and Satala:
T heodosiopo lis, m o d ern  E rzu ru m , lies tw o  h u n d re d  an d  fifty  
kilom etres sou th  of the Black Sea p o rt of Batumi, 163 S ituated on a p lateau  
near the head-w aters of the u p p er Euphrates (Kara Su), the city lies on the 
m ain h ighw ay betw een Asia M inor, Transcaucasia, and  Iran. M ajor routes 
rad ia te  north-w est to Kars and  the u p p er A ras river valley, or south-east 
th rough  the D elibaba gorge to Mt. A rarat, and  then  strike sou th  for Persia, 
w hile the Pontic A lps are crossed by tracks north  to H opa  and  Batum i, or 
north-w est tow ard  Trapezus.
160 Th. Sim., 4.14.5; 5.3.1; 8.11.10-11. Maurice had secured the see for his ambitious young 
relative shortly after being appointed mag. mil. per. Or. in A.D. 577/8, L.M. Whitby (1988) 
14.
161 L.M. Whitby (1988) 5.
162 Th. Sim., 3.14.11; L.M. Whitby (1988) 262-6 for a discussion of this episode.
163 For a concise history of Theodosiopolis (Erzurum) and Karin see DHGE 831-36, El (1) 31, 
and El (2) 712.
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The site has a long history as the u rban  centre of the region know n 
as K arentis or K arin, an area  com prising the  E uphrates p lain  below  the 
Pontic Alps. W rested from  the  m ountain  chieftains by  the  A rm enians, by  
th e  f irs t c en tu ry  A .D . K arin  soon  d e v e lo p ed  a com m erc ia l a n d  
adm in istrative  focus. Sim ply dubbed  K a rn o y ', o r the  city of K arin, the  
settlem ent w as probably  the capital of one of the one-hundred  and  tw enty  
satrapies established by T rdat the Great.i64 W hen A rm enia w as d ivided in 
A.D. 387, and  P ap 's eldest son, A rshak II, was set u p  as Rom an client king 
in  K arnoy, the  city h a d  expanded  its econom ic position  an d  possessed  
w a l l s .  165 Karin had  form ed one of the principal dom ains of the  A rsacid 
d y n a s ty  even  befo re  th is  p a rti tio n  occured . M anuel M am ikonean  
challenged the  A rsacid prince V arazdates on the fields of Karin, and  later 
du ring  the  regency of the young A rshak, M anuel based A rsacid pow er in 
Karnoy.166 Som etim e after bo th  the death  of A rshak in  A.D. 390 and  the 
com pilation of the  Notitia D ignitatum , the im peria l governm en t p laced  
the princes of Armenia minor under a comes Armeniae, b u t g ran ted  them  
im m unity  from  taxes and  a high degree of political m obility, so long as it 
acco rded  w ith  R om an p o l i c y . i 6 7  The comes Armeniae  w as, from  the 
A rm en ian  v an tag e  p o in t, little  d iffe ren t from  the  Iran ian  office of 
m arzpan. U nlike o ther R om an com ites, he  com m anded  no troops, b u t 
w as the senior civil official of the area, and  like the old  im perial vicari, his 
function  w as to superv ise the  econom y, hand le  im portan t legal m atters, 
an d  oversee  th e  g o v ern o rs . This R om an v iceroy  e s tab lish ed  h is 
com m and at K arnoy, renam ed Theodosiopolis,
164 Strabo 11.14.5.; Pliny, Nat. hist., 5.20.87, where Karnoy is referred to as a praefectura; 
C. Toumanoff (1963) 79, 11-2, 156-7, and 331-2; H.A. Manandian (1965) 87-88; N. Adontz 
(1970) 43-44.
165 Faust. Buz., 6.1; MX 3.42; and LP 1.6-8, where Karinkoy is refered to as K'alak, or 
walled city; Garsoian (1989) 387, 535.
166 Faust. Buz., 5.37, and 54; C. Toumanoff (1963) 193-4 n. 209; N. Adontz (1970) 98-9.
167 Procopius, Wars, 2.3.35; MX 3.46; C. Toumanoff (1963) 152,133,193; N. Adontz (1970) 93- 
4; E. Stein (1949) 528 n. 89. However, A.H.M. Jones (1964) 229 holds that the comes 
Armeniae was not appointed until the reign of Zeno.
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The are  som e d isc rep an c ies  am o n g st th e  so u rces ov e r th e  
fo u n d a tio n  of T h e o d o s i o p o l i s / 6 8  H ow ever, it is possible to  establish  
several stages of developm ent and  iden tify  the m ain  m ilitary , civil, and  
ecclesiastical features. Arsacid Karnoy, w ith  its sim ple enclosure, had  been 
the  base of Rom an au thority  in  the region since partition  in  A.D. 387. In 
the m id-fifth  century , T heodosiopolis received im proved  defences w hen 
A n a to liu s , magister m ilitum  per Orientem  u n d e r  T heodosius II, w as 
o rdered  to  fu rther entrench Rom an pow er in Karin, perhaps in reaction to 
m in o r incu rsions in  A.D. 441.^69 A nato lius w as w ell-su ited  for the  
undertaking; his concern for the eastern frontiers insp ired  him  to instigate 
refo rm s a im ed  a t im p ro v in g  th e  d isc ip line  an d  effectiveness of the  
But in  spite of M oses' claim  to be reporting  the features of 
A natolius' construction, his h isto ry  m ore accurately describes the  w ork of 
A nastasius and  Justin ian, p rio r to w hich only  a R om an citadel and  the 
o lder A rm enian enclosure defended  the  p o s i t i o n . ^ 71 U nder A nastasius a 
c ircu it w all th irty  feet in  he ig h t w as ra ised  to  su rro u n d  the  grow ing  
civ ilian  se ttlem en t. H ow ever, th is w all p ro v ed  in su ffic ien t against 
determ ined  assailants, as the A.D. 502 cam paign of K avadh proved. The 
th ird  and  fullest stage of construction w as com pleted d u rin g  the reign of 
Justin ian , an d  it is to  th is p e rio d  th a t w e m ay a ttr ib u te  m ost of the 
im pressive qualities of Theodosiopolis hailed  in the sources.
Part of the  citadel hill tow ered  above the circuit w all jeopard izing  
the  south-east sector of the defences. The elevated rock w as carved aw ay 
and  a channel form ed betw een the citadel w all and  the  slope of the citadel 
hill. This channel w as joined w ith  a m oat w hich encircled the  entire city. 
Behind this m oat w as constructed a forew all and  beh ind  this a tw o-storyed
168 See N. Adontz (1970) 119-25 for a discussion of Procopius, Buildings, 3.5.1-12 , MX, 3.59, 
and the Disputation of the H oly Armenian Vardapets Moses and David with the 
Diophysites, trans. in N. Adontz (1970) 149.
169 Z. Rubin (1986) 36-39.
170 See discussion and sources in A.H.M. Jones (1964) 203,353,1109 n. 71, and 1146 n. 68.
171 N. Adontz (1970) 122, and R.W. Thomson (1978) 7-8; Procopius states clearly that the 
Anastasian walls enclosed the hill which the Theodosian fort dominated. Buildings, 3.5.1- 
4.
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c u r t a i n / 7 2  Careful m easures w ere taken to preven t an  enem y force from  
u n d e rm in in g  these  w alls. N ew  foundations of u n d ressed  stone w ere  
bu ried  deep below  the soil, and  the curious steps referred to in  the 'legend ' 
m ay have been  angled stonew ork  designed  to deflect a d irect b low  from  
picks and r a m s . ^ 7 3  Both prow -shaped and circular tow ers, and  broad  gates 
fea tu red  in  th e  defences, w ere  m ade  w ith  c renellations an d  n a rro w  
em brasures to m axim ize the  safety of the archers. The entire fortress was 
d ressed  in  fine stone, p resu m ab ly  ashlar. A  series of u n d e rg ro u n d  
channels are m en tioned , b u t on ly  by  the  A rm enian  sources. Som e of 
these conduits constantly supplied  fresh w ater to the city. O ne em erged by 
a m arsh, from  w hich fuel and  anim al fodder could be gathered . O n the 
m ounta in  side of the city, an  even larger tunnel w as constructed to allow  
the m ovem ent of cavalry, b u t this m ay sim ply be a garb led  reference to  a 
sally  p o r t . ^ 7 4  M any store-houses an d  an a rm oury  w ere  p laced  in  the 
citadel.
The city itself w as know n for its system atic organisation , and  its 
position  on the  central trade  rou tes encouraged a h igh  standard  of living 
an d  u rb an  d e v e l o p m e n t . ^ 7 5  stree ts  and  colonnades w ere set o u t in  an  
o rderly  fashion, and  the  m arkets and  slaughterhouses w ere im peccable. 
T h eo d o sio p o lis 's  ecc lesiastical a rch itec tu re  w as ce leb ra ted  in  local 
trad ition . A n um ber of relig ious estab lishm ents w ere  know n  to have 
ex isted  in  the  vicinity  of T heodosiopolis by the  sixth century . Two in 
particu la r enjoyed im peria l pa tronage. W ithin the city  itself, Justin ian  
ded icated  a church  to  the  M other of G od, and  nearby , refu rb ished  the 
m onastery of the Forty M artyrs.176
Furtherm ore, a series of im portan t poin ts along the  rou tes to  and  
from  T heodosiopo lis w ere  fo rtified  o r red ev elo p ed  b y  th e  im peria l 
governm ent in  the first half of the sixth c e n t u r y .i7 7  Justin ian  p rov ided
172 N. Adontz (1970) 122-3 gives the height of the wall as between twenty-four and thirty 
feet high and six feet thick. However, the Justinianic walls must have been higher, for the 
inferior wall of Anastasius was only thirty feet high.
173 "...two hundred steps, one below the other, were set on the outside wall for safety from 
tunnels by the enemy."
174 This incredible feature is only mentioned in the legend.
175 H.A. Manandian (1965) 90.
176 Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.12-14.
177 Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.6-10.
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grants or perhaps tax relief to encourage the repair of o ld  hill-forts or the 
b u ild in g  of new  o n e s / 78 ad d itio n , m ilita ry  in sta lla tio n s w ere
developed  at B aiberdon (Bayburt) and  A reon; w hile  L ysio rm um  and  
Lytarizon w ere reinforced, and  a new  fort w as established a t a site know n 
as G erm ani Fossatum /79 The tow n of Bizana (Erzincan) w as situated  on 
the  open p lain  of the upper E uphrates, exposed to cavalry raids and  near 
m alarial m arshes. Justinian chose no t to invest resources in  the site, b u t 
p laced  a new  fortified  settlem ent in  foothills to  the  w est at T zum ina. 
N ine kilom etres w est of Erzincan, at A ltintepe, is a g rea t m oun t crow ned 
by the  rem ains of an U rartian  citadel. Surrounding the o lder defences are 
enorm ous ash lar w alls, and  th is seem s to be the likeliest position  for 
T z u m i n a . 180 H ow ever, fo r the  c iv ilian  com m unity , w hich  rem ained  
largely at Bizani, Justinian built a m onastery dedicated to St. George; and at 
Coucarizon and Petrios he restored older c o n v e n t s . ^ ^ i
As a royal dom ain , the  area a round  K arin h ad  been  exposed to 
C hristian  evangelization in  the early  fourth  century. A certain  John w as 
dispatched  by  G regory the Illum inator to educate the princely families and 
their ru ral d e p e n d e n t s . ^ ^ z  O rdained at Caeserea, Gregory and  by extension 
John and  successive bishops of Theodosiopolis, had  an affinity tow ards the  
im peria l church and  a w estw ard  outlook, w hich w as reinforced by  the 
partition  of A.D. 387.^83 the  late  fourth  century . A rchbishop N erses 
re tu rn ed  from  his ow n consecration at Caeserea and  in structed  K had, a 
deacon  of K arin , to  estab lish  hosp ices based  on  the  R om an m odel 
th ro u g h o u t the  land.^^4 This w estern  d isposition  w as n u rtu red  by  the
178 Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.S-9.
179 Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.10; N. Adontz (1970) 49-51,113, and 118 locates these forts in 
the vicinity of Bayburt, except Germani Fossatum, which he palaces near Gümüshane, and 
Lytarizon which is identified with the Roman city Olotoedariza between Satala and 
Nicopolis.
180 I visited Altintepe in July 1990. It is slightly further west than the position for Tzumina 
as indicated by Procopius, but from the elevated scarp commands a view of the east-west 
road as well as a southern route emerging from Pülümür. In addition to the Urartian walls 
can be seen later ashlar faced works.
181 Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.13; N. Adontz (1970) 118 places the latter two monasteries near 
Bayburt.
182 Discussion of sources in N. Adontz (1970) 257,466 n. 12b; and N. Garsoian (1989) 470-1.
183 N. Adontz (1970) 281-88.
184 MX 3.20.
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im peria l g overnm en t's  invo lvem ent in  relig ious m atters. In the  m id ­
fifth  c e n tu ry , A n a to liu s  n e g o tia te d  w ith  th e  P e rs ian  k in g  from  
Theodosiopolis to acheive the release of the CathoUcos, Sahak the G reat, 
and  later appoin ted  his envoy as A r c h b i s h o p . ^ ® 5  Little else is know n of the 
C hristian  com m unity  a ro u n d  th e  city, b u t th ro u g h o u t late  an tiqu ity , 
T heodosiopolitan bishops are recognised: in A.D. 448 Peter is consecrated 
bishop; bishop M anase a ttended  the A.D. 451 council of Chalcedon; bishop 
Peter w as p resen t a t the  council of C onstan tinop le  in  A.D. 553; an d  
Theodore presided  at the A.D. 590 council held  a t Theodosiopolis itself.^56 
O nly a few  historical events are know n abou t the  city w hich  can 
illum ina te  how  T heodosiopolis an d  the  te rrito ry  of K arin  functioned  
w ith in  frontier defence. Loyalties so close to  the  fron tier w ere at tim es 
susceptible to disaffection and  local quarrels. In the au tum n  of A.D. 502 
K avadh, in alliance w ith  the Sabir H uns, m oved via the  Araxes valley to 
the u p p e r E uphrates p lain  and  assau lted  Theodosiopolis.^^7 w ith in  days 
the governor, C onstantine, rebelled, encouraged by  his anim osity  tow ard  
A nastasiu s, an d  su rre n d e re d  the  city  to the  P ersians. W ith  choice 
treasures and  captives led aw ay to Persia, K avadh reinstalled  C onstantine 
as his marzpan  w ith  a Persian garrison. In the sp ring  Eugenius, dux o i 
M elitene , sco red  m ild  successes ag a in st enem y forces in  n o rth e rn  
M esopotam ia, b u t unable  to  d raw  the Persians in to  a p itched  battle , he 
m o v ed  a g a in st an d  re to o k  T h e o d o s i o p o l i s . F u rth e r incen tive  to 
streng then  the frontier w as p ro m p ted  by  the  ease w ith  w hich  the Sabir 
H uns sped  across the  A rm enian p la teau  and p illaged R om an hold ings in 
A.D. 515; cities w ere w alled and  tax w aivers gran ted  to the unfortunate  by 
A n a s t a s i u s . 1 ^ 9  D uring  the  first quarter of the f i f t h  century , the im perial 
governm ent took advantage of the Persians' preoccupation w ith  a H unnic 
w ar, an d  began  im prov ing  the fortifications near P e r s a r m e n i a .  1 9 0  The 
in itia l A nastasian  resto ra tions m ay be d a ted  to  th is  p e rio d , b u t firm  
consolidation of the region aw aited  the reign of Justin ian , w hen  the old
185 MX 3.65, though the envoy's appointment may be a medieval elaboration.
186 N. Adontz (1970) 284,474; DGHE 834-5.
187 Chron. Josh., 48.
188 Chron. Josh., 51-2.
189 Mai. 16.17; C. Capizzi (1969) 207.
190 Procopius, Wars, 2.2.10.
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trans-E uphratene  sa trap ies w ere p laced  un d er d irect im peria l control of 
th e  n e w ly  c re a te d  m agister m ilitu m  per A rm eniam  et P ontum  
Polemoniacum et gentes, in s ta lle d  a t T heodosiopo lis . H o w ev er, 
fluctuating  loyalties still com plicated regional cohesion. Just over one 
h u n d red  kilom etres no rth  of Theodosiopolis, near m odern  Ispir, w as the 
m oun ta in  fortress of P hrag ium , from  w hich the  Persian  sa trap  Sym eon 
m an ag ed  the  go ld -m ines o f K ing K avadh . In  A.D. 530, Sym eon 
su rrendered  the  fortress to the  Rom ans reta in ing  the  m ines for him self. 
Shortly after this, the  Persarm enian  generals N arses and  A ratius defected 
to Rom an arm s, and  their youngest b ro ther Isaac su rrendered  the fortress 
of Bolum, east of Theodosiopolis.^^^ Symeon w as charged w ith  num erous 
m o u n ta in  v illages, b u t soon  fell fou l of p ro -P ersian  m agnates, w ho  
m u rd ered  him . Sym eon 's fam ily continued  to ru le  the  m oun ta in  area, 
un til it  w as announced  th a t the  new  client, A m azaspes, w as p lo tting  to 
de liver T heodosiopolis an d  o th er reg ional forts to  the  Persians. H is 
executioner an d  form er friend , A cacius, succeeded h im  an d  lev ied  an 
unpopu lar tax, for w hich he w as slain; his assassins barricaded  them selves 
in  Phragium ; the region w as d iv ided  by  rebellion.^^^
A nastasius h a d  envisioned the  city as a base from  w hich  to launch 
forw ard  operations against P e r s a r m e n i a , ! ^ ^  ^ role m ain tained  th roughou t 
the  nex t tw o centuries. In  the  A.D. 543 cam paign, the  general V alerian 
encam ped  a t Theodosiopolis, w here  his im peria l forces w ere  jo ined  by  
N arses, his Eruli auxiliaries and  a m uster of A rm enians. By the end  of 
th e  six th  cen tu ry  T heodosiopolis w as the  chief base  from  w hich  to 
p reserve  lines of com m unication  to  Lazica and  exert p ressu re  on  the  
fractious m ounta in  tribes in the Pontic A lps and  Iberia; such action w as 
crucial for p ro tec ting  R om an in terests in Colchis and  deny ing  Persian  
access to the  Black Sea.^^^ Similarly, the patrician Justinian seem s to have 
u sed  the  city to  conduct secret negotiations w ith  disaffected nobles of 
P e rsa rm en ia  in  A.D. 5 7 2 . The  P ersians ap p ra ised  the  w o rth  of
191 For these defections see Procopius, Wars, 1.15.26-33.
192 Procopius, Wars, 2.3.1-7.
193 Procopius, Wars, 1.10.18-19.
194 Procopius, Wars, 2.24.12.
195 Men. Prot., 18.6.80-5, Cod. Th. 2.15-16; L.M. Whitby (1988) 201 and 212.
196 Evagr. 5.7,; J.Eph., HE., 2.20; N, Adontz (1970) 267-8; L.M. Whitby (1988) 250-1.
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T heodosiopolis and  subord ina te  tow ns of the u p p e r E uphrates. In  the  
sp rin g  of A .D. 576, K husro  a ttack ed  K arin  th ro u g h  P e rsa rm en ia , 
a ttem pting  to restore Persian influence in the region. A lthough successful 
in  destroying m inor settlem ents, the Persians d id  n o t take Theodosiopolis, 
and  the k ing 's cam paign ended  in  an em barrassing defeat.^^^ in  A.D. 607 
the  Persian arm y sufferred severe casualties in  an  assault against the city. 
H ow ever, w hen  Theodore approached , announcing him self as M aurice 's 
son, the  gates w ere opened  and  the  nobles accepted the Persian host.^^^ 
T he c ity  w as reg a in ed  u n d e r  H erac liu s , an d  as la te  as A.D. 653, 
Theodosiopolis w as still envisioned as a centre for assem bly and  offence, 
as is indicated in  the w ar plans of Constans II against the Arabs.^^^
The events in  K arin  underline  the advantages and  d isadvan tages 
com m unities so close to  the  Persian  sphere  p resen ted . W inn ing  the  
loyalty  of the  A rm enians w as crucial in  m ain tain ing  local control. A 
sing le  d isg ru n tled  officer could  cost the  im peria l governm en t several 
years in  tr ib u te  an d  th e  p e rm a n en t loss of te rrito ry . C onversely , 
tem pestuous ethnic bonds stre tched  in to  Persarm enia, and  if p roperly  
cultivated  could  b ring  high-level defectors, or the b loodless conquest of 
strategic sites. To obtain these loyalties, the  governm ent invested  heavily 
in im pressive m ilitary  construction, and  supported  the  evangelization of 
th e  c o u n try  th ro u g h  m o n as tic  p a tro n a g e  in  th e  h ig h la n d s , an d  
ecclesiastical bu ild ing  in the  cities. W hen civilian settlem ents such  as 
B izana no longer fo und  a garrison  in  their presence, the  governm en t 
continued to support them  th rough  civic schemes. Every effort w as m ade 
to assure A rm enian subjects tha t the im perial governm ent, or church, w as 
in terested  in  their welfare.
The site of Satala lies approxim ately  forty-five kilom etres no rth  of 
Erzincan and is now  occupied by  the  m odern village of Sadak.^^^ Located 
n ear the  head -w aters of the  Lycus (Kelkit) and  the  A cam psis (Çoruh)
197 For Khusro's campaign see J. Eph., HE., 6.8-9; Th, Sim. 3.12.15-15.10; Evagr., 5.14, Men. 
Prot,, 18,6; and L.M. Whitby (1988) 261-4.
198 Sebeos, 23.
199 Sebeos, 35,
200 For a general introduction to the site see F, and E. Cumont (1906) 304-12; T.B. Mitford 
(1974a) 165-171, (1974b), (1977), and forthcoming survey edited by C.S. Lightfoot; use has 
been made of notes from this survey.
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rivers, Satala stood on  the Rom an road  betw een Sam osata and  Trapezus, 
and  m on ito red  the n o rth ern  rou tes in to  Asia M i n o r . I t  is difficult to  
da te  Satala 's establishm ent precisely. The site w as pe rhaps tem porarily  
occupied du ring  the cam paigns of Corbulo,202 b u t perm anen t occupation 
canno t be g u a ran teed  u n til A.D. 76, w hen  a m ilestone  m en tions the  
legionary base; how ever, the  earliest inscription comes later in the second 
cen tu ry .203 T hroughout m uch of its history, Satala w as garrisoned by  legio 
X V  Apollinaris, a ttested  in  the  sources and by sixteen stam ped  brick tiles 
from  the site.204 N o sim ilar tiles have been uncovered for its predecessor, 
legio X V I Flavia firma, w hose  stay  w as less th an  fo rty  years an d  is 
in d ic a te d  by  tw o  in sc rip tio n s .205 C oin rem ains ind ica te  con tin u a l 
occupation  from  the second th ro u g h  seven th  centuries. The ro ugh ly  
'p laying  card ' outline of the walls corresponds to early im perial design, b u t 
the core of the w all itself is Justinianic.206 By the  sixth century  the walls 
had  fallen into a precarious state.207 The defences w ere largely rebuilt and  
p ro v id ed  w ith  a fo rew all an d  an d  m oat. The easte rn  corners h a d  
projecting tu rre ts  and  tow ers a t regu lar intervals along the  no rthern  and  
eastern walls208
The civilian settlem ent, consisting in itia lly  of leg ionary  fam ilies, 
developed  w ith in  the w alls, b u t soon spilled  no rth  an d  east beyond  the 
garrison , as natives responded  to the needs and  advantages of long term  
occupation, no t untypical for legionary bases in the east.209 if w e accept a 
n u m b er of m ed iaeva l passions, i t  is possib le  to  d a te  th e  C h ris tian  
com m unity a t Satala to the reign of Diocletian, w hen  the young Eugenios, 
a na tive  of the  city, w as m arty red  a t Sebastia; la ter he  w as invoked  as
201 T.B. Mitford (1974a) 165; A. Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 33.
202 B. Isaac (1990) 410 n. 186.
203 T.B. Mitford (1974a) 170.
204 Hot. Dig., O r . , 38.13. Legio X 7  had served with Corbulo in the area, and after being 
stationed at Satala constituted the backbone of Arrian's force: Tac., Ann., 15.25; Arrian, 
Ektaxis, 5.15, 24.
205 Contra D. Van Berchem (1983).
206 F. and E. Cumont (1906) 345; T.A. Sinclair (1989) 330; however, see caution expressed in J. 
Crow (1986) 84.
207 Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.2-3. The reliability of this account has been questioned by B. 
Croke and J. Crow (1983) 147; in defence see L.M. Whitby (1987) 102-2.
208 An accurate plan is forthcoming in C.S. Lightfoot's survey of Satala.
209 D. Magie (1950) 1436,1465; B. Isaac (1990) 139, 281; contra T.S Parker (1987) 183.
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S a ta la 's p a tro n .210 G regory  the  Illum inato r began  his conversion  of 
no rthern  A rm enia and  Iberia from  Satala in  the early  fou rth  cen tu ry .211 
Later, Basil w rote an epistle  discussing problem s the civilian com m unity  
w as hav ing  w ith  its b ishop. A  final m ention of the  civilian settlem ent 
describes the Persians' a ttem pt to  destroy p a rt of the city .212
Little w hich predates the sixth century is visible at the site; although 
a t the  sou th-w est tow er several stages of construction  are preserved.2i3 
Beyond a gully  no rth  of the  garrison  walls bones, m asonry , and  po tte ry  
sh e rd s reveal the  area  of the  civilian settlem ent. Illegal excavations 
un earth ed  a lined  brick channel of a bath-house in  the  settlem ent area. 
Spolia fo u n d  on the  site ind icate  th a t there  w as con tinual occupation  
d u rin g  late an tiquity , w hich  th inned  o u t after the seven th  cen tury  un til 
the early m odern  period. O n the h igh  ground  w est of the city is an ashlar- 
lined  cistern , still p rov id ing  the  site w ith  fresh  w ater.214 South-east of 
Satala  are the  rem ains of w h a t C um on t an d  M itfo rd  took  to  be  an 
a q u e d u c t .215 H ow ever, the  area  h ad  been the  o rig in  of several early  
C hristian  funerary  inscrip tions and  w as covered in  roof-tiles.216 N ow  
surveyed, the  structure has been confirm ed as a basilica, perhaps th a t of St. 
Eugenios. O n a slope north  of the  fortress are the rem ains of a late Rom an 
block house, com m anding view s of the north-east, north-w est, and  sou th­
east valleys.217
In the  second century Satala had  been the assem bly po in t of at least 
tw o  m ajor cam paigns: T ra jan 's  A rm en ian  cam p aig n  a n d  A rr ia n 's  
response  to  the  A l a n i .218 F urtherm ore, the  em peror accepted honours 
from  client kings of A lbania, Iberia, Colchis and  Pontus.2i^ By the th ird
210 Evidence discussed in A. Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 166 and 168. For Satala's 
military families see D.H. French and J.R Summerly (1987).
211 Agathangelos, 425; C. Toumanoff (1963) 458-9.
212 Basil, Ep., 102 (A.D. 372); Procopius, Wars, 1.15.12 (A.D. 530).
213 F. and E. Cumont (1906) 345. The south-east tower was illegally exposed by villagers, 
and surveyed in July 1990.
214 T.B. Mitford (1974b) 230 n. 8 notes now lost terracotta pipes which delivered the water 
to the garrison.
215 F. and E. Cumont (1906) 343; T.B. Mitford (1974b) 235 n. 13.
216 T.B. Mitford (1974b) 221,233,
217 Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.5 mentions the construction of a phrourion nearby.
218 C.S. Lightfoot (1990) 117-8.
219 Arrian, Perip., 4.1 and 7.3; T.B. Mitford (1980) 1198.
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cen tury  Satala and  its environs requ ired  significant resto ra tion  w ork  by  
the im perial g o v e r n m e n t .220 N earby, the  Sabrina bridge  w as refurbished 
by  the em peror Decius around  A.D. 250.221 Efforts w ere largely in response 
to  the  dam age regional defences received from  the G othic raids of A.D. 
255-7. T roops dep loyed  to T rapezus from  legio X V  m ay have facilitated 
the brief capture of Satala by Sapor in A.D. 256.222 A n ornate  dedication to 
the  em peror A urelian  in  A.D. 272 m ay indicate fu rther bu ild ing  a t Satala 
as the  city 's strategic and  econom ic position  along the  A rm enian frontier
in c r e a se d .2 2 3
O n tw o occasions du ring  the early  fourth  century, Satala m ay have 
been a base for suppo rting  A rm enian conflicts w ith  Persia. In the early  
350s k ing  K husro  of A rm enia , in  reaction  to S apor's  su p p o rt of his 
enem ies, b roke his accord w ith  Persia and  sent a special tribu te  to the  
R om an em peror. The R om an arm y gave its su p p o rt to  K husro in  his 
successful repulse of the  Persian counter-attack.224 i t  is n o t entirely clear 
w here  these troops cam e from , b u t a second Persian  invasion  m entions 
Satala d irectly . In  A.D. 354, w hen  K husro d ied , an d  his son  T iran 
jo u rn ey ed  to  C onstan tinop le  to receive h is crow n from  the em peror. 
Sapor d ispatched another arm y against w hat he hoped  to be a disorganised 
re a lm .225 The A rm enians d rew  up  their forces in  the  M rul river valley 
ju st to  the  no rth -east of Satala, and  defeated  the P ersian  force .226 n  is 
a rguable, in  the first case, th a t m ilita ry  assistance w as p ro v id ed  from  
Satala, am ong  o th er locations. In  the  second case, th e  A rm enians 
positioned their arm y close to Rom an territory  for strategic reasons. Their 
general, A rshavir K am sarakan, h ad  been active in  negotiations w ith  the 
Rom ans p rio r to the battle, and  m ay have hoped to receive troops in the 
com pany of the new ly crow ned Tiran. Such a hope w as w ell-founded, for
220 T.B. Mitford (1974a) 169-70, (1977) 1207-8.
221 D. Magie (1950) 1568 n. 29; CIL 3-14184/14.
222 Zos., 1.33; RGDS 18; T.B. Mitford (1974a) 169.
223 CIL 3-14184/3; T.B. Mitford (1974a) 170.
224 MX 3.10; Faust. Buz., 3.8, who mentions the Armenian victory, but not the Roman help.
225 MX 3.10-11; Faust. Buz., 3.12.
226 MX 3.10; Faust. Buz., 3.21.
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a decade earlier C onstan tins II h ad  sen t a force u n d e r the  praefectus, 
A ntiochus, to crow n K h u s r o . 2 2 7
In  the  m idd le  of the  fifth  century  m easures w ere  again  taken  to 
bo lster the  defences of Satala. The im peria l a rm y h a d  decreased  its 
presence in  the east, re ly ing  on peaceful relations w ith  Persia  to allow  
resources to be d iverted  elsew here. In  A.D. 441, Persian  forces invaded  
R om an A rm enia, C appadocia  and  Syria, to express their dissatisfaction 
w ith  the  R om an refusal to con tribu te  tow ard  the  jo in t defence of the 
C aucasus passes.228 This incursion revealed the debilitated state of Satala, 
and  legislation w as enacted to  rectify the  neglected fortifications.229 The 
inroads of the Sabir H uns in  A.D. 515 are likely to have again w eakened 
th e  fro n tie r a ro u n d  the  Lycus a n d  E uph ra tes valleys, b u t no  d irec t 
evidence indicates th a t repairs w ere m ade as a result.230
In  A.D. 530 the  P e rsian  g en era l, M erm ero , in v a d e d  R om an 
A rm enia  w ith  th ir ty  th o u san d  so ld iers and  H unn ic  m ercenaries, and  
bypassing  T heodosiopolis, p itched  cam p near the  e igh th  m ilestone from  
S a ta la .231 The R om an generals S ittas and  D oro theus h a d  a lread y  
assem bled sixteen thousand  m en at the city. One tho usand  of these Sittas 
led  in to  the su rround ing  hills. The follow ing day the Persian host closed 
on  Satala and  began  p illag ing  the  unpro tec ted  civilian settlem ent to the 
north . From  h igher g ro u n d  Sittas advanced his force against their rear, 
m ask in g  h is sm all n u m b ers  by  th e  a m o u n t o f d u s t  th ro w n  up . 
S im ultaneously, the m ain  Rom an contingent em erged from  the w alls and  
engaged the Persians. The battle raged  th roughout the day, b u t in the end 
M erm ero  w ith d rew  his force an d  b ro u g h t an e n d  to  th e  cam paign. 
Possibly as a consequence of this assault, Justinian began  rebu ild ing  the 
d ilap id a ted  fo rtress.232 A long the  Lycus valley w est of Satala, tw o other 
p rom inen t sites w ere given a ttention. A t C olonea (Sebinkarahisar), on
227 MX 3.5-6.
228 Theod., HE., 5.37.5; J. Lydus, M ag., 3.53; Z. Rubin (1989) 38-39.
229 Cod. Th., 2.15-16; L.M. Whitby (1988) 207 n. 19,
230 Mai., 16.17.
231 Procopius, Wars, 1.15.9-17 is the only source.
232 Procopius, Buildings, 3.4.2-5; suggested by L.M. Whitby (1987) 101-2 as one possible 
sequence of events. However, it is also feasible that the repairs were made before the A.D. 
530 campaign.
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the  site of an A rm enian fortress once refurbished by Pom pey, b u t by  the 
sixth cen tury  in ru ins, Justin ian rebu ilt the defences. A nd  at N icopolis, 
ano ther Pom peian settlem ent shattered  by an  earthquake in  A.D. 499, the 
em peror constructed  w alls and  a m onastery  ded icated  to the forty-five 
sa in t s. 233 N o m ention  is m ade of Satala in the second half of the sixth 
century, b u t ongoing conflict in  Ciscaucasia ensured  tha t Satala rem ained a 
key to northern  operations.
A lthough  the  advances of A.D. 608-10 b ro u g h t the  Persian  arm y 
against Satala, and, according to  Sebeos, the city w as taken, the  defensive 
netw ork  seem s to have checked m ovem ent further along the  Lycus valley. 
Rom an resistance around  the upper E uphrates w as fierce, and  after initial 
setbacks, H eraclius estab lished  the  fortress as a base  for his coun ter­
a tta c k s .234 The dem ise of Satala in  the  seventh century  is due  less to 
Islam ic d estru c tio n  th a n  the  d isso lu tio n  of the  n o rth -so u th  lines of 
com m unication along the  Euphrates.235
Like M elitene, Satala developed  from  a ru ra l m ilita ry -post in to  a 
lively fron tier city. The com m unities w hich sp rang  u p  a round  Rom an 
fortresses, ap art from  pro tection , enjoyed the h igher s tan d ard  of liv ing  
w hich  follow ed w ith  the  in troduc tion  of im peria l eng ineering  and  the  
investm ent of funds into the  local economy. The repairs m ade  on bridges 
m ay only have offered indirect evidence of the governm ent's concern to 
cultivate the settlem ents, b u t certainly the sort of tax relief ex tended in the 
w ake of invasions, indicates a realisation  by  governm ent th a t continued  
revenues w ere  d ep en d e n t on  a p ro sp e ro u s  and  loyal fron tier. The 
position  of Satala again  aim ed at the  control of a specific area, b u t the 
fo rtre ss 's  h isto ry  in d ica tes  th a t it  exerted  an in fluence  b ey o n d  the  
im m ediate  region. The A rm enian royalty  could d raw  u p o n  the  tangible 
benefits of d irec t R om an in te rv en tio n  in  a crisis, or sim p ly  use  the  
presence of a legionary base to  bolster morale. Both cases h in t a t how  the 
defence of in d iv id u a l localities fea tu red  in  the  w id e r defence of the  
em pire.
233 Procopius, Buildings, S.4.6-7, and 12-14; F. and E. Cumont (1906) 296-302.
234 Sebeos, 23 and 26. The successful resistance of Satala is maintained by T.S. Brown, A. 
Bryer, and D. Winfield (1978) 26; contra the interpretation of C. Foss (1975) 722.
235 T.B. Mitford (1977) 506.
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§ 5. The Black Sea and  Pontic Alps: Trapezus:
The port-city  of T rapezus, m odern  Trabzon, is located  n ear the 
south-east corner of the Black Sea.236 N ever an A rm enian city, T rapezus 
w as established on a spu r of the southern  slopes of the Pontic A lps in the  
seventh  century  B.C. as a Sinopean colony. Proxim ity to the  Pyxites river 
(Macka Dere) and the Zigana pass g ranted  the city nearly  year round  access 
to the A rm enian plateau; though  shorter routes existed, they  could only be 
used  in  clem ent weather.237 D espite a num ber of lesser harbours fu rther 
east, T rapezus represen ted  the principal p o rt for rou tes across the Pontic 
A lps th ro u g h o u t antiquity.238 A H ellenistic city grew  around  the  rock 
acropolis w hich dom inates the  harbour. In 36 B.C. it becam e the base for 
the  royal fleet of the R om an client Polem o II. W hen Rom an expansion 
increased in Ciscaucasia, it  becam e obvious tha t firm  control of the  coast 
w ou ld  be a logistical requirem ent. Corbulo supplied  his legions from  the 
city in  A.D. 58, and  in  A.D. 64 the  en tire  k ingdom  of Polem o II w as 
incorporated  in to  Galatia, w ith  the Rom an fleet stationed at Trapezus.239 
Five years la ter, citizens of T rapezus and  coastal tribes, led  by  a fleet 
com m ander, e ru p te d  in to  revo lt and  s lau g h te red  th e  g arriso n  of an 
aux iliary  cohort. This action  an d  the  ongoing d ifficu lty  w ith  p iracy  
resu lted  in  an increased  m ilita ry  presence a t strategic po in ts along the  
Black Sea shores during  the first and  second centuries; T rapezus received 
vexillations detached from  nearby C appadocian legions.240 In A.D. 129, the 
em peror H adrian  im proved the harbour facilities, b u t otherw ise T rapezus
236 For a concise description of the topography and history of Trapezus in antiquity see F. 
and E. Cumont (1906) 363-71; and A. Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 1-16, and 178-82.
237 A. Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 48-9.
238 A.H.M. Jones (1971) 538. Smaller sites such as Rize or Batumi were essentially fortified 
outposts serving the needs of local communities, protecting secondary land routes, or policing 
the coast; see A. Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 12.
239 Tac., Ann., 13.39; D. Magie (1950) 374ff., and 433.
240 Tac., H is t, 3.47-8; A.B. Bosworth (1976) 70-1; R. Syme (1981) 277; and B. Isaac (1990) 42- 
50; with a discussion of continued military occupation through to fifth century at 233. 
Evidence for legionary detachments discussed in T.B. Mitford (1974) 163; A. Bryer and D. 
Winfield (1985) 181.
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rem ained  a lack lustre  m ilita ry  p o rt, sho rt of am enities.24i D uring  its 
heyday, the Rom an fleet, the Classis Pontica, num bered  forty  ships, w hich 
m ain ly  sup p o rted  efforts a t subdu ing  brigand  clans to  the  n o r t h - e a s t . 2 4 2  
W hen relations w ere good, troops could be levied from  these t r i b e s . 2 4 3  
Even after the headquarters of the im perial fleet w as transfered  to Cyzicus 
in A.D. 175, T rapezus rem ained a central port am ongst the coastal defences 
and  by  the th ird  century  received legio I  PonticaM^ H ow ever, T rapezus 
w as never a p o p u lo u s  city ,245 an d  as p a rt of the  R om an fron tier, its 
functions w ere largely to rem ain as an adm inistrative centre for the tribes 
of the  m ounta in  h in terland , to harbour ships engaged in  bo th  trade  and 
curb ing  p iracy , an d  to  control lines of sup p ly  and  com m unication  to 
R om an forces in  A r m e n i a . 2 4 6
E vidence for s tru c tu ra l rem ains before  the  seven th  cen tu ry  is 
m i n i m a l . 2 4 7  add ition  to  a num ber of tem ples, the  city possessed tw o 
walls; it is likely this refers to the  citadel and  circuit w a l l s . 2 4 8  in  the sixth 
cen tu ry , coastal ro u tes  an d  passage  over the  P on tic  A lps reg a in ed  
im portance  w ith  R om an expansion  in to  Lazica a n d  conso lida tion  in  
A rm enia; as a consequence, T rapezus enjoyed im peria l attention. A fter 
in c o rp o ra tin g  T rap ezu s an d  its  n e ig h b o u rh o o d  in to  I  Armenia, 
Justin ian constructed an aqueduct in  honour of St. Eugenios, refurb ished  
m any of the  city 's churches, and  restored  public buildings and  presum ably 
the  defences. M uch of th is w ork  cam e u n d er the  d irection  of Bishop
241 Arrian, Perip., 16.6; H.A. Manandian (1965) 79 dates the rise in Trapezuntine economic 
power to these improvements.
242 Josephus, Bell }ud., 2.16.1. The fleet had a northern base in Bosporus. For a concise 
history of the Classis Pontica see C. Starr (1941) 125-9. For Roman relations with these 
Pontic tribes see R.W. Edwards (1988) 129-134. For literature discussing coastal brigandage 
see B. Isaac (1990) 45 n.77.
243 Arrian, Ektaxis, 7; discussed in A.B. Bosworth (1977) 234.
244 For evidence of Trapezus as a military port in the early fourth century see Zos., 2.33. For 
garrion of the I Pontica see Not. Dig., Or. 38.16 and B. Isaac (1990) 168 n. 28.
245 Contrary to Zos., 1.33, A. Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 179-80 calculated the civil 
population as never exceeding four thousand.
246 F. Cumont (1923) 109-227.
247 A. Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 180-249.
248 Zos., 1.33; A Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 181.
249 Nov., 28, preface; and Nov., 31.1.
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Irenaeus, and  an  in sc rip tion  da tes its com pletion  to  A.D. 542.250 
add ition  to the  fortifications and  garrison  a t T rapezus, a num ber of sm all 
forts stood  along the rou te  lead ing  th rough  the Z igana pass. M ost held  
less than  a cohort, and  it is no t know n how  long they w ere maintained.25i 
In the late sixth century, T rapezus w as active as a supply  base for bo th  land  
and  m aritim e activities in  Colchis, and  undoub ted ly  p layed  a m ajor role 
in the exchange of luxury goods w ith  Lazic m erchants.252
A single recorded  event displays the role T rapezus p layed  in  local 
defence. In  A.D. 254 Gothic raiders com m andeered  B osporan ships and  
sailors and  launched  a series of raids against the  south-east coast of the  
Black S e a . 2 5 3  T heir early  v ic to ries caused  genera l pan ic , an d  the 
p o p u la tio n  began  to  w ith d raw  in to  m oun ta in  refuges. H ow ever, the 
Rom an com m ander a t P ityus, east of Trapezus, successfully engaged the 
G oths. T hree years la te r a la rger assau lt took place, an d  the  G oths 
m axim ised the  naval skills of their captives; this tim e P ityus fell and  the 
ru ra l dependen ts of T rapezus p o u red  in to  the city.254 The Goths d id  not 
seriously  hope to take the  city, w hose norm al garrison  h a d  recently been 
enlarged. H ow ever, one evening w hen the w atch grew  slack and  drunk , 
the Goths slipped  over the  w all and  opened the gates. T rapezus and  its 
territory  w ere ransacked.
A w eakness in the  defence of T rapezus and the  Pontic coast lay  in 
the  tenuous loyalty  w hich  local inhab itan ts  felt to w ard s th e  im peria l 
governm ent. D uring the early  em pire a rebellion co-ordinated by  a native 
officer had  to be p u t dow n. W hen the Goths sw ooped along the coast, no t 
all the T rapezuntines show ed the  sam e spirit of resistance as som e of their 
no rthern  M esopotam ian contem poraries. G regory T haum aturgus has left 
a Canonical Epistle addressing , a t poin ts, how  Pontic com m unities should
250 Procopius, Buildings, 3.7.1. Other evidence noted by A. Bryer and D. Winfield (1985) 
182 n. 39.
251 Not Dig., O r ., 28.16,18,19,37,38; discussed in N. Adontz (1970) 75-84.
252 Agathias, 3.19.3, and 3.20.6. Roman control of Black Sea trade discussed in D.C. Braund 
(1984) 94. On luxury trade into Lazica see J.G.F Hind, (1983-4) 91-7; D. Braund (1991) 224-5.
253 Zos., 1.32; B. Isaac (1990) 49-50.
254 Zos., 1.33.
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trea t those w ho abetted the raiders.255 Some had  p lundered  the property  of 
slain neighbours, and  w ere to suffer excommunication.256 O thers, striving 
to recoup their ow n losses, m ade them selves Goths by appropria ting  the 
belongings of unfortunates; these w ere to be excluded from  p rayer and  
pub lic ly  accused.257 Those citizens w ho escaped from  the  p irates m ight 
find  them selves so ld  in to  slavery by  Pontic provincials.258 W orst of all 
there w ere those w ho forgot they  w ere Christians and  joined the ranks of 
the barbarians, acting as guides and helping them  plunder; these w ere held  
in  excom m unication until judged  by  a bishop.259 A t tim es of crisis, loyalty 
to  im peria l or local governm ent w as n o t alw ays a t a p rem ium  am ongst 
the  T rapezuntines. Both the  governm ent and  the  C hurch  increasingly  
pene tra ted  the  m ounta ins sou th  and  east of T rapezus. But even in the 
late sixth century, despite  the  grow ing num ber of recruits assim ilated by  
th e  im p eria l a rm y , th e  tribes su rro u n d in g  T rapezus w ere  slow  to 
relinquish  their isolation and  brigand  lifestyle.260
T rapezus and  the  su rro u n d in g  forts a ttest the  im portance  sm all 
sites had  to supp ly  and  com m unication on a large scale in  the control of 
A r m e n i a . 2 6 1  W hen the  Rom ans w ere unable to suppress piracy, the tribes 
of the  Pontic A lps rem ained  recalcitrant, and  the p ro sp e rity  of regions 
beyond  the Pontic coast w as ham pered . In such a volatile environm ent, 
loyalties w ere never cem ented, a lthough  C hristian ity  m ade  significant 
efforts a t establish ing  ru les of conduct to curb b rigandage and  ally the 
Pontus to im perial governm ent.
§ 6. Conclusions:
255 See D. Magie (1950) 705-107 for a discussion of Gregory's Epistles. R. Van Dam (1982) 
surveys the career of Gregory, see esp. 302-5 where Gregory's role as local leader is 
examined.
256 Greg. Thaum., Canons 2,3,4,8, and 9,
257 Greg. Thaum,, Canon 5.
258 Greg. Thaum., Canon 6.
259 Greg. Thaum., Canon 7.
260 Agathias, 5.1.2; R.W. Edwards (1989) 133-4. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix (1981) 477-9 goes too 
far in suggesting that the Trapezuntine disloyalty was typical of the low morale of the 
frontier.
261 D.C. Braund (1989) 38.
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In  sum , the  foundation  of frontier sites aim ed to achieve lim ited  
an d  local goals. U sually , the Rom an choice of a site, regard less of the 
existence of a previous settlem ent, h ad  as its initial pu rpose  the  securing 
of a river crossing, the dom ination of a valley, access to  m ajor highw ays, 
o r the  control of passes. A fortress or fortified settlem ent p rov ided  its 
im m ediate region w ith  a refuge du ring  tim es of crisis, and  du ring  periods 
of peace a d e te rren t against low -level b rigandage. Local econom ies 
im p ro v ed , as p rov inces developed  w ell-o rgan ised  m ark e t cen tres in 
w hich to operate; a w ider range and am ount of goods w ere exchanged, and  
foreign investm ent w as injected into the frontier region.
D uring  p e rio d s  o f w a rfa re  b o th  the  cities a n d  the  im p eria l 
governm ent realised tha t they could not rely on a w idely-d istributed  arm y 
to m eet threats. It becam e obvious that in  a siege, on ly  a h an d fu l of 
technicians, like A m m ianus' protectores, w ere necessary to co-ordinate the 
ru nn ing  of engines, w atch  over equipm ent, or d rill m ilitia. L eadership  
w as p rov ided  by im portant civic and  religious figures. As long as care was 
taken in  p roperly  constructing  fortifications, m ain tain ing  arm ouries, and  
keeping  cities as w ell-supplied  and  as sanitary  as possible, the  lim itanei 
and  average citizen could adm irably hold  an enem y at bay  for m onths.
Retaining the loyalty of these citizens w as a crucial factor in a strong 
local and  im perial defence. M ost capitulations w ere the resu lt of treachery 
w hen city walls w ere strong, or subm ission before a fight w hen the state of 
defences w as poor. T raditional A rm enian pow er structures and  custom s 
w ere often at odds w ith  firm  control over the  frontier. D uring  the late 
fifth and  early sixth centuries, the im perial governm ent enacted a series of 
reform s w hich, w hile often retain ing  aspects of A rm enian offices, ensured  
th a t senior com m anders in  a region w ere allied to the  em peror; this action 
b rough t w hole aristocratic families into the em pire w ho eagerly com peted 
to ho ld  offices both  locally and abroad. Such legal reform s w ere gradually  
reinforced w ith  new  build ing  projects th roughout A rm enia. The im perial 
governm ent tried  to secure the loyalty  of peasan t com m unities th rough  
civic and  ecclesiastical construction, tax concessions, and  the support of the 
C hurch, w hose leadership  w as crucial during  the m ost critical m om ent of 
eastern  frontier warfare: the siege.
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w ere  often  at odds w ith  firm  control over the  frontier. D uring  the late 
fifth and  early sixth centuries, the im perial governm ent enacted a series of 
reform s w hich, w hile often retain ing  aspects of A rm enian offices, ensured  
th a t senior com m anders in a region w ere allied to the  em peror; this action 
b rough t w hole aristocratic families into the em pire w ho eagerly com peted 
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C hristian Leadership and U rban Defence 
§ 1. Introduction:
This chapter will explore the  rise of C hristian leadersh ip  along the 
north-east frontier and  the role it p layed in  local defence. Evidence will be 
d ra w n  from  the  Pontic an d  C appadoc ian  p rovinces, n o rth e rn  Syria, 
n o rth e rn  M esopotam ia, A rm enia, an d  Georgia; the im plication— w hich 
th is exploration w ill hopefu lly  suppo rt— is th a t there  are m any  recurring  
phenom ena  th ro u g h o u t the  leng th  and  b read th  of the  reg ion , an d  th a t 
this 'no rth -eastern  fron tier' can be v iew ed as a loosely un iform  society. 
C hristian  clergy rose to pow er because they  m ade them selves accessible 
and  h igh ly  visible; they  secured  their au tho rity  by  publicly  associating 
them selves w ith  trad itional bases of pow er, b u t su rpassed  non-C hristian  
groups by  either offering alternative im ages of au thority  or w here possible 
m onopo liz ing  these  im ages.^ The role ecclesiastics p layed  in  a m ilitary  
capacity w ill be given special a ttention in  th is chapter. Conflict w as often 
p resen t in  this region. If C hristian  clergy w ere to  m ain tain  positions of 
pow er it w as necessary  for them  to exercise their au tho rity  in  m ilitary  
situations as m uch  as anyw here  else. In  try ing  to form  a m ethod  of 
setting ou t the evidence, I have found it im possible to give equal attention 
to  every  ecclesiastical figure  w hich  I have  encoun tered  in  the  sources. 
Instead , selected ind iv idual figures w ill act as case stud ies of particu lar 
phenom ena or characteristics, w hich are postu lated  as being typical for the 
entire  region.
§ 2. Cerem onies and  the netw ork of com m and w ith in  frontier
com m unities:
In o rder to p rov ide any effective leadership  du ring  a m ilitary crisis, 
C hristian  leaders needed  to have the confidence of large portions of their 
com m unities. Two w ays in  w hich this respect w as obtained  w ere by the 
m ain tenance of cerem onies w hich allow ed the  Church to  m odera te  daily  
life in the cities of the frontier and  the  distribution of social benefits w hich
1 W.H.C. Freud (1967); R. MacMullen (1984) 102-119; and R.L. Fox (1986) 545, 623-27, and 
668-81.
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in d eb ted  the  p easan t pop u la tio n  to  the  C hurch. This com bination  of 
cerem onial patronage and  charity will be exam ined briefly before m oving 
on  to  an exam ination of the part p layed by  the clergy in local defence.
By the  fo u rth  cen tury , C hristian  ecclesiastical leaders exerted  a 
pervasive influence w ith in  the ir com m unities.^ From  b irth  till death  the 
activities of u rban  C hristians w ere m apped  out by  the C hurch. A bishop 
oversaw  the ind iv idua l's  entrance into the w orld  and  the  initial cleansing 
of the  soul of the sin of A dam , and  w hen  they qu itted  their life, a bishop 
w ould  bo th  arrange tha t bodies w ould  be collected, and  a final resting place 
be set aside.^ Between b irth  and  burial, the Church p rov ided  festivals and  
feasts, and  continuity to daily  life.4 The church's control of festivals h ad  to 
be tightly  asserted. It is clear tha t the  older celebrations still enchanted the 
citizens of the  fron tier cities. As late as A.D. 497 the peop le  of Edessa 
celebrated a rite  "at w hich the  heathen  tales w ere sung; and  the  citizens 
took even m ore pains about it than  usual." The revelry proceeded for a 
w hole week and  the entire city fell into debauchery:
"...they were going up in crowds to the theatre at eventide, clad in linen garments, and 
wearing turbans, with their loins ungirt. Lamps were lighted before them, and they were 
burning incense, and holding vigils the whole night, walking about the city and praising 
the dancer until morning, with singing and shouting and lewd behaviour. For these reasons 
they neglected also to go to prayer, and not one of them bestowed a thought in his duty, but 
in their pride they mocked at the modesty of the fathers...
Joshua next reflects w ha t w as probably  a serm on or a t least the  C hurch 's 
in terp retation  of consequent events. For he  records th a t G od w arned  the 
people of their e rran t w ays by  causing the  colonnades and  the tepidarium  
to  collapse. Few ind iv iduals w ere killed, and  this w as declared  as a sign 
th a t G od 's  clem ency w as m om entarily  g rea ter th an  his w ra th . Soon 
afterw ards, an ed ict w as announced  w hich  exem pt artisans from  a tax 
levied every fourth  year. A C hristian celebration then began:
2 A.H.M. Jones (1963) 17-18; W.H.C. Frend (1979) 36-9.
3 Chron. Ed, 540, 29: construction of the baptistry in A.D. 370. Chron. Ed. 540, 13: bishop's 
construction of a cem etay in A.D. 324.
4 Urban and rural life revolved around carefully planned festivals and everyday ritual; see 
W.A. Meeks (1983) 140-63; S.R.F. Price (1984) 101-32; R.L. Fox (1986) 66-8, 90-92.
3 Chron. Josh., 30: The dancer referred to seems to be the popular entertainer Timerius who 
plunged the city into all sorts of depravities, see Chron. Josh., 27.
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"The whole city rejoiced and put on white garments, both small and great, and carried 
lighted tapers and censers full of burning incense, and went forth with psalms and hymns, 
giving thanks to God and praising the emperor, to the church of St. Sergius and St. Symeon, 
where they celebrated the Eucharist. They then re-entered the city, and kept a glad and 
merry festival during the whole week, and enacted then that they should celebrate this 
festival every year."^
C hurch  leaders recognised the  need  to sponsor and control celebration.^  
W hen th rea tened  by  non-C hristian cerem onies, such as the  w ild  parties of 
T im erius, they rep laced  them  w ith  som ething m ore institu tional. In  the 
case cited above, a tten tion  shou ld  be given to the overlapp ing  of praise 
g iven  a t once to  G od and  the  em peror, and  the m erg ing  of civil and  
religious affairs under the auspices of the local church.
Cerem onies allow ed church leaders to  galvanise their com m unities 
and  allay com m on concerns.^ W hen on the 23rd of October A.D. 499 the 
sun  w as eclipsed and  the populace of Edessa sm itten  w ith  alarm , bishop 
Peter im m ediately w as able to organise m assive public prayers:
"He took all his clergy and all the members of religious orders, both men and women and all 
the lay members of the holy Church, both rich and poor, men, women, and children, and 
they traversed all the streets of the city, carrying crosses, with psalms and hymns, clad in 
black garments of humiliation.... and so, by the prayers of all the holy ones, the light of 
the sun was restored to its place, and we were a little cheered."^
The speed  alone w hich  m u st have  been  necessary  to p u t  together a 
m oderate reaction to the sun 's eclipse attests the organisational skill of the 
u rban  clergy. It w ou ld  seem  th a t g iven the  recurring  n a tu re  of tragedy  
along the frontier, public m echanism s for voicing woes and  expressing the 
links of the  com m unity  in  their suffering w ere pe rpe tually  em ployed  by  
the Church. Public prayers typically follow ed outbreaks of pestilence and  
special intentions w ere even voiced to protect the visitors of a city.^® Thus
 ^Chron. Josh., 31.
2 For the absorption of pagan mysteries and festivals by Christianity see A. Grabar (1968) 
35 and 41; J. Geffcken (1978) 389-91; S.G. MacCormack (1981) 62-7, 121; and R.A. Markus 
(1990) 107-121.
3 Although the interpretation of ceremonies might differ among various sectors of a 
community, they served more to ease friction and promote cohesion by giving tensions a 
visible and displaced form; see W.A. Meeks (1984) 142; S.R.F. Price (1984) 108, 11-14; R.A. 
Markus (1990) 118-19,21; and D. Handelman (1990) 41-8.
 ^Chron. Josh., 36.
Chron. Josh., 44. Such public rituals became an increasingly common response to crises; see 
E. Patlagean (1977); A.M. Cameron (1978) 104-7; P. Brown (1982a) 124-6; and R.L. Fox (1986) 
679.
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those located in  the  centre an d  those v isitors from  ru ra l satellites w ere 
b rough t together in  tim es of crisis by  bo th  m isfortune and  the consequent 
rituals w hich m ade visible the  connections.
W ithou t the  s tru c tu re  p ro v id ed  by  C hurch  leaders, th e  fron tie r 
com m unities occasionally fell into disorder. D uring  the A.D. 503 siege of 
A m ida, John the bishop died. For a tim e there w as no central ecclesiastical 
figure p resen t to adm onish the  people and  preven t the p ro u d  and  boastful 
behav iour from  rag ing  unchecked. W hen the  new  b ishop  w as chosen 
from  one of the m onastic com m unities w ith in  the  city, he  im m ediate ly  
set about publicly  rebuking  the people, especially the m agnates, and  had  
pub lished  a personal vision concerning the city 's fate. In this revelation 
an  angel had  appeared  to  him  and  w arned  tha t G od's w ra th  w ould  befall 
the city if the m ighty d id  no t tu rn  and  help their poor brethren.^!
The organ isation  of cerem onies rep lica ted  the existing p a tte rn  of 
asym m etrical social r e l a t i o n s . ^ 2  The poor w ere dependen t on the elites to 
organise expensive rituals, and  hence the dom inant role of church leaders 
and  th e ir benefactors w as p e rp e tu a lly  evoked. W ealth  w as g iven  a 
concrete, if sym bolic, form  in  bo th  the sm all b u t w idely  d istribu ted  gifts 
such as crosses, garm ents, and  candles, and  also in  the m ore sum ptuous 
item s such as incense, icons, and  banners w hich p layed  an  instrum ental 
p a r t  in  C h ris tian  celebration.^^ in  con tro lling  th e  civic cerem onies, 
ecclesiastical leaders en su red  th a t their notions of com m unity  w ere  the  
ones expressed, at the expense of their rivals.
W orks of charity  also p ro v ed  h e lp fu l in  b u ild in g  su p p o rt for 
C hristian  leadership . D uring  the  late an tique period  the  construction of 
hospices, o rphanages, and  even civic m ain tenance an d  in te rven tion  in 
the  m arket place w as increasingly m anaged by the C h u r c h . ^ 4  D uring the 
horrific  fam ine w hich  struck  E dessa d u rin g  the  w in ter of A.D. 500/1  
ecclesiastical leaders organised the sanitary disposal of corpses and  set up
Zach. Mit., 7.4.
12 R.L. Fox (1986) 80-2,92; and D. Handelman (1990) 15,23-28, and 49-52.
13 For examples of such endowments see Chron. Ed. 540, 60 (a senator giving a silver 
tabernacle to the Great Church at Edessa); Chron. Ed. 540, 61 (the magister militum per 
Orientem providing a silver sarcophagus for the bones of St. Thomas); and Zach Mit., 74 
(the consul Isaac Bar 'Ai furnishing costly vessels and garments for the church). Such 
legacies are highly prizeded by local communities, see M. Mauss (1954) 41-43.
14 J.B. Segal (1955) 116-117; E. Patlagean (1977) 193-5; H. Chadwick (1980) 11; and R.H. 
Weaver (1987) 368-81.
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in firm aries for the  living.i5 Bishop N onnus of Edessa w as recorded  as 
hav ing  constructed , in  add ition  to several churches, a place for invalids, 
convents, defensive w orks, bridges and  level roads.i^ Church leaders even 
h ad  som e degree of influence in  setting  the  price of corn. In  A.D. 503, 
b ishop  John of A m ida p u b lish ed  an  account of his d iv ine  revelation  
w herein  he w arned  th a t those hoard ing  corn and  neglecting the  m ouths 
of the  poor w ere  only  sav ing  u p  g ra in  for the  enem ies of the  c ity .12 
H ow ever, C hristian  leaders do  n o t alw ays exhib it the  best reco rd  in 
su p p o rt of their com m unities. W hen in A.D. 525 a terrible flood w ashed 
th rough  Edessa, the  Bishop, Asclepius, w as recorded as having  abandoned 
his flock to find safety in  Antioch. After a seventy-day absence, he died. 
O nly  la te r d id  h is com m unity  b rin g  A sclepius ' b o d y  back  to  re s t in
Edessa.i3
There is no th ing  new  abou t elites pa tron iz ing  civic construction. 
H ow ever, w hen  C hristian elites en ter into such projects, it is w orth  noting 
tha t C hurch funds becam e increasingly en tangled  in  w ha t m ay  be seen as 
the  responsibilities of the  State— ie., fortifications, m ain tenance of roads 
and  bridges, etc., —resu lting  in  g rea ter enfranchisem ent of ecclesiastical 
leaders. That is to say, the in terest of Church and  the State m erged. It is 
also w orth  no ting  th a t the  fron tier p opu la tion  in tim es of peace looked 
increasingly to the C hurch hierarchy to p rov ide guidance and  patronage, 
and  such leadership  continued in  tim es of war.
§ 3. Church Leadership in  Local Defence:
The role w hich C hristian  clergy p layed in m ilitary affairs along the 
en tire  easte rn  fron tie r has been  g rea tly  un d er-em p h asised  in  general 
s tud ies  in  E nglish  of the  la te  ancien t w orld . Jones g ives the  false 
im pression  tha t the  C hurch and  the  m ilitary  w ere, by  and  large, w idely  
separa ted  in  their activities, and  tha t only the  dregs of society en tered  the
3^ Chron. Josh., 42.
16 Chron. Ed. 540 ,68: Nonnus was consecrated in A.D. 458.
Zach. Mit., 7.4. Local governments were often slow in responding to food shortages; see P. 
Garnsey (1988) 257-61. Christian leaders provided local intiative to restore some of the 
control of regional food supply lost through imperial intervention, P. Garnsey (1988) 267-8. 
18 Chron. Ed. 540, 91-91.
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clergy w ith  a m ilitary  background.^^ M arkus states th a t active C hurch 
participation  in w arfare w as inconceivable, "foreign to the cast of m ind  of 
G reek Christianity... there w as neither the need  nor the scope for clergy to 
take over the  ru nn ing  of cities or arm ies ."20 Later, he goes so far as to 
claim  tha t the Byzantine East "w as too complex a society for the  church to 
dom inate."2i In  both  statem ents, M arkus is granting a state of detachm ent 
probably  never even striven for, and  certainly never attained, by  Christian 
leaders in  the  east. Like the ir w estern  coun terparts , th e  ecclesiastical 
leaders along the frontier not only oversaw  m ilitary affairs w hen no  civic 
a u th o r i ty  w as present,22  b u t d id  so o ften  in  con junction  w ith  the 
adm in istra tion  or as the  tru sted  agent of the im perial governm ent. It is 
only recently in  general studies that the clergy have been no ted  as essential 
to the  surv ival of the  trad itional u rban  government.23 The rem ainder of 
this chapter will explore the m ilitary functions of the urban-based clergy of 
no rthern  M esopotam ia and  A rm enia.
A fter th e  civic m ilita ry  au th o ritie s , ecclesiastics w ere  the  m ost 
obvious sources of in sp ira tio n  and  direction. W ith the  C onstan tin ian  
r e f o r m s , 2 4  the  chain of com m and w ith in  the  im perial arm y evolved. The 
fourth-century  em perors fo rm ulated  a new  system  in  w hich civic officials 
w ere  re lieved  of the ir trad itio n a l m ilita ry  r o l e s . 2 5  As the rhetoric  of 
frontier w arfare took on an increasingly  religious tone, th e  au tho rity  of 
the  clergy could even, in  m any  cases, supersede  th a t of the  m i l i t a r y .2 6  
Furtherm ore, given the na tu re  of w arfare along the  north-eastern  frontier, 
it is no t surprising  to see urban-based ecclesiastics leading com m unities in 
a m ilita ry  capacity . U nder C onstan tin s II, a defensive s tra teg y  w as
A.H.M. Jones, (1964) 922ff.; usually it was to avoid conscription, he claims, that soldiers 
entered upon a religious life. Jones does not discuss the civic role of ecclesiastical leaders in 
his chapter on "The Church" (1964) 863-937; however, there is a brief discussion in (1940) 
190-210.
20 R.A. Markus (1974) 166.
2: ibid, 168.
22 For a western study, see W. Klingshim (1985) 183-203.
23 J. Herrin (1987) 72-73; L. Bréhier (1949) 526-29 had discussed the Church's civic capacity 
earlier, but was equally brief.
24 A.H.M. Jones (1964) 97-100.
25 G.A. Crump (1973) 91-103, at 91; on the fourth- century army see R. Tomlin (1987); on the 
growing tension between civil and military authorities see E.A. Thompson (1947) 73-9.
26 T.D. Barnes (1985) 126-36 for early use of the Christian religion as a mechanism of 
frontier warfare.
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developed w hich w ould  rem ain in effect for the next three centuries.27 By 
a v o id in g  p itc h ed  b a ttle s  an d  in c reas in g  th e  n u m b er o f fo rtif ied  
settlem ents, Rom an leaders aim ed to keep their casualties to a m inim um . 
The Persians w ou ld  be d raw n  in to  long cam paigns w hich  w ou ld  bo th  
neu tra lise  their cavalry and  archery  advantages, and  w aste  the a lready  
inferio r strategic resources of Sasanian Iran.28 The attem pts of Sapor in 
A.D. 359 to  lu re  im perial forces into a single decisive p itched battle ended  
in  failure, and  desp ite  the  loss of Bezabde, the defensive postu re  of the 
Rom ans w as successful. It w as on ly  th ro u g h  the  fa ilu re  of Ju lian 's  
expedition tha t the em pire lost significant frontier areas.29
In  sp ite  of the Persians' largely  unfulfilled  desire  to  crush  Rom an 
arm ies in  the  field, it w as still necessary for them  to m ake advances in 
no rthern  M esopotam ia and  focus on  the cap ture  of cities an d  their trade  
ro u te s .30 Persian  w eakness in  bo th  m ilita ry  technology and  n a tu ra l 
resources w as no torious, and  w ars betw een  the tw o g rea t pow ers had  
broken  o u t because of their great disparities.3i Even du ring  tim es of peace 
in  the  th ird  th rough  fifth centuries, trad e  w as tigh tly  contro lled  by the 
R om an au tho rities lest m ilita ry  technology or large  quan tities of raw  
m aterials should  pass into Persian hands. East-west trade  w as restricted to 
A rtaxata, N isibis, and  C allin icum  u n til the sixth cen tury , w hen  it w as 
confined to D ara and N isibis .32 Thus, it w as in the interest of the Sasanian 
kings to  conquer the  cities of n o rth ern  M esopotam ia, n o t on ly  for the 
technical skills of their inhabitan ts, b u t m ore im portan tly  to gain  control 
of specific nodal po in ts w hich  could  exploit the m ineral-rich  A rm enian 
h in te rla n d .
D uring  m ost of the  late ancient period , peaking  in  the  early  sixth 
cen tury , the  cities of the  R om an East saw  a g rea t increase in  bu ild ing
27 L. Dillemann (1962) 224.
28 B.H. Warmington (1977) 509-520; V. Chapot (1907) 136-42.
29 B.H. Warmington (1977) 515-517.
30 On the cities and trade routes see A.H.M. Jones (1971) 215-22, and H.A. Manandian (1965) 
72-82; on the strategic importance of these cities see J. Matthews (1989a) 51-7. D.S. Potter
(1990) 17, 370-80, points out that the northern Mesopotamian cities were loyal Parthian 
holdings, so that their subjugation was of further interest to the Persians.
31 E.A. Thompson (1982) 9-15; on poor Persian siege equipment see V. Chapot (1907) 193-5.
32 C/, 4.63.4. For tight trade controls see R. MacMullen (1970) 333-41.
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p ro jec ts  a n d  u rb an  d e v e lo p m e n t.33 In  n o rth ern  Syria, ag ricu ltu ra l 
expansion allow ed greater revenue to be am assed w ith in  u rban  centres.34 
A rchaeological evidence along the eastern  M editerranean  coasts supports 
a v iew  of increased trade  and  civic wealth.35 C hristian  com m unities h ad  
acquired a legitim acy w ith in  these g rea t u rban  centres and  began to share 
and  eventually  com m and an increased am ount of wealth.36 i t  w as in the 
in te rest of C hristian  leaders to p ro tec t their cu ltural and  econom ic base 
roo ted  in  the  city. As such, one w o u ld  anticipate  the clergy p laying  a 
significant role in the defence of the frontier during  tim es of conflict.
§ 4. The M ilitary Background:
A precedent for holy m en becom ing involved in m ilitary  conflicts 
w as a lready  la ten t in  the  O ld T estam ent, and  along the  no rth -eastern  
fro n tie r  such  im ages w ere  u p h e ld  as exem pla  fo r m em bers of the  
C h ris tia n  p rie s th o o d  w ho  fo u n d  them selves sa d d led  w ith  m ilita ry  
re sp o n sib ilitie s .37 Sim ilarly, am ong late  an tique pagan  society w e find 
exam ples of holy m en com ing to aid  their com m unities du ring  a m ilitary  
crisis. Sam psigeram os, a p rie s t of A p h ro d ite , o rgan ised  farm ers in  
no rthern  Syria to check the advances of Sapor in A.D. 2 5 2 . 3 ®  These forces 
w ere little  m ore th an  ligh tly -arm ed  sk irm ishers, b u t w hen  the Persian  
king recognised the garm ent of Sam psigeram os as tha t of a holy m an, he
33 K. Randsborg (1991) 15; S.J.B. Barnish (1989) 385-400 for a review of currentscholarship; 
M. Hammond (1974) 26-28.
34 K. Randsborg (1991) 50-51 points out that increased precipitation permitted more 
cultivation in northern Mesopotamia than is any other Roman period; however, C.B 
Stevens (1966) 92-124, dismisses the likelihood of climatic change, but emphasises the 
abundance of pasture land in the east, 92-95. See G. Tchalenko Û953-8) for the most 
thorough exploration of urban and village growth in Syria.
35 T. Lewit (1991) 48-9,59-63, and 85-88; K. Randsborg (1991) 126, shipwrecks in the eastern 
Mediterranean do not decline until the beginning of the eighth century; S.J.B. Barnish 
(1989) 396-98. However, as a note of caution concerning the uneven spread of wealth see M. 
Hendy (1989).
36 A.H.M. Jones (1964) 894-5; R.L. Fox (1986) 577-85 for the vitality of the eastern cities; 
663-681 for the growth and dominance of the Christian communities within these cities.
37 See, for example, R.Thomson (1975) 329-341. On the contribution of Old Testament 
literature to an aggressive imperial stance during the period, F. Dvornik (1966) 278-402 is 
useful; also see J. Trilling (1978) 262-3 for a discussion of religious heroic models for a 
Christian empire.
38 On Sapor's A.D. 252 campaign see D.S. Potter (1990) 46-7, and 290-308.
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b ro u g h t a h a lt to  the  com bat an d  offered to  m eet Sam psigeram os in  
conference, Sam psigeram os h ad  com m unicated previously  w ith  the king 
by  letter, and  w as able to  persuade Sapor to receive him  as the am bassador 
for the  region. A ccording to  M alalas, a slinger struck Sapor d u rin g  the 
conference, causing  nego tia tions to be  b roken  off. The P ersian  force 
w ithd rew , harassed  the  entire  w ay  by  Sam psigeram os' militia.39 in  pre- 
C hristian  A rm enia, there  w as a d irect connection betw een the  successful 
outcom e of m ilitary adventures and  the honour due to the  gods and  their 
priests. A fter assisting the  Parth ians in  p u ttin g  dow n a rebellion. K ing 
K husro  w as very  m eticulous in  his victory  celebrations. First, he  p a id  
hom age to his fam ily ancestors at their tem ples, offering up  w hite  oxen, 
ram s, horses, and  m ules, in add ition  to  gem s, silks, and  o ther fantastic 
treasures. Second, he gave one fifth of all w ar p lu nder to the  A rm enian 
priesthood.40 Obligations to the dead  also played a p a rt in  the form ulation 
of w ar aims.4i Again, as the A rm enian priesthood w as responsible for the 
m ain tenance of tem ples of the  dead , they  m ay have been  invo lved  in 
fo rm ula ting  any policy of vengeance th rough  w ar. In  a la ter edict, the 
A rm enian  King T r'dat is quite clear on the connection betw een  w ar and  
appeasem ent of the gods, for w hen he h ad  lived am ongst the Rom ans, he 
h ad  observed how  careful they  w ere in  honouring  their deities w ith  gifts 
and  sacrifices. Such offerings w ou ld  bring  divine favour, b u t neglect of 
th e  gods w o u ld  b rin g  d ev asta tio n  to  nations.42 Indeed , the  in itia l 
appearance  of C h ristian ity  p o sed  som eth ing  of a th rea t to  th is tigh t 
relation betw een religious piety and  m ilitary  victory:
"You yourselves know how from the time of our ancestors we were granted many victories 
and peace by the help of the gods, and how we subjected all races and held them in 
obedience. But when we were not able to please the gods with worship and favourably 
incline their will towards us, then in their anger they deprived us of our great authority. 
So we command you in the matter of the sect of Christians... that such people be found and
exposed..."43
3  ^ Mal.,12.26; D.S. Potter (1990) 325, holds there is little reason to believe the 
Sampsigeramos episode, but offers no evidence to support this conjecture.
40 Agathangelos, 22.
41 Agathangelos, 123.
42 Agathangelos, 128-29.
43 Agathangelos, 135.
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From  its in itia tion  in to  A rm enia, C hristian ity  con tinued  to  u p h o ld  the  
essential connection betw een religious devotion and  national, particu larly  
m artia l, su ccess.44  G regory the Illum inator w arned  T r'dat an d  his nobles 
th a t if they  d id  no t em brace the  C hristian  God, all their glory  w ould  be 
sw ep t aw ay. W ithou t reverence  to the  new  relig ion  an d  his L ord 's  
sanction , A rm enia  w o u ld  soon fin d  herself accursed  by  th is m igh ty  
D ivinity and  crushed:
"If you refuse to hear the preaching of the word of life, then He will strike you and kill you 
with vengeful and cruel blows, and He will judge you by means of foreign enemies, and also 
taking revenge on you will bring you to death."45
C hristian ity  d id  no t easily place her aegis over the m ilitary  establishm ent 
along the  borderlands of A rm enia. In  A gathangelos there is evidence of 
conservative pagan resistance, for w hen  T r'dat began m arching his arm y 
ag a in st the  p ag an  centres a ro u n d  th e  city  of A rtashat, he m et w ith  
opposition:
"And here the demons took visible form in the shape of a multitude of cavalry and a force 
of infantry, bearing lances and javelins, rushing forward like men armed with spears and 
standards. With a great shout they raised a cry and fled, rushing into the temple of 
Anahit whence they attacked those who had arrived. From the building they showered 
down on the men below..."46
As tim e w en t on, the  C hristian  forces becam e increasing ly  dom inant: 
tow ns and fortresses w ere devoted to God; the nobles heavily endow ed the 
church; the  arm y w as w idely  used  to destroy  fire tem ples and  construct 
C hristian chapels;47 and the old pagan  priestly families w ere re-educated by 
G regory  an d  his m onks in to  a new  C hristian  priesthood.48 Indeed, so 
b o n d ed  w ere the  new  relig ious leaders and  the  m ilitary  establishm ent, 
th a t w hen  G regory  and  his son, the  b ishop  A ristakes, and  the  b ishop 
A lbianos jou rneyed  to jo in  the  council a t N icaea, th ey  w ere, in  one 
exaggerated account, accom panied by the four senior com m anders of the
44 c. Toumanoff (1963) 43-8, and 138-9; N. Adontz (1970) 273-288. H. Chadwick (1980) 10 
indicates this connection is true throughout the late ancient world.
45 Agathangelos, 242.
46 Agathangelos, 779; see also 786.
47 Agathangelos, 811-12. Such actions mirrored the strong co-operation between the Church 
hierarchy and the Roman government; see G. Fowden (1978) 53,56-7, and 77-8.
48 For examples see Agathangelos, 785 (settlements devoted to God); 802,837 (endowments); 
and 840 (conversion of priesthood^
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A rm en ian  b o rd erlan d s, o th e r m agnates, an d  seven ty  th o u san d  h an d - 
p icked troops.49 That G regory w as accom panied by  such a large guard  is 
unlikely. H ow ever, th a t A gathanglos believed it reasonable th a t high- 
rank ing  ecclesiastics should  be accom panied by an elite m ilitary  force is 
im portan t, as is the  role G regory w ou ld  p lay  arranging  a m ilitary  pact 
be tw een  the  tw o  pow ers. T hrough  the m ed ia tion  of the  Illum inato r, 
T r 'd a t and  C onstantine concluded an alliance, "hold ing  their faith  in the 
Lord C hrist as an in term ediary  so th a t they  m ight constantly  and  for ever 
keep faithfu l love betw een the ir k ingdom s."30 C hristian leaders and  the 
C hristian  faith , far from  pacifying a m artia l spirit, increased the m artial 
bonds betw een  pa trons an d  clients, em pire  an d  allies. By con tinu ing  
develope  trad itiona l connections betw een  w ar and  relig ion , the  clergy 
w ere b o u n d  to participate  in the hostilities endem ic to the  frontier cities. 
As the sp iritua l and  secular gu ides of these com m unities, ecclesiastics 
w ould  be expected to play a dom inant role in w ar as well as in  peace.
C hristian  leaders w ere  o ften  w ell-su ited  for h a n d lin g  m ilita ry  
con tingencies. N early  every  in h ab itan t of the  easte rn  fro n tie r w as 
graphically  fam iliar w ith  the process of w ar, and  the clergy should  no t be 
seen as being m ore tim id than  anyone else. W arfare w as so com m onplace 
as to im bue theological discourse w ith  m ilitary m etaphors. Let us tu rn  to 
the  Acts of the Disputation to see how  com plicated argum ents are m ade 
accessible th rough  the use of m artia l images.31 W hen b ishop A rchelaus 
and  M ani first debated, the heretic claim ed that God had  separated  by  walls 
th a t w hich is good from  th a t w hich is evil. A rchelaus in  tu rn  asked, how  
then  has the Evil O ne entered  this w orld , w hich is p a rt of the  good K ing's 
territo ries,
"lest he first cast down [those walls] as we have heard that such things have been done by 
enemies, and indeed with our own eyes we have quite recently seen..., when a king attacks a 
citadel surrounded by a strong wall, he first uses ballistae and projectiles; then he 
endeavours to cut through the gates with axes, and to demolish the walls by battering 
rams; and when he at last obtains an entrance, and gains possession of the place, he does 
whatever he likes, whether it be his pleasure to carry off the citizens into captivity, or 
make a complete destruction of the fortress, or... grant indulgence..."32
49 Agathangelos, 873. The practice of drawing these impressive honour guards from the 
borderlands continues; see for example Faust. Buz., 4.5.
30 Agathangelos, 877.
31 For a brief discussion of this episode see S.N.C. Lieu (1985) 97-100.
32 Archelaus, Disputations, 24.
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T ow ards the close of the debate, A rchelaus fired  o u t the  m ost dam ning  
invec tive  in  h is a rsena l, by  tag g in g  M ani as the  in s tru m e n t of the 
A ntichrist used  like a spy or raider,
"but a mean and base one, used by him as any barbarian or tyrant may do, who in attempting 
to make an inroad on people living under righteous laws, sends some select agent,... with 
the view of finding out the exact magnitude and character of strength possessed by the 
legitimate king..."33
Later, M ani, on  the  basis of M atthew  12.46-50, p roposed  th a t C hrist, in 
asking "W ho is m y m other, and  w ho are m y brothers?" w as n o t born  of 
th e  V irg in  M ary, and  th u s  d id  n o t possess h u m an  n a tu re . B ishop 
A rchelaus, a fte r a ttem p tin g  an  exegetical response , m oved  to  term s 
com prehensible to h is flock:
"...I shall prove this to you by illustrations suited to your capacity. A certain king who had 
taken up arms, and gone forth to meet an enemy, was earnestly considering and planning 
how he might subdue those hostile and foreign forces. And when his mind was occupied 
with many cares and anxieties..., a certain man broke inopportunely in upon him, and began 
to remind him of a domestic matter."34
Such graphic dicta suggest som ething very  close to a firsthand  view  of the 
m echanics of siege w arfare. A rchelaus' readiness to use this im agery hints 
a t the  advanced  developm ent of C hristian  m etaphorical use of m artia l 
im a g e s .3 3  H ow ever, in the archbishop 's case, it is clear tha t his fam iliarity 
w ith  technical descriptions of sieges comes from  the careful observation of 
one w ho  has seen cities razed  and  com m unities subjected. Sim ilarly, w e 
find the  follow ing passage in  the Chronicle of Edessa:
"The year 715, 'Absamia Kashisha (presbyter), son of the sister of the blessed Ephrem, 
composed poems and discourse upon the coming of the Huns to the territory of the
Romans."36
33 Archelaus, Disputations, 36. On the role and status of spies see V. Chapot (1907) 199-205.
34 Archelaus, Disputations, 48; Although I am uncertain, this passage appears to hide a 
criticism of the Roman emperor for not protecting certain provinces, or perhaps it was 
inspired by Valerian's defeat: "For what else should be a king's care, so long as the time of 
war endures, than to provide for the safety of the people of his province and look into 
military matters."
35 The use of military language in ecclesiastical writings may have been well-established 
due to the long tradition of viewing the Church as at war with Satan, see Dvornik (1966) 
558-610, esp. at 577.
36 Chron. Ed. 540 ,47: A.D. 404.
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U nfo rtunate ly , 'A bsam ia 's  poem s no longer exist. But it sho u ld  no t 
su rp rise  us th a t a long  the  fron tie r even  the  clergy w o u ld  tu rn  the ir 
lea rn in g  to w ard s  m artia l top ics. C learly , church  m en  h a d  en ough  
know ledge of defensive m atters to be tru sted  w ith  the construction of city 
defences,^^
Furtherm ore, m any m em bers of the clergy came from  a background 
w hich included  previous m ilitary train ing  or service. O n bo th  sides of the 
fron tier there  w ere C hristian  leaders w ho  had  experienced the  m ilitary  
life. A  notable exam ple from  the early  fourth  century  is th a t of M illes, 
w ho forsook his m ilitary  vocation to live an ascetic life. In  tim e, he w as 
o rdained  b ishop of an  unknow n Persian city w here his evangelical w orks 
m et w ith  h a rd sh ip  and  failure. C u rsing  the  city, he  left for R om an 
territories w here he w orsh ipped  in  Jerusalem , before m oving on  to study  
w ith  Egyptian monks. A t a later date he w as m artyred. H is form er Persian 
city w as even tually  dem olished  and  sow n w ith  corn for offend ing  the 
king.^® N erses, the Catholicos of A rm enia, w as selected for this position in 
p a rt for his enviable m ilitary  prow ess. A t the tim e of his o rd ination  he 
w as serving in  the  m ilitary  office of Senekapet, and  w as acclaim ed pastor 
of the  A rm enian  peop le  by  the  arm y of k ing  Arsak.^^ In  add ition  to 
possessing  an  en tire  ne tw ork  of contacts th ro u g h o u t the  lands of the  
em pire 's eastern enem ies, ecclesiastical leaders them selves m ay have been 
form er captives in  Persian territories, as w as the case w ith  N onnus, bishop 
of Amida.^o In  the  sixth century , the  patriarch  of A ntioch w as him self 
fo rm erly  the  h ighest-rank ing  m ilita ry  officer on  the  frontier.^! W hen 
E uphrasius, the form er Patriarch , fell in to  a boiling cau ldron  of wax, he 
w as succeeded by E phrem  of A m ida. A t the tim e of his appo in tm ent, 
E phrem  w as still the  Comes Orientis.^^ As Patriarch , h e  enjoyed the
Chron. Josh., 91; in which we find bishop Sergius overseeing the construction of the 
fortifications at Birta in A.D. 505/6. See also ecclesiastics discussed under individual cities 
in Chp. 2, and the Bishop Thomas at Dara below.
Soz., 2.14; Sozomen makes mention of Syrians having recorded his vita, but I have found 
no otiher record, nor have I discovered the circumstances of his martyrdom.
Faust. Buz., 4.3.
Chron. Josh., 83: Nonnus was ordained in A.D. 505.
Chron. Ed. 540 ,97: In A.D. 526 Ephrem of Amida was ordained bishop of Antioch.
Zach. Mit,, 8.4; Mal., 17.22; for a discussion of Ephrem's career see G.Downey (1938) 364- 
70.
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suprem e patronage of the  em peror, w ho o u t of an o ld  fondness backed 
E phrem  and  his policies, and  "paid  attention to w hat he w ro te  to him /'^^ 
It is likely th a t "w hat he  w rote" concerned no t just ecclesiastical m atters, 
b u t m ilitary ones, given Ephrem 's previous career.^^
Later, those w ho m ay  n o t have  come from  a m ilitary  background  
still fo und  them selves in  the  th ick  of m ilita ry  operations. There are  
exam ples of m en, w ho, a lthough  it is no t know n w hether or n o t they  
cam e in to  their office w ith  m ilitary  experience, nonetheless took p a rt in  
m artia l ventures. Bishop Eusebius of Em esa w as he ld  in  h igh  enough 
o p in io n  to  be inv ited  by  the  em pero r C onstan tine  on  h is p ro p o sed  
exped itions against the  Persians.^^ The construction of the  im portan t 
fortress city of D ara w as placed u n d er the supervision of Bishop Thom as 
of Amida.^6 Furtherm ore, the  ranks of the  'officers' w ere sw ollen w ith  
clergy:
"And when they began by the help of the Lord and commenced the work, there were as 
overseers and commissaries over it Cyrus "Adon and Eutychian the presbyters, and 
Paphnout and Sergius and John the deacons, and others from the clergy of Amida. And the 
bishop himself paid frequent visits to the place."^^
It w ould  be m istaken to believe tha t Thom as and all his clerics had  a deep 
know ledge of m ilitary science, b u t ra ther their trustw orthiness m ade them  
a ttractive  overseers in  such expensive m ilitary  projects. W hen the city 
w as com plete, the  em peror appo in ted  the above-m entioned E utychian as 
th e  b ishop , a m an  "zealous and  accustom ed  to  the  tran sac tio n s of 
business." To assist him , John, a soldier from  A m ida, w as tonsured  and  
m ade  priest. A fter E utychian 's death , Thom as Bar 'A bdiyo of Resaina, 
"w ho h ad  been a Rom an soldier, and  h a d  been appoin ted  stew ard  of the 
C hu rch  of A m ida, also  v ig ilan t an d  w ell v e rsed  in  b u sin ess"  w as
Zach. Mit., 8.4; Ephrem had been responsible for putting down the blue faction riots in 
Antioch, Mai., 17.12.
^  G. Downey (1938) 364 doubts that Ephrem's theological training was of any note. He was 
chosen for his administrative skills and ruthless energy.
Soz., 3.6; though it is not known at what capacity he served. According to Eusebius, VC, 
4.56 and 62, Constantine planned to bring a large contingent of priests and a portable field 
alter, akin to the one accompanying the ancient Israelites. However, this text must be 
viewed with a degree of caution, see T.G. Elliot (1991) 162-71.
On the strategic location and construction of the fortress city of Dara see J.G Crow (1983) 
12-20; B. Croke amd J. Crow (1984) 142-59, esp. 149-50; L.M. Whitby (1986b) 737-83.
Zach. M it, 7.6.
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consecrated bishop of Dara.^8 The joint operations of civic and  religious 
com m unities a t D ara also h ad  a positive effect for the  ou tly ing  frontier 
com m unities, as im perial craftsm en w ere subsequently  len t to benefit the 
nearby  m onastic  houses and  villages of the  T ur 'Abdin,^^ A nd these 
m onaste ries  them selves w ere  co n stru c ted  to  take  on  th e  fo rm  an d  
function  of sm all fortlets w hen  n e c e s s a r y J O  w h e n  a m u tiny  later broke 
o u t in D ara, it w as u n d e r the  leadersh ip  of the priest. M am as, and  his 
associates tha t the revolt w as d efea ted /^  G iven its strategic im portance, 
D ara w as perhaps m ore likely to vaun t a clergy of m ilitary b ack g ro u n d /^  
H ow ever, this city does not stand  ou t too boldly  w hen com pared to o ther 
cities of the  period. W ithin a city, all m em bers of the  com m unity  w ere 
expected to participate  in  the defences, regardless of vocation. In A m ida, 
m onks w o u ld , d u rin g  tim e of crisis, fin d  them selves a llo tte d  the  
responsibility  of safeguarding a section of the wall.^3 Zachariah provides 
tw o fu rther exam ples of m en w hose previous civic responsibilities w ould  
have included  participation  in  m ilitary  m atters. N onnus of Seleucia, w ho 
h ad  been  the  governo r of A m ida d u rin g  the  siege of A.D, 503, w as 
subsequently  appoin ted  the city's bishop. H e died a few  m onths later. The 
selection of the next bishop reinforces a notion that know ledge of civil and  
m ilita ry  m atte rs  w ere, if n o t requ is ite  in  the  fron tie r cities, at least 
attractive;
"And in succession to him again, in the presence of three bishops, as the canons require, 
Nonnus of Martyropolis, Arathu of Ingilia, and Aaron of Arsamosata, who were on the spot, 
they ordained Moro Bar Kustant, the govemor."^^
D om itianus, b ishop of M elitene, and  a relative of the  em pero r M aurice, 
accom panied K husro, as did  Gregory, the archbishop of Antioch, w hen the 
Rom ans in itiated  a cam paign for the  deposed  king’s re-installation (A.D.
Zach. Mit., 7.6.
69 A. Palmer (1990) 123.
70 ibid, 131.
7t Procopius, Wars, 1.26.5-12. W.E. Kaegi (1981) 65 for a discussion of the Dara revolt; 75 
for the conviction of the impérial government that the destinies of Church and State were 
intertwined.
72 It is possible that clergy ^ e  receiving weighted attention due to the survival of 
ecclesiastical sources; see B, Croke (1983) 77-8.
70 Procopius, Wars, 1.7.22.
74 Zach. Mit., 8.5.
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5 9 0 ) /5  It m ight be argued tha t G regory's capacity was in no w ay m ilitary, 
b u t th is w as no t the  case for D om itianus. It w as D om itianus w ho  had  
encouraged the em peror to  undertake  the  expedition, ra ther th an  to allow  
the  Persian em pire to fall in to  a chaotic civil w ar— this la tter suggestion 
being  the  advice of bo th  the senate and  the Patriarch  John Nesteutes.76 
W hen the  Rom an force en tered  the  siege to regain  M artyropolis, it  w as 
b ishop  D om itianus w ho nego tia ted  w ith  leaders of the  garrison , w ho 
d ispa tched  the praepositus sacri cubiculi to convince the Persians to qu it 
the  city, w ho  u sed  troops a t h is d isposal to convince, even  p ressu re , 
K husro  to hand  over the  tu rncoa t Sittas to the  general of th e  East for 
pu n ishm en t and  execution, w ho b ro u g h t the  disloyal soldiers to  justice, 
an d  w ho  o rchestra ted  the  celebrations for the  city 's sa lvation .77 The 
bishop w as no t in actual com m and of the  force; the arm y of the  East w as 
sen t o u t u n d e r its ow n com m ander, Com entiolus.78 Yet, Theophylact 
im plies th a t D om itianus had  the  au thority  to w ithd raw  m ilitary  aid  from  
K h u sro .79 It is m ost likely tha t D om itianus had  no official au thority  as a 
field com m ander, b u t th a t his trem endous influence allow ed him  to exert 
p ressu re  bo th  on Rom an officers and  Khusro. W hatever the case, b ishop 
D om itianus' prestige is ev ident from  the sources. H e w as a b lood relative 
of the  em peror M aurice, and  personally  dispatched by  im perial decree.®^ 
Beyond his sp iritua l discipline and  p leasan t dem eanour, he  w as know n 
for being a capable m an  of action: decisive, quick, and  sh rew d in  secular 
operations of the h ighest order.^i C learly he im pressed K husro, for w hen 
G reg o ry  h a d  rem o v e d  to  A n tio ch  a n d  th e  g en era l o f th e  E ast, 
C om entio lus, h ad  been rem oved  for offending the  Persian, D om itianus
75 Th. Sim., 4.14.5-6; Evagr., 6.18. On which see L.M. Whitby (1988) 297-304. E. Honigmann 
(1953) and R. Paret (1957) discuss the career of Domitianus.
76 j. Nik., 96.10-13; Th. Sim., 4.14.1.
77 Th. Sim., 4.15.8-18; Evagr., 6,19.
78 Th, Sim., 4.12.8-10 and 4.14.5-6; Evagr., 6.18, the force marched under Comentiolus, but 
was to attend to Khusro’s directions.
79 According to Th. Sim., 4.15.14-16, bishop Domitianus warned Khusro that the mass of 
Roman troops could be turned against him if he did not comply with the interests of the 
empire; and at 5.3.4-7, Domitianus is on the verge of leaving Dara with the entire Roman 
army when Khusro offends the Christian community by taking residence in a group of 
religious buildings.
80 Th. Sim., 4.14.5; Evagr., 6.18.
81 Evagr., 6.18.
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r e m a in e d ,82 Such m en  m u st have  been  a ttrac tive  to  th e  im peria l 
adm in istra tion  because they  p rov ided  su p p o rt for, and  adherence to, a 
system  of ideas an d  political goals in  a geographical a rea  rife w ith  
conflicting loyalties/^  In  such situations, solitary leaders are the deciding 
factor, especially during  a crisis/4
§ 5, Ecclesiastical Leadership D uring Sieges:
These u rb an  ho ly  m en  exh ib ited  their m artia l lead ersh ip  m ost 
clearly a t the critical m om ent of frontier w arfare: the s ieg e /^  It w as the 
bishop w ho w as m orally responsible for d irecting the people and  keeping 
th em  u n d e r  con tro l.86 D uring  the  siege, ecclesiastical leaders could  
circulate w idely  and  rap id ly  am ong the  defenders; unlike a p itched battle, 
they  could  rem ain  h igh ly  consp icuous a t all tim es. If w e recall the 
in tim ate  bond  w hich the C hurch had  forged betw een u rban  com m unities 
an d  the ir clergy, w e gain a b e tte r u n d e rs tan d in g  of how  insp ira tional 
b ishops and  the ir fellow s w ere to  the beleaguered  citizenry. U pon  the 
w alls o r th ro u g h o u t the  streets cou ld  be seen the sam e m en w ho h ad  
bap tised  them  and  bu ried  their elders, w ho had  organised  fam ine relief 
and  settled their pe tty  disputes. N ow  these ecclesiastics, visible to  all and  
a t equal risk  to their ow n lives, w alked am ongst them , adm inistering  the 
sacram ents and  cheering on the forces. It is "the personal bond  betw een 
leader and  follow er th a t lies a t the  roo t of all explanations of w hat does 
and  does no t happen  in  a battle."®^ U nlike im perial officers, ecclesiastical 
leaders lived and d ied  in  the com m unities they w ere defending.88 in  the 
case of th e  A rm en ian  c lergy , th e  fam ilies of the  b ish o p s h a d , for 
genera tion  after generation , se rved  the  C hristian  com m unities in  the
82 Th. Sim., 5.2.7-3.1.
83 F. Millar (1971) 1-17; S.P. Brock (1982) 1-19; T.D, Barnes (1985) 130-6.
84 G.W. Allport (1968) 190.
85 On the importance of siege warfare in the region see C.P.T. Naudé (1958), and J. 
Matthews (1989) 53-66, 287-96.
86 Zach. Mit., 7.3.
87 J. Keegan (1978)114.
88 Throughout the late ancient' period the central administration became dependent on local 
leadership, a dependence which became increasingly strained, see W.E. Kaegi (1981) 14ff; 
and J. Matthews (1989) 40-1. For the self-reliant nature of the frontier see J.B. Segal (1955) 
112-15.
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sam e episcopal capacity. Thus, the clergy p rov ided  a continuum  betw een 
peace-tim e leadership  and  crisis leadership . Their concerns w ere n o t for 
the  expediency of the m om ent. W hereas a dux  or comes m igh t leave as 
soon as the engagem ent w as concluded, the church leaders rem ained, and  
th e ir  concern  fo r th e  in d iv id u a l's  w ell-being  ex ten d ed  b ey o n d  any  
particu lar m ilitary contingency.
Som e of the  earliest a n d  m ost d e ta iled  accounts of ep iscopal 
leadersh ip  d u ring  sieges can be found  in  the  stories w hich  su rro u n d  the 
efforts of the bishops Jacob and  Vologases during  the p ro tracted  assaults on 
N isibis in  A.D. 338 and  350.89 The narratives of these events are extrem ely 
convolu ted . H ow ever, for th e  p u rp o se  of study ing  the  ro le  of church  
leadersh ip , it is n o t necessary  to d istingu ish  betw een ind iv idua l sieges. 
Jacob had  reluctantly  accepted the leadersh ip  of the N isibene com m unity: 
"Because he w as conspicuous for his actions and  beloved by  all and  his 
nam e c ircu lated  in  everyone 's  m ou th , he w as com pelled  to accept the  
office of bishop."90 It w as precisely because of his de term ined  asceticism  
th a t the  C hristian com m unity believed Jacob w ould  be the finest choice for 
le a d e r .9 t  The ascetics, w hose  lo y a lty  to  a w ea lth y  u rb an -b a se d  
establishm ent m ay be questioned, possessed certain qualities w hich w ould  
m ake th em  a ttrac tive  leaders a t tim es of w ar. They h ad  an  in tim ate  
u n d ers tan d in g  of the  im portance of obedience to superio rs and  austere  
d isc ip line , an d  it w as the  n o rm  for la te  ancient m onks to  have  the 
responsib ility  of an  en tire  com m unity  u ltim ately  invested  in  a so litary  
f i g u r e . 92 W hile the  em p ero r C o nstan tiu s w as m u ste rin g  forces in  
A n tioch , S apor in v es ted  N isib is w ith  the  b est a rm am en t h is force 
possessed. Yet all his efforts came to  naugh t due to the b ishops's holiness:
"[Sapor] completely sun*ounded the city, setting up machines of war, commissioning towers, 
erecting palisades, the areas between strewn with branches placed crosswise, then he 
ordered his troops to raise embankments and build towers against the city towers. Then 
while dispatching his archers to ascend the towers and direct their arrows at those
89 For a variety of annotated translations on these events see M.H. Dodgeon and S.N.C. Lieu
(1991) 164ff. We know almost nothing about the second Persian siege which occured in A.D, 
346, and I do not include it in this essay. C.S. Lightfoot (1988) 105-25 has untangled the 
three separate events as best possible.
90 Theod., H is t Relig., 1.7.
9f S. A. Harvey (1990) 12.
P. Rousseau (1978) 21-32 and H. Chadwick (1981) 11-24, esp. 23.
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defending the wall, at the same time he charged others with undermining the walls from 
below. Yet all these plans came to nothing, rendered useless by the prayers of J a c o b . . . " ^ ^
M odern readers m ay find such p ious explanations of the Persian failure to 
be inadequate. Theodoret is not, how ever, the only ancient source to trace 
the  cause of v ictory  to the  ho ly  m an 's  p r a y e r s . ^ 4  To u n d e rp lay  such 
sentim ents as influential on the m ind  of beleaguered C hristians is to court 
f o l l y . 95 Sapor, u n d e te rre d  by  the  c ity 's  reso lve, d am m ed  u p  the  
M ygdonius river and  used  it to dem olish  the  foundations of the  city 's 
b u l w a r k s . 6^ An im m ediate onslaugh t w as postponed: perhaps to  allow  the 
m u d d y  breach to dry , pe rhaps to allow  the arm y som e rest. W hile the 
P ersians took th e ir repose, Jacob ra llied  the  N isibenes from  the G reat 
Church. N one of the sources say at this po in t in  their narra tives th a t the 
b ishop took to the streets himself, b u t all are quite clear tha t his leadership  
an d  th e  lead ersh ip  of h is clergy w ere  responsib le  for d isp e llin g  the  
im pend ing  doom :
"For that holy man, through his prayer, filled with valour both the troops and the rest of 
the townsfolk, and both built the wall, withstood the engines, and beat off the advancing 
foe."97
"The citizens redoubled their prayers, with the noble Jacob as their intercessor. All those 
old enough to be of use set to in earnest to rebuild their defences."9&
"But the bishop Jacob and the Blessed Ephrem with all the church through the whole time 
of the siege were interceding with God. Finally, the holy bishop raised the strength and 
morale of the cavalry and of all the inhabitants of the city; he rebuilt the wall and set up 
a structure and ballista on it, by means of which he checked and drove back the besiegers.
93 Theod., Hist. 1.11
9  ^ For the power of Jacob's prayers delivering the city see other sources given in M.H. 
Dodgeon and S.N.C. Lieu (1991) 7.1.3.
95 As N.H. Baynes (1955b) 248-60 pointed out long ago, "there can be no doubt that the 
Byzantine lived in a world where miracle could happen and did happen, and that belief in 
miracles is itself a fact of history which the student ignores at his peril." 248. As J.R.E. 
Bliese (1984) 11 and (1989) 217-9 illustrate, speeches arguing that one side had a just and 
divinely sanctioned cause became increasingly important in mediaeval warfare, especially 
in regard to the morale of the combatants.
96 According to the sources the river was pent up until sufficient force could be released, 
shattering the walls. As Nisibis lies low on a plain, the height of a dam necessary to 
create such an effect makes this element of the story dubious. However, in the dry summer 
heat, the Mygdonius could have been channelled in such a way as to erode parts of the 
defences; see M.H. Dodgeon and S.N.C. Lieu (1991) 384; contra, C.S. Lightfoot (1988) 114-6.
97 Theod., HE, 2.30.
98 Theod., HE, 1.11.
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He accomplished these things although in person he was far removed from the wall, being 
in God's temple and interceding with the Lord of all."^^
If one travels to N isibis today /00  it ig possible to v isit the  site of Jacob's 
tom b. The p resen t chu rch  contains the  sa in t's  rep u ted  sarcophagus, 
though  the  bu ild ing  is slightly later than  the one from  w hich the bishop 
m ay have p r e a c h e d . ^oi j t  ig an unim posing building, and  certainly during  
the  siege no t m any  of the  N isibenes w ou ld  have been p resen t w ith in  the 
G reat C hurch. It is therefore likely th a t th rough  the m inor clergy and  
w o rd  of m ou th , new s of the  b ish o p 's  serm ons w as be ing  passed  on 
th ro u g h o u t the  besieged city. H ow  m uch influence Jacob or Vologaeses 
h a d  on  th e  p rac tica l s ide  of defensive  o rg an isa tio n  is d ifficu lt to 
de term ine . N onetheless it is m uch  m ore im p o rtan t to  h ig h lig h t the  
psychological boon they p rov ided  for the  defenders. A lw ays in the  backs 
of their m inds w ould  be the notion th a t w ith in  the city 's G reat C hurch a 
holy  m an w as constantly invoking God on their behalf; such beliefs uplift 
m en and  keep them  fighting w hen  u n d er p r e s s u r e . ^ 8 2  K now ledge th a t 
p rayers w ere sung  ensu red  the  frontiersm an of the  righteousness of his
cause.^83
A lthough  the  m ake-shift w all w as of sufficient he ig h t to p reven t 
either a cavalry charge or even scaling-ladders, there w as still great anxiety 
am ongst the  N isibenes th a t the  Persians w ou ld  break  th rough  again. It 
appears th a t the  defenders called upon  E phrem  to convince Jacob to rally  
the  troops from  the ram parts and  insu lt the Persian host. It m ay have 
been a great effort for Jacob to appear, for w e know  he d ied  shortly after the
99 Historia S. Eph„ 6-7.
8^0 In the summer of 1991,1 had the good fortune of visiting Nisibis with C.S. Lighfoot. We 
were led into the 'crypt' of the church and shown what is undoubtedly a late Roman 
sarcophagus. According to Gennadius, liber de scriptoribus ecdesiasHcis, 1, the emperor 
Julian entered the city and had the saint's remains disinterred. However, Julian is not 
known to have entered Nisibis. The church is still used by the Christian community, while 
the building itself is owned by a Muslim family who live in the upper stories.
181 The present building is thought to be the baptistery of the Great Church, built the year 
after the siege by bishop Vologaeses; see G. Bell (1982)142-45.
102 "Yet above and beyond any symbol— whether it be individual life or a pillbox 
commanding a wadi in the Sahara— are all of the ideas and ideals which press upon men, 
causing them to accept disciplining and to hold the line even though death may be at 
hand." S.L.A. Marshall, (1947) 161.
183 A. Palmer (1990) 52-3,110.
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s i e g e . 1 8 4  Tw o ph en o m en a  are  reco rd ed  in  connection  w ith  Jacob 's 
appearance. G oing up  into one of the  tow ers and  looking upo n  the  arm y 
of Sapor, Jacob let fly his ow n particular salvo:
"...he prayed to God to send upon them a cloud of gnats and mosquitoes. He spoke, and the 
Lord, persuaded as he was by Moses, delivered. The men were mortally wounded by the 
heaven-sent darts, the horse and elephants broke their tethers and escaped, plunging this 
way and that, unable to bear the stings."185
"...he discharged no other curse than to ask that mosquitoes and gnats might be sent forth 
upon them, so that by means of these tiny animals they might learn the might of the 
Protector of the Romans."186
Plagued thus by  clouds of insects, the rank  and  file of the besiegers broke. 
H ow ever, a m ore  sign ifican t even t convinced  Sapor th a t he  sh o u ld  
w ithd raw  from  the pro tracted  siege:
"When [Sapor] saw the holy man walking on the ramparts he supposed it was the emperor 
in person who presided over the operations— for he seemed to be wearing the purple robe 
and the diadem—, and then he turned in anger on those who had deceived him and advised 
him to undertake this campaign, guaranteeing the emperor was not present. He condemned 
them to death, disbanded his army and returned to his royal palace as quickly as 
possible."187
Such C hristian  leadersh ip  d u rin g  the  siege is no t en tirely  un ique  to the 
north-eastern  frontier, a lthough  it is m ore p revalen t there. For instance, 
w hen  the C hagan attem pted  to dem oralise the besieged in  C onstantinople 
by  parad ing  in person w ith  his A vars before the w alls, the  action w as m et 
by  the  Patriarch Sergius strid ing the ram parts in a rival display of guff.^88
§ 6. Use of Relics:
8^4 See sources in M.H. Dodgeon and S.N.C. Lieu (1991), 171.
8^5 Theod., Hist. Relig., 1.11; on Jacob's intimate relationship and favour with God see 1.3; 
on his ability to curse 1.4.
486 Theod., HE, 2.30; other versions follow along the same pattern; however, the Historia 
S. Eph., 6-7 has Ephrem climbing a tower and bringing the swarm upon the Persians.
487 Theod., Hist. Relig., 1.12; Theodoret, HE, 2.30 and the Historia S.Ephr., 6-7, which 
also discuss Sapor mistaking the figure on the ramparts, place the episode before Jacob 
takes to the ramparts, but this order lacks narrative logic.
488 Theod. Sync., 305.13-28,
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The clergy often u tilised  the  sacred relics in  their possession and  
thereby achieved the sam e enthusiasm  and  loyalty th a t ind iv idual leaders 
c o m m a n d e d / 8 9  Two passages in  E vagrius illustra te  this phenom enon. 
A lthough no  nam ed ecclesiastical figure is present, w e m ay safely assum e 
th a t the  cerem onies su rro u n d in g  the  use o r abuse of relics w as tigh tly  
con tro lled  by  the  estab lished  church. D uring  his A.D. 544 cam paign, 
K husro  m oved  against the  city of E dessa, goaded  on  by  his desire  to  
d isprove the legend that the city w ould  never fall to the enem y due  to the 
special a tten tion  afforded  to her by  Christ.448 H is engineers erected a 
m o u n d  of e a rth  an d  tim ber ag a in st th e  city w alls, from  w hich  the  
assau lting  forces cou ld  ra in  m issiles dow n  u p o n  the  defenders. The 
E dessenes im m edia te ly  excavated  a m ine  dow n  ben ea th  the  Persian  
m ound. They filled th is tunnel w ith  com bustibles, w hich  they  hoped  to 
ign ite , causing  th e  m o u n d  to  collapse  in to  th e  su b seq u en t hollow . 
H ow ever, desp ite  the ir efforts, th e  k ind ling  w ou ld  n o t b u rn . If the  
Persians could m aintain  their position on the m ound, they could clear the 
w all of defenders and  effectively breach the defenses. A t th is despera te  
m om ent, the  M andy lion— th e  clo th  w hich  C hrist h a d  im p ressed  his 
features u p o n  and  sent to  the ailing Edessene king, A bgar— w as b rough t 
forth:
"In this state of utter perplexity, they brought the divinely wrought image, which the 
hands of man did not form, but Christ our God sent to Abgar on his desiring to see him. 
Accordingly, having introduced this holy image into the mine, and washed it over with 
water, they sprinkled some upon the timber; and the divine power forthwith being present 
to the faith of those who had so done, the result was accomplished which had previously 
been impossible: for the timber immediately caught the flame... and fire spread in all
directions"441
W hen th e  c itizens saw  w h a t w as h ap p en in g , th ey  h u r le d  jars of 
inflam m ables in to  the  the  m ine. For three days the  w ood  sm ouldered . 
K husro countered  th is by  d iverting  the river to  douse the  flam es. The 
action seem ed to provide the final force necessary. Perhaps sw ept clean of 
the  charred  supports, the  m ound  and  the Persians' resolve finally  sunk
489 G. Kitzinger (1954)'87-95;and 103-3; A.M. Cameron (1981a) 24.
448 On the campaign see J.B. Segal (1970) 115.
444 Evagr., 4.27. On the legends surrounding Abgar see J.B. Segal (1970) 62-78; on the 
Mandylion see A.M. Cameron (1983) 80-94; and "The Sceptic and the Shroud", in A.M. 
Cameron (1981).
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in to  the  cavity. Evagrius ends the chapter w ith  w hat could easily be the 
e n d  of a serm on , the  en d  of th e  official sto ry  w h ich  the  C hurch  
d issem inated  after the Edessene victory: "Then K husro, in  u tte r despair, 
im pressed  by  the  circum stances w ith  a sense of h is d isgraceful folly in 
hav ing  en te rta in ed  an idea  of p reva iling  over the  G od the  Edessenes 
w orship , retreated  ingloriously." In addition  to  the M andylion, C hrist also 
w as repu ted  to have sent a letter to king A bgar via the apostle T haddeus, 
the  text of w hich w as inscribed above the city gates.442 This construction 
m u st have  been  a rran g ed  by  th e  C hristian  leaders of the  city, w ho  
th roughou t her h istory  cultivated the  legend of C h risf s beneficence. After 
h is fa ilu re  a t E dessa, the  Persian  k ing  struck  o u t to w ard  Sergiopolis. 
K h u sro  h e ld  back  fro m  im m e d ia te  a ssa u lt a n d  tu rn e d  to w a rd  
negotiations. H e w as to ld  th a t am ongst the m any sacred treasures in the 
city w as a golden cross w hich h ad  been an endow m ent from  the  im perial 
family. Furtherm ore, in  his negotiations w ith  a priest of the city, the king 
becam e aw are th a t the  rem ains of St. Sergius rested  in  a silver-p lated  
sa rcophagus. This d iscovery  ro u se d  the  k ing 's  in te res t, a n d  soon  
a fte rw ard  he com m enced an assau lt on the  walls. H ow ever, w hen  the 
force reached the city they found  the  ram parts bedecked w ith  shields and  
arm s. K husro w as m ystified, for he had  been inform ed that only the w eak 
an d  the  h a lt w ere  p resen t in  the  city. H e called off opera tions and  
w ithdrew , according to Evagrius, because he realised tha t the sa in f s pow er 
h a d  been  s tirred  by  his coveting ho ly  relics.443 Far from  shifting  the 
bu rd en  of the defences off the  shoulders of the com m on citizen, relics like 
the M andylion, or the sacred objects in  the walls of M artyropolis, bolstered 
th e ir hope  in  salvation.444 The M andylion  b ro u g h t the  in itia l sp a rk  
necessary , b u t the  citizens them selves had  constructed  the  m ine and  
fueled the  fire. Similarly, the pow er of Sergius via his relics d id  no t arm  
the ram parts, b u t only prov ided  the gu id ing  im petus. Like the  concept of 
d iv ine  Grace, su p e rn a tu ra l assistance only  appears effective w hen  the  
inhab itan ts of the  city w orked  in  partic ipa tion  w ith  the  Spirit. Yet we 
m u st alw ays keep in  m in d  th a t the  resu lting  legends and  p ro p ag an d a
442 Euseb., HE, 1.13.
413 Evagr., 4.28. On the site of Sergiopolis see L.M. Whitby (1987) 102-105, and on the 
ecclesiastical complex in particular see R.M. Harrison (1984) 105-6.
444 N.H. Baynes (1955b) 259.
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w hich follow ed sieges w ere of equal im portance to the even t them selves, 
for they  underlined  the ability of church leaders to m ain tain  control and  
cohesion in  their fron tier c o m m u n itie s /45 A n im age like th a t of C hrist 
on  the M andylion looked ou t upon  the  siege and judged  the  successes or 
failu res of the  defenders, pe rh ap s add ing  incentive or p ressu re  to  the 
b esieg ed 's  action /46  j h e  u rban  ecclesiastics u sed  such  artifices as the  
M andylion to reassert their ow n h e g em o n y /47
§ 7. The Clergy and  Capitulation:
Should the  city find  itself in  an  untenable situation, the final duties 
of su rren d er or, in  the  case of cities w hich  w ou ld  or cou ld  n o t resist, 
subm ission  w ere often undertaken  by the  leaders of the  church. By the  
fou rth  century  such activities h a d  becom e alm ost the com m onplace du ty  
of the  bishops.448 Bishop H eliodorus' efforts in the fall of Bezabde provide 
an early  exam ple of a church  leader negotiating  the su rren d er of a city. 
The Rom an city of Bezabde served  tw o functions, one m ilitary  and  one 
e cc le s ia s tic .449 The site of the city dom inates the access to  the  central 
A rm en ian  p la teau  th ro u g h  th e  T aurus m oun ta in s an d  w as the  chief 
u rban  centre for the recently-acquired lands of Zabdicene. As such, it w as 
in  th e  in te res t of the  im peria l go v ern m en t to p lace a large  garrison  
t h e r e ,420 a n d  of th e  C hurch  to  cen tre  its ow n  ad m in is tra tiv e  an d  
evangelical base. The very  fact th a t the city boasted a bishop indicates that 
the civilian and  C hristian popu lation  w as significant.424 In A.D. 362 Sapor
445 As J.B. Segal (1970) 77, points out, the episode of the Mandylion is not recorded in the 
narrative of Procopius; it is found first some fifty years later in the account of the orthodox 
Evagrius. Indeed, even in Evagrius' account, the bishop Eulalius finds the Mandylion 
amongst the broken tiles of a wall.
446 p. Brown and S. MacCormaik (1982c) 212.
447 On the Christianisation of ceremonies like the parading of the Mandylion or of victory 
rituals see M. McCormack (1986) 100-11; and S. MacCormack (1981) 67-78, and (1982) 298-9.
448 J. Matthews (1989a) 436.
449 On Bezabde see C.S. Lightfoot (1983) and 189-204 G. Algaze (1989) 248-52. G. Algaze 
discusses locations previously hypothesised for Bezabde— either at modern Cizre or on the 
eastern side of the Tigris at Eski Yapi (Fenik). The archaeological evidence now supports a 
thesis that the Roman fortress at Bezabde was located on the western bank of the Tigris at 
Eski Hendek.
420 The Bezabde garrison was thrice that of Amida, J. Matthews (1989a) 53.
421 C.S. Lightfoot (1983) 195, n. 1.
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besieged  the  city, and  Bishop H eliodo rus is know n  to  h ave  en te red  
discussions w ith  the Persian concerning the city 's fate. After indicating his 
w illingness to  parlay  w ith  the  Persians by  "nods and  signs", H eliodorus 
im plored  Sapor to break  off his siege, as the price a lready p a id  by  both  
con tenders w as high. H e m et w ith  no  success in  th is pe tition . Soon 
afterw ards the city fell and  her inhabitants w ere led aw ay into captivity.422 
D uring  th e  A rm en ian  rebellion  of A.D. 450/1  th e re  is fu rth e r  
ev idence of ep iscopal invo lvem en t in  the  reso lu tion  of a siege. The 
Sasanian arm y dealt a serious defeat to the rebel forces on the plains near 
the  river T lm ut, after w hich  contingents of the  A rm enian  a rm y  sough t 
refuge in  a nearby fortress.423 W hen the ensuing siege proved  indecisive, 
the  Persians entered  negotiations w ith  the en trapped  b ishops Yovsep and 
Levond. The Gospels w ere b rough t forth  by  the Persians, and  prom ises of 
am nesty  m ade  u p o n  them . It is d ifficu lt to say w he ther any  of the 
besiegers w ere Christians or w hether the pagans bringing the gospels forth 
held  a solem n respect for the ho ly  books. Vasak, an apostate  A rm enian 
noble, led  the force, and  perhaps the oaths w ere of his doing. The clergy 
agreed  to accept a cease-fire and  to  undertake  discussions concerning a 
su rren d er, b u t the  so ld iers believed  th a t the  oaths w ere em pty  of any  
va lid ity . In  th e  end , the  tw o  h u n d re d  an d  th irteen  A rm enians w ere 
sta rved  in to  subm ission and  executed on  the spot, w hile the clergy w ere 
led  in to  cap tiv ity .424 The Persian  force then  proceeded  u p  the  A raxes 
valley to  the  fortress of the  Blue M ountain , w here  it b roke the  resistance 
of the  be leaguered  garrison. H ere the  p ries t A rshen in tervened  "in  an 
appealing  and  friendly w ay" on behalf of the civilian com m unity, b u t to 
no  avail. A rshen w as im m ediately bound , captives w ere taken, and  m any 
places w ere p u t to the torch.425
W hen A m ida fell in  A.D. 503 and  slaughter filled th e  streets, the 
elderly  b ishop of the city m et K avadh w ith  reproaches, sta ting  th a t such 
behaviour w as beneath  the dignity  of a king. The m assacre w as halted, b u t 
A m ida w as still p lundered  and  the  rem ainder of the  populace led  aw ay
422 Ammianus Marcellinus, 20.7.1-9. On the fate of the inhabitants see A. Voobus (1960) 
204.
423 Elishe, 106-21.
424 Elishe, 122-23.
425 Elishe, 126.
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into captivity/26 C onstantina fared slightly better, a t least for the C hristian 
com m unity. Early on, the Jews of the city h ad  a ttem pted , b u t failed, to 
betray  the city to the Persians.427 W hen this foiled a ttem pt w as discovered, 
the  defenders began  to ro u n d  u p  the  Jews and  cu t them  dow n  in  the 
streets. It w as only after the  b ishop. Bar 'A dotos, in tervened w ith  comes 
Leontius tha t the slaughter w as b rough t to an end.428 Before the siege was 
resolved, the bishop. Bar 'A dotus, approached  K avadh b ring ing  w ith  him  
w ine, d ried  figs and  honey, and  loaves of fine bread— offerings symbolic of 
the  c ity 's appeal for p ro tec tion , forgiveness, and  renew ed  life.429 The 
b ishop w as a devout and  prayerful m an, and  his closeness to G od could be 
seen im m ediately  by  all w ho gazed u p o n  his face. C onstantina, claim ed 
Bar 'A dotus, w as a neglected place, ungarrisoned  and  uncared  for by  the 
Rom an adm inistration, filled w ith  sad folk. So im pressed w as K avadh by  
th is  m ee ting  th a t he  g ran te d  to  th e  b ish o p  C o n stan tin a 's  freedom ; 
furtherm ore, he alleviated their suffering by giving to Bar 'A dotus Persian 
siege supplies for d istribution am ong the people.430
W hen K avadh  sen t w o rd  to  the  be leaguered  ma gist er m ilitum , 
A reob indus, a t E dessa e ither to  accept his m arzban  in to  the city, o r 
conclude a trea ty  w ith  him , it w as a t the C hurch of St. Sergius th a t the 
negotiations took p l a c e . 434 Later, A reobindus gathered the loyal m ilitia of 
Edessa in  the  G reat Church and  presented  them  w ith a w a r d s . 4 3 2  in  neither 
case are  any  clergy m en tioned  d irectly , a lthough  it w ou ld  be h a rd  to 
believe  th a t ecclesiastical lead ers  w ere  n o t invo lved  on  som e level, 
p e rh ap s organ ising  the cerem onial side of these occasions. W hen the 
initial negotiations d id  n o t resu lt favourably for the Rom ans, it  w as often 
the case that church leaders w ould  continue efforts to secure the  release of
126 Procopius, Wars, 1.7.30-32; the captives were, however, treated with kindness, and in 
time allowed to return to their homes, although Kavadh claimed they had escaped, 
1.7.33-34.
427 Judaeo-Chrisitian relations had been poor ever since the A.D. 363 fall of Nisibis. With 
Nisibis lost, the Jewish community in Mesopotamia was deprived of mercantile ties and one 
of her greatest centres of learning; and with the Christianization of the Roman empire, 
Jews found themselves neglected and marginalised, see J.B. Segal (1970) 41,101-2.
428 Chron. Josh., 58.
429 E.S. Drowser (1956) 7-8,37, and 112-14.
430 Chron. Josh., 58; Procopius, Wars, 2.13.8-13.
434 Chron. Josh., 59.
432 Chron. Josh., 63.
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C hristian captives. These efforts m ay have been an extension of canonical 
teachings regarding  charity and  the protection of the poor.433 Clergy m ight 
travel g rea t distances or negotiate  the release of captives from  far-flung 
com m unities. W e find, for exam ple, tha t in  the  royal city of C tesiphon, the 
p riest James of G am uw a conducted a treaty  freeing m any prisoners from
the Persians.434
The im portan t place of the  C hurch  leaders is undersco red  in  the  
A.D, 531 siege of M artyropolis, w here the Rom ans w ere felt d isadvantaged  
because of the recent death  of their b ishop, N o n n u s .  435 K husro 's cam paign 
of A.D. 540 offers fu rther exam ples of the  b ishop’s prom inence du ring  a 
c ity 's  c ap itu la tio n . U n fo rtu n a te ly , it  is o ften  d ifficu lt to  u n tan g le  
cow ardice or lack of resolve from  a realistic reaction  to  w eak  fron tier 
defences. The case of Sura show s th a t som e bishops d id  no t alw ays see fit 
to  have  recourse to m ilitary  solutions. W hen the m ilitary  com m ander of 
the  city, A rshak , an  A rm enian , w as slain , the  city gave u p  all hope. 
A p p aren tly , th e  co-o rd ina tion  of the  defence h ad  re s ted  en tire ly  on 
A rshak 's abilities, or vainglory, for the day  after his death  the city sent its 
b ishop to beg clemency. The distressed m an tearfully supplicated  K husro, 
p resen ting  foods and  w ine and  an account of the m iserable sta tus of his 
frontier city. The giving of such gifts by  Bar 'A dotos or the bishop of Sura 
h igh ligh ts several im p o rtan t fea tu res of negotiation . F irst, the  agen t 
delivering  the  gift is the  m oral rep resen ta tive  of the  in ferio r party . In 
add ition , the recipient obtains alm ost sp iritual rights over the  p roperty  of 
the donor.436 Finally, in retu rn ing  a greater gift— in our case clemency to a 
city— one is u ltim ately  defin ing  a social rela tionsh ip  an d  em phasising  
one 's su p e rio rity  over the  g i v e r . 437 The b ishop , p e rh a p s  som ew hat 
foolishly after a d irge  w hich m ay have revealed  the  w eaknesses in the  
city 's defences, p rom ised  to raise  a ransom  w orthy  of the  city of Sura. 
K husro feigned leniency, b u t d u p in g  the b ishop into accepting an  escort 
back to Sura, w on  the  gates th rough  g u i l e . 438 The Persian  king slightly
433 H. Chadwick (1980) 5; for a discussion of the social dimensions of captivity and the 
evidence see S.N.C. Lieu (1986) 475-505.
434 Zach. Mit., 10.12.
135 Procopius, Wars, 1.21-18; Zach. Mit., 8.6, and Mai., 18.66.
436 M. Mauss (1954)3-11.
437 ibid, 72.
438 Procopius, Wars, 2.5.8-27.
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tem p ere d  h is w ra th , b u t  n o t h is avarice , by  a llow ing  th e  w om an  
E uphem ia, new ly taken as his w ife, to travel to Sergiopolis an d  there b id  
the b ishop  C and idus to raise  ransom  m oney for the 12,000 c a p t i v e s / 8 9  
Shortly  thereafter the  citizens of A ntioch fell in to  a panic, fearing  th a t 
K husro w ould  train  his efforts on tak ing  their city; the em peror's nephew  
w as p resen t an d  reinforcem ents w ere n o t expected. They elected  to 
d ispatch  Bishop M egas of Beroea, w ho had  been caught d u rin g  a v isit by  
the unfavourable toss of events, M egas called for m ercy, odd ly  im plying 
th a t the  garrison  a t A ntioch w as insufficient for her defence, and  like the 
bishop of A m ida in  A.D. 503, he appealed  to  the regal d ign ity  of the king 
no t to crush those w ho could no t offer resistance. The b ishop then  stated 
th a t in ternational protocol h ad  been violated, for the Persian h ad  neither 
g iven  any  w arn ing  of his in ten tions, no r allow ed the Rom ans to m ake 
p rep a ra tio n s .440 Inspired  by  th is inform ation, K husro m arched his arm y 
to  H ierapo lis , w here  th e  citizens, n e ither tru s tin g  th e  sta te  of th e ir 
defences, nor w ishing to have their adjacent lands w asted, chose to pay  the 
Persian  tw o  thousand  p o unds of silver, despite  the presence of a strong 
garrison . A t th is p o in t, M egas re len tlessly  begged  K husro  to  accept 
paym ent of gold and depart entirely from  the region. O btaining a prom ise 
from  him , the  b ishop re tu rned  to Antioch.44i There M egas w as opposed  
by  Ju s tin ian 's  recen tly  a rr iv e d  a secretis, Ju lian , w h o  fo rb ad e  the  
a p p e a se m e n t of th e  enem y  th ro u g h  b rib es , an d  w h o  d e n o u n ce d  
archb ishop  E phrem  for be ing  in collusion w ith  those w ho  p lan n ed  to 
deliver A ntioch to Khusro. E phrem  show ed little confidence at all in  the 
city's defence and  fled to Cilicia.442
W hile  A ntioch  m ad e  h er p rep a ra tio n s , the  P e rsian  a rm y  h a d  
descended u pon  Beroea, Both sides realised tha t the w alls w ere in poor
439 Procopius, Wars, 2.5.28-30.
440 Procopius, Wars, 2.6.14-19; Procopius himself, in commenting upon the actions of Khusro, 
can hardly believe that the Persian could be so reckless or foolish: 2.6.20. However, 
Khusro's subsequent advances seem quite reasonable given that Megas had revealed or 
confirmed the sad state of the frontier defences!
441 Procopius, Wars, 2.6.20-25.
442 Procopius, Wars, 2.7.14-17. The accusations against Ephrem carry some credence. 
Evagr., 4.25 states that he fled having failed to achieve some scheme and later ransomed 
the church and her precincts by surrendering sacred treasures. Ephrem may have had a 
more reasonable opinion of the city's defences, and was perhaps out of favour with the 
emperor, who was appalled by local leadership buying off the Persians, see G. Downey 
(1953) 342-4.
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condition, and  a fixed am ount of silver w as agreed upon  as ransom . The 
Beroeans could no t p roduce the entire fund, and  fled w ith  their anim als to 
the  citadel. W hen M egas re tu rn ed  to Beroea the  w ater supplies w ere 
nearly  exhausted and an enraged K husro stood ready to give the city to the  
torch.443 Again, w ith  no little audacity , the  bishop accused the Persian of 
a c tin g  in  a u n k in g ly  fa sh io n , a n d  ch id e d  h im  fo r b e h a v in g  
immoderately.444 it  w ould  seem  that the bishop 's pluck w as in p a rt fueled 
b y  th e  hope  th a t th e  acropo lis w o u ld  offer som e res is tan ce , th u s  
precip itating  either a Persian w ithdraw al or com prom ise, for w hen  M egas 
w as briefed on the the scarcity of w ater, he re tu rned  as a tearful supp lian t 
to Khusro.445 It also seem s probable tha t the garrison lacked the zeal to 
fight. It h ad  been som e tim e since the governm ent h ad  pa id  them , and  
th e  m ajo rity  w illin g ly  jo in ed  th e  P e rsian 's  cam paig n  a fte r M egas 
negotiated clemency for the city.446
It is curious th a t even w ith  the  A rchbishop E phrem 's fligh t from  
the city, the clergy p layed  such a sm all p a rt in either A ntioch's defence or 
f a l l . 4 4 7  A fter a v isit to  ba the  near Seleucia, K husro directed his force to 
A pam ea, and  although  he sta ted  th a t his only in tention  w as to accept a 
tho u san d  p ounds of silver, all w ere in  fear th a t he w o u ld  create som e 
p re te x t u n d e r  w h ich  to  p lu n d e r  th e  e n v i r o n s . 4 4 8  in  a pan ic  the 
congregation  of A pam ea flocked to  their b ishop, Thom as, w ho calm ed 
their nerves by d isp lay ing  a portion  of the  true  cross. U pon  seeing the 
rad ian t w ood, the people felt th a t their salvation w as assured; they  w ep t 
and  rejoiced, and  b id  their bishop m arch repeatedly around  the body  of the 
c h u r c h . 4 4 9  Thom as thence proceeded to the Persian and  assured  him  that 
no resistance w ould  be offered; a hand-p icked  force follow ed the bishop 
in to  his city. As soon as the city w as secured, K husro dem anded  tha t all 
the  treasures be confiscated. A lthough Thom as w as no t able to stem  the
443 Procopius, Wars, 2.7.1-13.
444 Procopius, Wars, 2.7.19-33.
445 Procopius, Wars, 2.7.34.
446 Procopius, Wars, 2.7.34-37.
447 G, Downey (1938) 369-70 praises Ephrem's action which saved the Church of the Virgin 
as an example of brave local initiative when the imperial government ultimately failed to 
save anything else.
448 Procopius, Wars, 2.11.3-4.; indeed Khusro's greed was all too evident to the Roman 
ambassadors.
449 Procopius, Wars, 2,11.19; Evagr., 4.26.
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drain ing  of earth ly  riches— in fact, Evagrius im plies he d id  all he could to 
pacify the  king— he m anaged  to keep the city's true  defence: the  w ood of
the c r o s s / 5 0
O n the ou tsk irts  of b e leag u ered  cities, ho ly  m en  co n tin u ed  to  
intervene at tim es of crisis. D uring the w inter siege of A m ida in  A.D. 502- 
3, Jacob the  Syrian offered all peop le  succour, friend  a n d  foe alike. 
D w elling in  a cage-like h u t one day 's  journey outside the city so tha t he 
m ight practice his m onastic life w ithou t distraction, Jacob w as confronted 
by a b an d  of E phthalite H uns. These rovers found  them selves unable to 
shoot the  w ondrous m an, and  w hen  new s of the event w orked  th rough  
the ranks of the arm y, the Persian king, K avadh, w as eager to see w ho this 
m an  w as w ho could stay  the  blow s of his w arriors. U pon  m eeting  the  
m an, the  king  asked forgiveness for the  im pudence of his H uns, w hich 
Jacob graciously gave; this action seem ed to relieve the m arauders of som e 
injurious distress. K avadh then  g ran ted  Jacob w hatever he  w ished  from  
h im , a n d  th e  ho ly  m an  asked  th a t h is fastness be recogn ised  and  
guaranteed  as a sanctuary for those refugees of the conflict.451
§ 8. Conclusion:
By w ay  of conclusion, it has been  show n th a t the  C hurch  as a 
frontier institu tion  becam e responsible, or perhaps u su rp ed  responsibility, 
for m any  p rev iously  civic offices, projects, o r m echanism s. The clergy, 
w hile  ra re ly  h o ld in g  leg itim ate  m ilita ry  au tho rity , w ere  essen tia l in  
bolstering  the  m orale of com m anders, troops, and  citizens. It w ou ld  be 
dangerous to slight the trem endous psychological role u rban  ecclesiastics 
p layed  in the frontier w ars of the East, Their serm ons in  the churches and  
h a ran g u es from  the  w alls w ere  essen tia l in  focusing the  com m unity 's  
energy on  victory. C ertainly, the increased presence of clerics in  sensitive 
positions corresponds w ith  the increased num ber of o ld  u rban  elites w ho 
them se lves becam e C hristians, T here is a trem en d o u s  am o u n t of 
continu ity  betw een the  pagan  fron tier city and  the C hristian, H ow ever,
150 Procopius, Wars, 2.11.14-30; Evagr., 4.25: but Thomas was by no means a Persophile. 
When asked if it was an honour to meet Khusro, the bishop replied, 'not in his 
neighbourhood'.
451 Procopius, Wars, 1.7.5-11.
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w hen studying  the shifting foundations of pow er in  the late ancient w orld  
it is im p o rtan t to  realise  th a t the  rise  in  charitab le  beneficence u n d e r 
C h ris tian  leadersh ip  d rew  large  num bers of peasan ts  in to  th e  cities, 
sw elling bo th  the  u rban  popu lation  and  the  support— and  hence pow er— 
of the church elites/82
152 E patlagean (1977) Chp. 5.
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C hristianity  and  D iplom acy on  the N orth-East Frontier
§ 1. Introduction:
This chap ter aim s to  exam ine the  w ays in  w h ich  C hristian ity  
influenced dip lom atic  policy  along the  north-eastern  frontier. Like the  
th irteenth-century  church law yer struggling  to unders tand  the function of 
diplom acy in his ow n day, I have adopted  a  b road notion  of w ha t qualifies 
an  ind iv idual to be a diplom at: "a legatus (diplom at) is anybody sent by  
ano ther."! The prim ary  roles of such "diplom ats" are to establish foreign 
contacts, to  exchange in fo rm ation , an d  to  spy.2 In  o rder p roperly  to 
u n d e rs ta n d  la te  R om an d ip lom acy , especially  w ith  reg a rd s  to  the  
co llection  of m ilita ry  in te lligence a n d  the  vast, po litica lly  exped ien t, 
netw ork  of contacts established by  the  Church, this chapter also takes into 
co n sid era tio n  in d iv id u a ls , such  as m issionaries an d  h erm its , w hose  
occupations connected them  w ith  the collection a n d  d issem ination  of 
inform ation. The efforts m ade by bo th  Rom an and  Persian governm ents 
to  cultivate regional contacts is an activity essential to an understand ing  of 
local defence. W ithou t these  contacts the  links be tw een  the  im peria l 
governm en t an d  fron tier com m unities w ou ld  w eaken  a n d  the  em pire 's  
defences w ould  erode. Ecclesiastical leaders, once again, served  as local 
agents of im perial policy, and  deserve study.
W hy w ou ld  the h ierarchy  of the  C hristian  church  partic ipa te  in 
negotiations w hich no t only led  aw ay from , b u t also to  w ar? The church 
obviously  h ad  an in terest in  a peaceful environm ent, for it is th en  tha t 
religious celebrations could readily  be undertaken.3 But in  a period  which 
m ight see peace dissolved, the  church then  had  an obligation to preserve 
the interests of its endangered  clients and  w here possible to expand and  to
4 Guglielmus Durandus, cited in J. Der Derian (1987) 76.
2 G. Mattingly (1955) chp. 5 sets these roles out for Renaissance diplomats; J. Matthews 
(1989) 34-5 points out that the Roman government did not have a specific institution to 
achieve this; however, these roles were still carried out on an irregular basis.
3 The importance of peace for celebration should not be underestimated. The Arab allies 
observed two months of religious festivals, and would not fight, see Procopius, Wars, 
2.16.18, although these celebrations occurred during the flood season, see L.M. Whitby 
(1988) 197.
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rec ru it in  new  areas. T herefore ecclesiastical leaders w ere  in tim ately  
invo lved  in  d ip lom atic  tran sac tions on  som e level, and  as increased  
political du ties w ere  u n d ertak en  by  clerics, the invo lvem ent in  foreign 
nego tia tions, even  on  a ru d im e n ta ry  level, increased.4 F urtherm ore , 
ecclesiastical delegates had  a d istinct advantage over secular ones, in  that 
the  political bo u n d aries  of the  fron tie r d id  n o t res tric t faith.5 It w as 
recogn ised , if n o t expected , th a t b ishops w o u ld  com m unica te  w ith  
C hristian  com m unities w ith in  Rom an, Persian, or A rm enian  territo ries .6 
Before tu rn in g  to  th e  C h ris tian  in fluence  on  d ip lom acy , it w ill be  
necessary to trace the diplom atic h istory  w hich the Church inherited.
§ 2. D iplom atic Heritage:
It had  been the  practice of the ancient Greeks to send  em bassies of 
respected and  p ru d en t ind iv iduals pu rely  as needs dictated.^ There w ere 
no  perm anen t foreign am bassadors, as expatriate m erchants, scholars, and  
travellers norm ally  passed  in form ation  back to th e ir hom e au thorities, 
and  exiles p roved  a perpetual, if prickly, source of inform ation for either 
side.8 W hen official delegations w ere d ispatched, it w as com m on practice 
to d raw  representatives from  the w ealthy  w ho  already h ad  a ne tw ork  of 
con tacts ab road . 9 These m en w ere expected to  d isp lay  an  inclination  
tow ard  justice, tem pered  by  a h igh  degree of patriotism . A  prem ium  w as 
p laced  on  education , specifically tra in ing  w hich  w o u ld  allow  them  to 
rem em ber their orders and recall transactions m onths later. H ow ever, the 
essential quality  w as a fine voice and  the ability  to p ersu ad e  a foreign 
aud ience . R om an em bassies w ere  also  com posed  of such  ta len ted  
ind iv idua ls , b u t m ore im portan tly , they  contained illu strious m en  w ho
4 On Christian diplomacy see J. Der Derian (1987) esp. at 84, 93. As G. Mattingly (1965) 59 
has pointed out, a diplomat's business is not always the pursuit of peace, but the 
preservation, if not aggrandizement of the state.
8 J. Der Derian (1987) 59.
6 On the movement of clergy across the frontiers see S.N.C. Lieu (1986) 491-4.
7 H. Nicolson (1954) 6; D.J. Mosley (1973) 5-6; 9.
8 Also ti'ue during the imperial period, see S.N.C. Lieu (1986) 491-5; J. Matthews (1989b) 35- 
37.
9 D.J. Mosley (1973) 43-50 reviews the evidence for the selection of ambassadors in the 
Greek world.
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could im press their audience w ith  social status, dignity, and, to a far lesser 
extent, refined m anners/O  Like the Greek cities, Rom e lacked perm anent 
d ip lom atic  establishm ents and  dealt w ith  foreign m issions on  an  ad hoc 
b a s i s / 4 W ithou t tra in ed  staff or even perm anen t archives, the  senate 
relied  largely on the  oral reports of generals and  ex tempore delegations 
for in fo rm ation , a n d  th e  collective w isdom  of th e  patres for m aking  
decisions. Later the em perors, desp ite  m odest im provem ents to official 
lib ra ries, re lied  large ly  on  th e  adv ice  of th e  consilium  principisA"^ 
H ow ever, R om an em bassies d u rin g  th e  R epublic  an d  early  em pire  
su ffered  in  the  eyes of con tem porary  non-R om ans from  the  em phasis 
p laced on  utilitas: it w as the objective of a Rom an delegate to  fu rther the 
in terests of Rome, no t to  com prom ise, negotiate, or p rov ide  an  unbiased  
source of arbitration; th is is w here  late  an tique am bassadors, especially 
C h ris tian s, d iffered , a t least fo r a tim e, from  th e ir  p red ecesso rs .4 3 
H ow ever, th e re  is a h ig h  d eg ree  of con tinu ity , an d  m any  qualities 
desirable in classical am bassadors continued to be valued  in  late antiquity.
In  the  O strogothic k ingdom , C assiodorus set o u t a descrip tion  for 
T heodo ric  of an  id ea l am b assad o r w h ich  so u g h t to  em u la te  the  
con tem porary  Byzantine m odel:
"If, indeed, eveiy embassy requires a wise man, to whom the conservation of the interests of 
the state may be entrusted, the most prudent of all should be selected who will be able to 
argue against the most crafty, and to speak in the council of the wise in such a manner that 
even so great a number of learned men will not be able to gain a victory in the business with 
which he is charged ."44
The confrontational Rom an ideals have no t been erased entirely, b u t they 
have been m ollified slightly  by  em phasising  the am bassador's  prudence.
40 D.S. Hill (1905) 39; H. Nicolson (1954) 17.
44 For the senate's handling of embassies and ambassadors under the Republic see A.E. 
Astin (1968) esp. 14-15; the Romans usually waited until they were preparing to conquer a 
region before gathering information, F. Millar (1982) 11.
42 A.E. Astin (1968) 15; on the disorderly state of Republican archives see M. Cary (1919) 
67-8; F. Millar (1977) 259-72 for the diplomatic resources available to the emperors, and 
(1982) 15-20 for the slight resources available for military and diplomatic planning.
43 H. Nicolson (1954) 14-16 on the weakness of Roman diplomacy; although at 11, Nicolson 
concedes that under a dictatorial system, the Romans could reach decisions somewhat 
faster than under one more open to compromise.
44 Cassiodorus, Variae, 2.6.
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m ore than  pu re  skill and  utility. Slightly later W ittigis sent an em bassy to 
K husro  in  hopes of form ing a defensive pact against Justin ian . 4 8 The 
O strogoths chose their am bassadors w ith  the in ten tion  th a t they should  
p ass  th ro u g h  the  R om an p rov inces an d  across th e  easte rn  fro n tie r 
unh indered . Two priests w ere found  and  bribed , one of w hom  w as of 
h igh  social status and played the p a rt of a bishop; his com panion travelled 
u n d e r  the  gu ise  of assis tan t. A long  th e ir jo u rn ey  th ey  fo u n d  an 
in te rp re te r, since n e ither cou ld  speak  bo th  Syriac an d  G reek. Their 
d isguise and  success in penetrating  the frontier indicate th a t such a group 
w ou ld  not have a ttracted  u n d u e  attention. These sixth-century exam ples 
in troduce certain qualities and  features com m on to late Rom an embassies; 
greater detail can be observed if o ther qualities of ecclesiastical delegates 
are isolated.
§ 3. C hristianity  and  Arbitration:
By the  late th ird  cen tu ry  bo th  R om e's clients an d  enem ies h ad  
recognised C hristian clergy as just, honest, and  unbiased  interm ediaries in  
negotiations, a role inherited  from  and  shared  w ith  ph ilosophers in  late  
antiquity; b u t unlike their predecessors Christian clergy h ad  their rights as 
judges secured  by  law .46 O utside  the  em pire, C hristian  leaders w ere 
perceived as recognisable local figures w hose linguistic  skills and  status 
m ade them  adm irable brokers. W ith in  the em pire, it  h ad  been  com m on 
practice for provincial am bassadors to be pagan  priests, an d  th roughou t 
Asia M inor it w as trad itional tha t the religious figures w hich su rrounded  
ru lers han d led  petitions.47 C onstantine enacted legal changes w hich no t 
on ly  leg itim ated  ep iscopal a rb itra tion , b u t also set it above the  civil 
co u rts .48 Recognition of the  m oral suprem acy of the ecclesiastical courts 
allow ed, if no t com pelled, the clergy to  cultivate their im age as one of just 
an d  u n b iased  m o d era to r s. 4 9 D esp ite  fifth -cen tury  restric tions w hich
48 Procopius, Wars, 2.2.1-11.
46 H. Chadwick (1980) 9-10; J. Matthews (1989b) 41-44.
47 F. Millar (1977) 375-463,492, 537, 542-4; S.R. F. Price (1984) 243-7.
48 Soz., HE, 1.8-9; Cons. Sir., 1 and 17, discussed in W.K. Boyd (1905) 90-1; F. Dvomik (1966) 
786-88.
49 See for example the exhortations found in Didascalia Apostolorum, 10 and 11.
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requ ired  th a t bo th  parties w illingly subm it to ecclesiastical arb itration  for 
such judgem ent to be valid , a b ishop 's decision rem ained  final and  vested 
in the  cleric 's m oral virtues; the  church h ad  becom e caretaker of public 
m o ra lity .20 Furtherm ore, the church 's adoption, as a du ty , of the  custom  
of intercession on  behalf of clients, and  developm ent of the  p riv ilege of 
asy lum  o u t of o lder custom s w hich  p ro tec ted  ho ly  g ro u n d  a ttes t the  
clergy 's increased activity in  public  life.24 Yet over the  next centuries the 
interests of secular and  ecclesiastical pow ers w ere b rough t closer together, 
w ith  a resu lt th a t the church w as no longer expected to  act w ithou t bias. 
Finally, u n d er Justinian, it w as declared  th a t the  decisions of the  clergy 
w ere to be in  accord w ith  the interests of the state.22 Thus on  the basis of 
legal changes w e m ay perceive how  the focus of clerical em bassies changed 
from  the early  fou rth  cen tu ry  to  the  seventh  century . O rig inally  law s 
pronounced the clergy as superior to civil judges on the basis of indiv idual 
v ir tu e , an d  clerics w ere  expec ted  to  be  m ore  co -o p era tiv e  th an  
confrontational; by  the m id-sixth  century , ecclesiastics w ere  being d raw n  
back to w ard  utilitas, and  their honestas w as a quality  tem pered  by  the 
in te res ts  of th e  em pire. W e shall trace  th is d ev e lo p m en t th ro u g h  
ind iv idual cases of ecclesiastical delegates, b u t first let us tu rn  tow ards the 
qualities expected or found  in  Christian am bassadors.
§ 4. Qualities of a Diplomat:
It is difficult to review  the qualities of honesty, equanim ity, or p iety 
w hen  so m uch of the ancient evidence discussing ind iv idual d ip lom ats is 
panegyrical; all holy m en are regarded  as p ious and  just by  their disciples 
or chroniclers. H ow ever, in  several cases these qualities are  m entioned 
directly  as adm irable features in the  context of diplom atic service, and  so 
m ay be review ed. C onstantine, in  selecting a bishop to head  his delegation 
to  the Iberians, had  carefully sought a m an of great faith  and  piety. Such 
v irtues qualified h im  for th is ven tu re  in the sam e m anner as his religious
20 C/, 1.4.7 and 8; also see discussion with further evidence in F. Dvornik (1966) 782.
21 W.K. Boyd (1905) 97-100.
22 For example, NJ, 7.2.1; discussed with further evidence in F, Dvornik (1966) 816-28. Also 
see S.M. Olster (1989) 166-9 and M. Maas (1992) 45-7.
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delegate Theophilus, w ho opened diplom atic and econom ic relations w ith  
the  far east and  Ethiopia, or Eusebius, the  bishop of Em esa, w hose p iety  
w as a recognised source of au thority  along the frontier and  w as invited  on 
the proposed  Persian cam paign of A.D. 337.23
A lthough norm ally  recognised as neutral, occasions d id  arise w here 
bishops* actions becam e suspect, as in  the siege of Bezabde in  A.D. 359.24 
Soon after the  b ishop 's  in itial d iscussions w ith  the enem y com m anders, 
Bezabde fell w hen  a w eak  p o in t in  the w all w as breached . H ow ever, 
A m m ianus exonerates the  cleric from  any dup lic ity , an d  upho ld s the  
belief th a t b ishops could be tru sted  to transcend political allegiances. A 
b ishop 's  sense of fa ir-p lay  m igh t even m ake h im  a favou rite  in  tw o  
im perial courts. M arutha, the  founder and  bishop of M artyropolis w en t 
on  several d ip lom atic  m issions to  the  P ersian  cou rt on  behalf of the  
im perial governm ent in  the early  fifth century.25 K ing Y ezdegerd found  
him  a m an of great p iety and  bestow ed m any honours upon  him. Because 
of the ir conversations on  C hristian ity , Y ezdegerd so ftened  h is stance 
to w a rd  his C h ristian  subjects, a k indness w hich  a ttrac ted  vehem en t 
criticism  from  the  M agi. Even at tim es of b itte r crisis, the  p ie ty  and  
sp iritua l au tho rity  of the  clergy w ere  accepted as a g u a ran tee  for fair 
negotiations. Perhaps as long-term  hostage exchanges fell in to  decline and 
localised short-term  guarantees w ere em ployed, the  m ediating  role of the 
clergy w as able to come to the  fore.26 W hen the A rm enians defeated  a 
Persian force in  the A.D. 451 rebellion, the marzpan su rrendered  no t to the 
m ilitary  com m anders, b u t to the bishops, taking oaths on  the gospels that 
he w ou ld  repent.27 The Persian king Yezdegerd II, found  the  A rm enian 
b ishops w ith  w hom  he nego tia ted  in  an  early  a ttem p t to  deflate  the
23 On the Iberian embassy see Theodoret, HE, 1.24; on Theophilus, see Philostorgius 3.4-6, 
on Eusebius of Emesa and Constantine's priestly entourage see Soz., 3.6; Euseb., VC, 4.56, and 
62.
24 Amm. Marc., 20.7.9.
28 The sources for Marutha and his diplomatic missions are Soc., 7.8; Soz., 8.16; 
Theophanes, 1.128; and the Armenian vita translated and discussed in R. Marcus (1932).
26 A.D. Lee (1991) 369-71; if mutual recognition between Rome and Persia was on the rise, as 
is suggested by M. Higgins (1941) 281-82, it would be reasonable to say that guarantees 
offered by Christian priests ranked equally with the brief exchanges preliminary to a 
greater settlement.
27 Elishe, 66.
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rebellion firm  and  pious, rew ard ing  them  w ith  presents.^® In an incident 
w h e re  P ersian  loyalists co rnered  th e ir A rm en ian  co u n te rp a rts  in  a 
m o u n ta in  refuge , th e  fu llest possib le  use  w as m ade  of the  C hurch  
h ierarchy in  negotiations. Priests w ere called upon  to speak, the  gospels 
w ere  p a ra d ed  before the w all as a sign  of the  ag reed  sanctity  of the 
d iscu ssio n s, an d  o a th s w ere  sw orn ; d esp ite  all th is , ho w ev er, the  
A rm en ian  so ld iers rem ained  unconv inced  of P ersian  good  faith  and  
resisted  to the  end.^9 A fter the  rebellion h ad  been crushed, the  Persian 
court a ttem pted  to reconstruct an accurate p icture of the  events and  m ete 
o u t just punishm ent. The hazarapet adv ised  Y ezdegerd, "if you  w ish  to 
h ea r th e  p la in  tru th , have  the  leaders of th e  C hristians in  A rm enia  
sum m oned. They will come w illingly and  explain everything. "30 Sahak, 
b ishop  of R eshtunik , w ho h ad  partic ipa ted  in  the  negotiations w ith  the 
hazarapet a t a t the opening  of the rebellion, led  this em bassy. W ith the 
help of the hazarapet Sahak defended the actions of A rm enian C hristians, 
and  helped reconcile them  to Persian sovereignty.31
Such p ious m en from  the fron tier could come to  the  a tten tion  of 
the  im perial governm ent in  m any ways. John the  Scholasticus of A m ida, 
w ho  undertook  a confidential m ission on behalf of h is city to see the 
em peror, w as adm ired  as "a valian t m an, just and  u p righ t, fearing  G od 
and  forsaking evil", educated  and  "skilled in  dialectics."32 H is piety  was 
celebrated and  his tw o visions of A nastasius' accession b rough t him  into 
the  circle of the new  em peror. Local repu tation  could also qualify clergy 
for d ip lom atic  m issions. John the  H erm it of A nastasia, en listed  by  the  
im perial arm y in A.D. 532, w as know n  am ongst the  Rom an com m unity  
for his honourable disposition.33 H is contem porary, Sergius the  deacon, 
w as sen t to th e  A rabs on  the ir request.34 W hen the  Persian  sa trap  
M ebodes h ad  been  jeered  o u t of the  A.D 583 nego tia tions a t A m ida,
28 Elishe, 83.
29 Elishe, 122-3.
30 Elishe, 128.
31 Elishe, 130-7; Sahak's earlier contact with the hazarapet, 28.
32 Zach. Mit., 7.1; see translators’ commentary at 149 n, 2.
33 Zach. Mit., 8.5; 9.6.
34 Mal., 19.61.
114
Simon, b ishop of N isibis, becam e essential as the figure accepted by  bo th  
sides as trustw orthy  enough to pass proposals back and  forth.35
In negotiations betw een  elem ents of the  eastern  com m unity , the 
governm ent m ade a practice of selecting local figures respected  for their 
p ie ty  and  justice. W hen the  eastern  arm y rebelled  in  A.D. 588, secular 
officials failed to gain reception by the troops; how ever, bo th  the im perial 
g o v e rn m e n t an d  th e  m ilita ry  reco g n ised  v a rio u s local b ish o p s  as 
tru s tw o rth y  agents.36 Initially, the  Rom an com m anders them selves tried  
to  appeal to  the relig ious convictions of the  arm y by  p a rad in g  an  icon 
before them , and later sent the bishops of Constantina and  Edessa on  w hat 
p roved  to be fruitless em bassies to  the  troops.37 P ersian  preoccupation  
w ith  the Turks p reven ted  them  from  taking full advantage of the discord, 
and  an assault on C onstantina w as repulsed , bu t it w as n o t un til the arm y 
m et w ith  b ishop G regory du rin g  H oly  W eek of A.D 589 th a t the m utiny  
w as resolved. G regory 's speech to  the  arm y is laced w ith  exhortations to 
trad itional Rom an m artial v irtues, b u t clearly G regory hoped  to p u t m oral 
p ressu re  on  the rebels and  took care to  rem ind his audience th a t it w as 
p resen tly  H oly  W eek, a p ro v id en t tim e for reconciliation . G regory 's 
en trea ty  m oved  m any  of the  so ld iers to  tears, a n d  after conversing  
am ongst them selves they  decided  tha t they  w ou ld  subm it, b u t declined 
G regory 's suggestion  th a t Phillip icus be accepted as the ir com m ander. 
G regory d id  no t w ish  to be perceived as being bullied , and  his response 
clearly spells ou t the sp iritual fibre beh ind  the au tho rity  of the  b ishop in 
negotiations:
""Without any hesitation he stated that he was bishop by Divine permission, and had the 
authority to loose and bind both on earth and in heaven, and at the same time he quoted 
the sacred oracle ."38
33 Th. Sim., 1.15.1-12. Although given the speed at which the Roman concluded the 
negotiations, it is unlikely Simon would have had much opportunity to intercede on the 
Persians behalf, see L.M. Whitby (1988) 280.
36 For the A.D. 588 rebellion, or Monocarton mutiny, see Evagr., 6.4-5, and 11-13; Th. Sim., 
3.3.8-4.2. Discussed in W.E. Kaegi (1981) 68-71, and L.M. Whitby (1988) 287-8
37 Th. Sim., 3.1.11-2,9. Troops recruited from the Roman provinces were normally receptive 
to such appeals, and by the late sixth century it was common for clergy to mediate between 
mutinous troops and the authorities; see W.E. Kaegi (1981) 70-71, esp. 71 n. 31.
38 Evagr., 6.12. The sacred oracle refers to Matthew 16.19, "I shall give to thee the keys of 
the Kingdom and whatever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and 
whatever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."
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A fter o b ta in ing  a t least th e ir  subm ission  G regory  a d m in is te red  the  
sacram ents to the arm y and  shared a m eal w ith  them . A fter his departu re  
Phillipicus w as set above them.39 Later, w hen M artyropolis w as betrayed  
to the Persians, and  Rom an efforts a t retaking it flagged, G regory w as again 
dispatched  by  the em peror to inspire the troops. H ow ever, lack of p roper 
supplies and the onset of w inter neutralised any effect the bishop had^O
T rust in  the  n eu tra lity  of ecclesiastics becam e open  to  question  
tow ards the  end  of the sixth century. A lthough the  Persians reso rted  to 
the N estorian  bishop of C hlom aron to negotiate w hen th a t city w as under 
a R om an siege, la te r  th e  em p ero r M aurice  h a d  h im  a rre s ted  for 
d isloyalty .4 i But at the opening of the  seventh century  the honestas of the 
clergy still encouraged a tolerable environm ent in  w hich  various parties 
m ight negotiate. After the deep breach of the frontier in  A.D. 615 brought 
the Persians to  the Bosporus, the presence of an associate of the patriarch  
w as necessary  for nego tia tions be tw een  the  P ersians a n d  Rom ans.42 
K husro’s declaration tha t he  perceived H eraclius as a u su rper, abandoned 
by  G od, charged any d ialogue the  Rom ans hoped  to  open  w ith  a h igh  
m oral tone: a p riest's  m ediating  influence created a link bo th  sides could 
accept.43
In add ition  to  p ie ty  and  fairness, frontier ecclesiastics possessed  
o ther, m ore tang ib le  qualities w hich  m ade them  a ttrac tive  agents of 
negotiation . A  pro-R om an background , w hether th is be  a ttrib u ted  to 
education , travel o r m arriage  links, w as desired  by  bo th  the  im peria l 
governm en t an d  fron tie r com m unities; m any p re -in d u stria l states are  
largely the p roperty  of fam ilies, w herein  personal ties betw een the holders 
of p o w er are  all im portant.44 Even if certain  in d iv id u a ls  canno t be
39 Th. Sim., 3.5.10 states that Philippicus was accepted with great reluctance.
40 Evagr., 6.14.
41 Men. Prot, 23.7; Anon. Guid. 2; L.M. Whitby (1988) 295.
42 CP, p. 706-9; Nic., 9.20-12.2
43 Sebeos, chps. 24 and 26. A.N. Stratos (1968) 115-17 suggested that the negotiations were 
the senate's initiative, but this does not weaken the role played by the clergy.
44 On the role of education in Romanisation see D. Braund (1984) 9-21, while these non- 
Romans resided in imperial cities they provided Roman elites with an important exposure 
to foreign customs, J. Matthews (1989b) 39-40; on marriage links in imperial states see G. 
Symcox (1974) 4-6.
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considered as traditional hostages, the continued education of non-Rom an 
nobles in Rom an cities still h ad  the effect of em phasising  the  dependen t 
sta tu s  of the foreign states.43 G regory the Illum inator and  his sons had  
b een  schoo led  in  C aesarea  a n d  p o ssessed  p a te rn a l links w ith  the  
A rm enian nobility, w hile G regory him self had  been raised  by  the relations 
of a Rom an m agistrate. Each A rm enian Patriarch from  G regory to N erses 
the  G reat w as consecrated in  and  re ta ined  strong  ties w ith  Caesarea.46 
N erses the Great, in addition  to his Caesarean tutelage, dw elt, according to 
one trad ition , as a young  m an in  C onstantinople w here  he took a Rom an 
a ris to c ra t as w ife; o th e r n a rra tiv e s  assign  to  N erses an  A rm en ian  
n o b lew o m an , b u t  d isp u te  n e ith e r  h is  w este rn  e d u c a tio n  n o r h is 
H e llen is tic  tendencies.47 M aru tha  of M artyropolis cam e from  a noble 
A rm enian  fam ily in  Sophanene, and  m ay have been the  son of the local 
satrap. H ow ever, he w as educated  in  A ntioch and  established his career 
first in  the  em pire, a ttend ing  several church councils in  the  late  fourth  
c en tu ry .48 Sahak the Great, am bassador to the Persian court, and  also of 
th e  G re g o rid  h o u se , m a rr ie d  h is  d a u g h te r  in to  th e  in f lu e n tia l  
M am ikonean fam ily and  th rough  personal influence ob tained  the highest 
m ilita ry  office of aspet for his son-in-law.49 But rivals of the  G regorid 
house latched on to  such w estern  sym pathies after the A.D. 387 partition , 
and  Sahak w as later denounced  to the Persian king V ram  for being  too 
sym pathetic  tow ards Rom an interests. In  the com pany of the  A rm enian 
em bassy w as another priest, Surm ak, w ho w as installed  as Catholicos of 
A rm en ia  after S ahak’s deposition.30 Fam ily links w ere  an im portan t 
elem ent in  establishing a w ide netw ork  of contacts, b u t they  w ere also a 
tw o-edged sw ord, for by  relying on clergy whose roots spread  on  either side
43 On the decline of the traditional exchange of hostages see A.D. Lee (1991) 366-7, who 
concentrates on Persia.
46 Faust. Buz., 5.29; MX 2.74,2.80.
47 MX 3.16; Faust. Buz. 4,2; Basil, Eps., 92; see N. Garsoïan (1990) 395-6 for other Armenian 
sources; also see discussion in R. Tliomson (1978) 270 n. 3.
48 Life of Marutha 18 and 19; Marutha attained minor notoriety by crushing the foot of John 
Chrysostom’s enemy Cyrinus and thus preventing his participation at the council of 
Chalcedon, Evagrius, 4.15. See R. Marcus (1932) 47-8 for Marutha's early career.
49 MX 3.51; LP pp. 23,37; Toumanoff (1963) 208.
30 MX 3.63-4; LP p. 23-5.
117
of the fron tie r, governm en ts took  on  the an im osity  in h e re n t w ith in  
com m unities of flu id  loyalties.
A  crucial factor in successful diplom acy was the ability of a dip lom at 
to express his opinions convincingly, and  the church encouraged the study  
of rhetoric as a standard  p a rt of ecclesiastical training.31 The persuasive 
skills of M aru tha of M artyropolis are said  to have b rough t Y ezdegerd to 
the  verge of conversion; the ir d iscussions placed h im  u n d e r danger of 
assassination, and  in the end  only  the  king 's death  stopped  the  process. 
Before th is M aru tha  convinced the P ersian  of the  benefits of cordiality  
betw een the tw o great em pires, and  persuaded  both  governm ents to invest 
in  the  construction  of M artyropolis.32 The final reconciliation betw een  
the  m utinous eastern  arm y in  A.D, 589 and  its com m anders w as secured 
by  G regory 's stirring  words.33 W hen the  Rom an arm y w as bogged dow n 
w ith  the recovery of M artyropolis, D om itian was able to brow -beat K husro 
in to  com pliance, and  his speech before the w alls so m oved the  resisting  
garrison that they opened the gates.34
A ny elem ent of e ru d itio n  o r technical skill e levated  d ip lom ats in  
the  eyes of their audience. M aru tha, the  C halcedonian  b ishop  sen t by  
M aurice to K husro's court w as trained  as a philosopher, w as the au thor of 
com m entaries on  logic, an d  spoke G reek, Syriac an d  Hebrew .35 But 
tra in in g  in  the m edical sciences w as perhaps the  m o st im pressive and  
useful a ttribute in diplom acy. The social status of the physician had  risen 
considerab ly  th ro u g h  late  an tiqu ity ; their he igh tened  position  b ro u g h t 
w ith  it an increased public profile and  responsibilities.^^ Furtherm ore, the
31 M.L. Clark (1971) 37,45,130. A well-delivered speech could save considerable resources 
and obtain the same result as a pitched battle or loyal fortress: one good speech is worth a 
thousand armed men, see G. Mattingly (1965) 58.
32 Soc., 7.8; Theophanes, 1.132; Life of Marutha 23-6, 28-9.
33 Evagr., 6.12; W.E. Kaegi (1981) 68-71 supports Evagrius' narrative which attributes the 
quelling of the mutiny to Gregory's spiritual authority and eloquence against Th. Sim., 
3.3.11, in which the procurator Aristobulus bribes the troops. However, the insurrection 
was fundamentally a protest against Maurice' tight-fisted fiscal policy, see L.M. Whitby 
(1988) 18-19.
34 Evagr., 6.15; there were still those who feared punishment if they surrendered, most 
notably the local commander Sittas, L.M. Whitby (1988) 299.
33 Chron. Seert, 67 or 68; also N. Garsoïan (1973) 126.
36 R.C. Blockley (1980) 89-100; N. Nutton (1984) 10-13, but see qualification at 111 n. 12; A. 
Kazdan (1984) 51.
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exchange and  s tu d y  of m edical m anua ls req u ired  th a t doctors w ere 
conversant in  several languages, and  it is not su rp rising  th a t adm irable 
physicians are found  bo th  am ongst ecclesiastical and  secular delegates.37 
In the early fourth  century  N ino, the evangelist of the Iberians, cured King 
M irian 's in fan t son of an unknow n disease.38 Im pressed  by her abilities, 
the  k ing  rew ard e d  N ino  b y  p ro v id in g  su p p o rt fo r h e r m ission , and  
receiving an em bassy headed  by a bishop sent by Constantine. Yezdegerd I 
w as deeply  indeb ted  to M aru tha  of M artyropolis w hen  he com bined his 
m edical train ing  and  sp iritual au tho rity  to heal the king's possessed son, 
and  relieve the king him self of persisten t headaches.39 Sim ilarly, Joseph, 
the  Persian Catholicos w ho developed  links w ith  com m unities of Rom an 
captives am ongst the  H uns beyond  the Caucasus passes, w as tru sted  and  
adm ired  by K avadh for his skills as a physician.60
Finally, an ind iv idual cleric's popu larity  am ongst his audience w as 
also desirable. As w ith  p ious virtues, m ost ancient accounts h ighlight the  
w arm  recep tion  an am bassador received from  his host. Two notab le  
negative cases, suggest tha t th is characteristic w as m ore than  just du tifu l 
p ra ise . N erses the  G reat u n d e rto o k  at least one official jou rney  to 
C onstan tinop le  to reconcile h is k ing  w ith  C onstan tins and  conclude a 
defensive  pac t be tw een  the  R om ans an d  A rm enians.61 A lthough  he 
accom plished his m ission, his unpopu larity  in  the A rian court resu lted  in 
tem p o rary  exile and  a ha lt to  his d ip lom atic  activities. Sim ilarly, the  
m onk Moses, w ho  resided  in  the  no-m an’s land  beyond D ara and  w as an 
acq u a in tan ce  of th e  P e rsian  queen , d id  n o t accom pany  Ju s tin ian 's  
am bassadors in  A.D. 532. The delegation  w as instead  led  by  R ufinus, a 
w ea lth y  figure , w ell-know n in  the  Persian  court. H ow ever, M oses'
37 For a secular example see Zacharias, the personal emissary of the empress Sophia who 
concluded the treaty of A.D, 574 and assisted in negotiations after the Armenian campaign 
of A.D. 576-7, M. Syr., 10.9, p. 312 and Men. Prot., 20.1, discussed in L.M. Whitby (1988) 258- 
9,267.
38 The story of Nino's mission amongst the Iberians and her part in encouraging dialogue 
between Constantinople and the Iberian court is found in Rufinus, HE, 10.11, Soc., 1.20, and 
MX, 2.86.
39 Soc., 7.8; Theophanes 1.131; Life of Marutha 24-25, 27.
60 Zach. Mit., 12.7.
61 Faust. Buz., 4.6; MX 3.30; see N. Garsoïan (1969) 148-64 for a discussion of the dating of 
this mission, contra the earlier arguments of N.H. Baynes (1955a).
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know ledge of local events and  his relationship  to the  Q ueen w as useful 
for p rom oting  negotiations.62
§ 5. Churches as proto-embassies:
The lack of perm anen t em bassies has been no ted  as a w eakness in 
ancient d i p l o m a c y . 6 3  A lthough one certainly w ould no t go so far as to  say 
th a t the  church ran  dip lom atic  offices th roughou t the  ancient w orld , the 
n e tw o rk  of m onasteries an d  the  p rov isions described  in  ecclesiastical 
docum ents concerning the  upkeep  of guest houses, indicate tha t Christian 
build ings m ight have fulfilled such a use. Bishops w ere expected to travel 
w idely, both  w ithin  their ow n see and  abroad, on occasions such as synods, 
and  instructions w ere given to  ensure  tha t p roper facilities w ere available 
to such visiting c l e r g y .64 The use of the church as a place of negotiation 
m ay have follow ed from  the princip les developed  in  the  priv ilege of 
asy lum . E ssentially , th e  C hristian  p ractice  p ro tec ted  those  aw aiting  
arb itra tion  so long as they  rem ained  w ith in  the holy g rounds of church 
b u i l d i n g s . 6 5  To w hat extent the Persians recognised this practice is difficult 
to say, b u t churches w ere selected as sites of negotiation. It is arguable that 
the  Persians sim ply  realised  the im portance C hristian  bu ild ings h ad  to 
local com m unities, and  em ployed churches to gain their attention, to add  
fu r th e r  in su lt  to  R om an  c a p itu la tio n , a n d  to  sp re a d  S asan ian  
p r o p a g a n d a . 6 6  After the siege of A.D. 503, K avadh concluded a treaty  w ith  
the  m agister m ilitu m , A reob indus, a t the  C hu rch  of St. Sergius in 
E d e s s a .6 7  D uring the sack of Antioch, K husro established his headquarters 
in  the C hurch of the Virgin, w here he m et w ith  am bassadors, w ho are not
62 Zach. Mit., 9.7.
63 j. Matthews (1989b) 35.
64 See for example Didascalia Apostolorum, 3 and 5; and the Canons 25-6, and 36 of 
Marutha of Martyropolis.
65 Cod. Th., 9.45.3-5; W.K. Boyd (1905) 99-100.
66 E.W. Gray (1973) 32.
67 Chron. Josh., 59.
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n am ed  as clergy, b u t  w ho  are  sa id  to  have  begged  for the  chu rch ’s
preservation.68
§ 6. Ecclesiastical Leaders, Geographical and  M ilitary Intelligence:
F re q u e n t d ip lo m a tic  c o n ta c t w as c ru c ia l to  th e  e ffec tive  
m aintenance of pow er and  p u rsu it of w ar for m ost advanced states.69 The 
pow er of the Rom an state w as relian t on the support of subjects to oppose 
the  d isloyal an d  alien. The self-consciousness of fron tier com m unities 
w as large ly  de fined  in  co n tras t to  those  w ith  w h o m  th e  im p eria l 
governm en t con tended , and  loyalty  w as de term ined  by  the  degree of 
pro tection  and fiscal atten tion  provided . Hence, to ho ld  the frontier cities 
it w as essen tia l th a t som e degree of a lertness be  m ain ta in ed  against 
Rom e's enem ies no t only a t tim es of crisis, b u t du ring  the long periods of 
peace in betw een. C hristian am bassadors had  a distinct advantage in  that 
their spheres of interests spilled  over international borders, and  they  w ere 
perm itted , if no t expected, to travel betw een em pires on  church business. 
T heir n e tw o rk  of contacts a llow ed  them  to tran scen d ed  geopolitical 
barrie rs b e tte r th an  any  p rev ious in stitu tion  in the  ancien t w orld: ’’the 
fro n tie rs  of e s tra n g e m e n t a re  n o w  d ra w n  b y  fa ith  ra th e r  th a n  
na tionalism . "70 N ow  let us exam ine the w ays C hristianity  achieved and  
u tilised  such constant contact.
A fu n d am en ta l p ro b lem  to any  m ovem en t a long  th e  easte rn  
frontier w as the restricted  na tu re  of the Rom ano-Persian border. In efforts 
to  reduce spying, N isibis w as chosen in  A.D. 298 as the  only  city th rough  
w hich official traffic betw een the em pires w as to pass; a t the beginning of 
the  fifth century  C allinicum  and  A rtaxata w ere added.71 Furtherm ore, 
em bassies w hich w ished  to address either court w ere requ ired  to hera ld  
their arrival at the  bo rder and  then  aw ait perm ission to  m ove on  to the
68 Procopius Wars, 2.9.14-17. The narration of the church's use as a place of negotiation in 
Procopius' narrative emphasises the bewilderment of the author with the "painful 
working of God's providence", see A.M. Cameron (1985) 106,145,232.
69 G. Mattingly (1965) 53-4 ; although F. Millar (1982) 15-20 indicates intelligence was 
normally not gathered until immediately before military operations.
70 J. DerDerian(1987) 59.
71 Peter the Patrician, Leg ad gen. 14; CJ 4.63.pr.; S.N.C. Lieu (1986).
121
capital.72 C hristian  b ishops, on  the  o ther hand , w ere  obliged to travel 
w idely  across the frontier, even though  they d id  im pose som e regulations 
on  them selves w hich  exp la ined  the  conditions necessary  for tak ing  a 
journey, and  lim ited the am ount of tim e ou t of their see.73
O ne of the p rim ary  reasons for travel w as the  su p p o rt of religious 
clients. Both the  A rm enian and  im perial churches h ad  early  ecclesiastical 
connections w ith  the  C hristian  com m unities in C iscaucasia and  Persia. 
F u rtherm ore , the  A rm enian  church  frequen tly  sen t de legates to  bo th  
im peria l courts, especially after the A.D. 387 partition . Those A rm enian 
clergy w ho officially represented their hom eland in the Persian court w ere 
g ran ted  free travel betw een the tw o countries. They also enjoyed the right 
to  appeal directly  to  the  court a t C tesiphon, if they  tho u g h t any  injustice 
h ad  been  com m itted by  a Persian  viceroy, and  fu rtherm ore, if such an 
appeal w as m ade, the clergy could no t have a sentence of death  passed  
u p o n  them.74 M oreover, official envoys w ere g rea tly  lim ited  in  their 
freedom , being requ ired  to stick to  strict instructions; unofficial visits by  
clergy w ere not, presum ably, under such constraints.^^ As a result of such 
freedom s, it w as considerably easier for ecclesiastics to m ove on all sides of 
the  frontier, bring ing  them  in to  contact w ith  diverse lands and  cultures, 
and  p rov id ing  a convenient pool of know ledge from  w hich the  im perial 
governm ent could draw . W hile cam paigning in  the u p p e r Tigris basin  
d u ring  A.D. 531, the im perial arm y w as accom panied by John, the  form er 
h e rm it of A nastasia  an d  new ly  elected  b ishop of M artyropolis. John’s 
fam ilia rity  w ith  the  H unn ic  ra id e rs , m ay, how ever, h ave  been  m ore 
ap p ro p ria te  to  th is exped ition  th an  his know ledge of the  area, w hich  
w o u ld  have  been  su p erflu o u s in  th e  com pany  of com m anders like
72 See for example Lib., Or. 12.76 and 18.164 for the difficulties of the Persian embassy 
which was attempting to dissuade Julian in A.D. 362, discussed by A.D. Lee (1986) 457-8. 
For the process of approaching the Persian court, see A. Christensen (1944) 414f.
73 Marutha, Canons, 25-6 charge the bishops and his appointed agents with visiting client 
churches, but 15 and 38 urge the bishop to curb his wandering to official business, and 69 
states a bishop should not be outside his see for more than six months unless ill or captured. 
The Synod of Laodicea, Canons, 41-2 bid deacons and priest to always obtain the consent 
and letters of transit from their bishop before embarking.
74 Freedom of travel; Elishe, 83 and Procopius, Wars, 2,24.7; right of appeal and immunity 
from capital punishment: Elishe, 123.
75 B.H. Warmington (1977) 515 and A.D. Lee (1986) 458-59 provide and discuss evidence 
which describes the limitations imposed on secular embassies.
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S itta s .76 It is also know n th a t som e of John's fellow  A m idenes h ad  
e s tab lish ed  a m ission  a m o n g st th e  H uns. M em bers of th e  n ew  
com m unity, initially com posed of Rom an captives led from  the vicinity of 
A m ida, h ad  in te rm arried  w ith  the  H uns, an d  sp en t years tran sla tin g  
C hristian  tex ts in to  th e  na tiv e  language.77 in  such  a case the  en tire  
m ission  could  be p a tro n ised  by  an im peria l see, an d  th u s  p rov ide  a 
p e rm a n e n t co m m u n ity  th ro u g h  w h ich  R om an in te re s ts  co u ld  be 
advanced. In other cases, patronage of only the leaders w as needed. For 
instance, Simon, the  b ishop of N isibis, w ho w as of g rea t he lp  p rov id ing  
inform ation to  the im perial governm ent, and  w as p resen t in  the A.D. 583 
negotiations at A m ida, w as a client of Gregory, b ishop  of A ntioch, w ho 
frequently  prov ided  m aterial and  spiritual help for the Persian bishop.78
It w as difficult to obtain a high level of secrecy in  the  ancient w orld, 
and  laborious p repara tions an d  the  h igh ly  ritualistic  n a tu re  of w arfare  
lim ited  opportun ities for s u r p r i s e .79 R um ours of foreign events usually  
filtered back to Rom an and  Sasanian agents, and  it w as a na tu ra l du ty , if 
no t n a tu ra l inclination, for m erchants to collect inform ation  and  gossip 
from  across the frontier. Furtherm ore, as tactical p lans w ere  no t alw ays 
d raw n  u p  in advance, surp rise  h ad  been rare in early  classical conflicts.30 
As a resu lt of the  'openness' of fron tiers and  Rom e's ap p aren tly  poor 
know ledge of geography, it has been  observed by  scholars th a t m ilitary  
operations w ere a t best lim ited  in  their scope and  strategy, and  a t their 
w o rst oppo rtun is tic  adventures.®^ H ow ever, w ith  the  travel restrictions 
im posed  betw een the  Persian and  Rom an em pire, it becam e possible to 
assem ble and  m anoeuvre a force against the frontier w ith  som e degree of 
se c rec y .® 2  Consequently diplom acy w as a key instrum ent in  either gaining
26 Zach. Mit., 8.5; 9.6.
77 Zach, Mit., 12.7.
78 Th. Sim., 1.15.11; Evagr., 5.9.
29 D.J. Mosley (1973) 4-6,8; A.D. Lee (1991a) 257-61.
®0 RE. Adcock (1957) 41, and (1970) 85-6.
81 R Millar (1982) 15-20; B. Isaac (1990) 401-6.
®2 The campaigns of A.D. 359 and 502 both found the Romans, not entirely unaware, but 
sufficiently off-guard that the attacker was at a distinct advantage.
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details of enem y defences for shocking an  opponen t w ith  m assed troops, 
or delaying, and  if possible, deterring  enem y a g g r e s s i o n . 8 3
C h ris tia n  c le rgy  w e re  q u ite  capab le  of p ro v id in g  m ilita ry  
in telligence, even em ploying  the ir archives and  lite ra ry  talen ts to good 
effect. A pparen tly  the church h ierarchy  w as in  the  practice of sending  
in fo rm ation  an d  keep ing  records of activities across the  frontier. The 
Catholicos, Sahak the G reat, w as v iew ed as a security risk  by  the nobles of 
Persarm enia, and  consequently  w as rem oved from  office.®^ The evidence 
supporting  these accusations is strong: he w rote m any letters to im portan t 
im peria l ecclesiastics an d  m ilita ry  com m anders, an d  w as a frien d  of 
A nato lius, the  magister m ilitum  a t T heodosiopolis, w ho  la ter a ttem p ted  
to  secure h im  safe passage into Rom an territory.®^ Bishop V r'tanes in  a 
letter to C onstantins w as able to cite records in his possession concerning 
the  defensive pact betw een Rom e and  Armenia.®^ Sim ilarly, Z achariah of 
M itylene had  access to  a letter betw een tw o Persian bishops concerning the 
in trigues of the  p riest A braham , an agen t of Justin , am ong the  Saracen 
princes.®2
The A rm enian  u p ris in g  of A.D. 451 d isp lays the  various n o n ­
m ilita ry  m echan ism s w hich  th e  chu rch  cou ld  ac tiv a te  in  tim es of 
d iplom atic crisis. A t the  beginning  of the  insurrection , the  bishops sent 
their chorepiskopoi in to  the  countryside to  inform  the  populace of w h a t 
w as h ap p en in g , an d  m ake p rep a ra tio n s  for resistance,®® A cap tu red  
m a rzp a n  p laced  h im self in  th e  cu sto d y  an d  a t th e  d isposa l of the 
A rm enian  b ishops, p ro v id in g  them  w ith  in form ation  abou t the  Persian  
army.®9 The hazarapet of A lbania cam e in  the com pany of his b ishop to
®3 B. Isaac (1990) 407 concedes that by the fifth century, the Roman empire had begun to 
collect intelligence in an orderly fashion; see G. Mattingly (1965) 57-8 on the crucial nature 
of diplomacy as preparation to conflict; on the role of embassies in stalling or dissuading 
invasions, see evidence and discussion in A.D. Lee (1986) 456-8.
®4 MX 3.66.
®5 For letters see especially those in MX 3.57; for friendship with Anatolius MX 3.57 and 65. 
®6 MX 3.4-5; see also letter in Faust. Buz., 3,21. Both refer to the military agreements 
between Tr'dat and Constantine, see Agathangelos, 877.
®2 Zach. Mit., 8.3.
®® Elishe, 57; Marutha, Canons, 25-6, indicate that a system for such dissemination was 
normally present for each see.
®9 Elishe, 66.
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p ro v id e  the  rebels w ith  in fo rm ation  on  P ersian  m ovem ents from  the  
n o rth ; b o th  w e re  se n t back  to  d e la y  th e  P e rs ia n  a rm y  w ith
disinform ation.90
N or w as th is rebellion  the  on ly  occasion w hen  clergy p ro v id ed  
m ilitary intelligence. T hrough the bro ther of the bishop of D w in, Gregory, 
Catholicos of A rm enia, the general Valerian learned  of the w eakened state 
of the  Persians' defences and  oppo rtu n ities  open  for a R om an assau lt 
against Persarm enia.9l Likewise, Justin II obtained im portan t inform ation 
about Persarm enian  affairs th rough  the ecclesiastical delegations sen t by  
V ardan betw een A.D 569 and  572, b u t even after an insurrection  began in 
Persarm enia, the  em peror took no active steps to p u rsu e  an  offensive.92 
D uring  the  M esopo tam ian  cam paign  of A.D. 573, in fo rm ation  on  the  
p rogress of the  siege of N isibis w as tardy , perhaps even  w ithheld  by the 
exaspera ted  Rom an general, M arcian, a rela tive  of th e  em peror. A n 
accurate briefing w as p rov ided  by  new s w hich the N isibene bishop h ad  
secretly conveyed to Gregory, bishop of Antioch. The N isibene bishop was 
a client of G regory, hav ing  received  costly gifts and  assistance in  the  
pro tection  of his C hristian  com m unity. O n several occasions th is bishop 
had  sen t inform ation  concern ing  m ilita ry  m atters to G regory. A  final 
com m uniqué ind icated  Persian forces w ere m assing for a counter-attack 
a g a in s t th e  R om an siege. This new s w as sw iftly  d isp a tc h ed  to 
C onstantinople. But Justin  II, eager to  capture N isibis, and  un im pressed  
w ith  M arcian 's actions in  the  area, h ad  already  sen t a m ore aggressive 
com m ander, w ho lost the su p p o rt of his troops, and  the  siege broke off.93 
Several years la te r G regory  ob ta ined  the  confidence of th e  em pero r 
M aurice w ho sent him  to negotiate  w ith  rebellious troops, and  repo rt on 
the  unsuccessful Rom an efforts a t retaking  M artyropolis.94 By the end  of 
the sixth century tables could be tu rned  on  the Rom ans, as w hen  H orm izd 
ob ta in ed  from  M ar Isho-Y abh, th e  N esto rian  b ish o p  of C h lom aron ,
90 Elishe, 70-2.
91 Procopius, Wars, 2.24.8-11; Zach. Mit., 12.7 for the identification of the bishop.
92 Evagr., 5.7.
93 Evagr., 5.8-9; see also J. Eph., H E, 6.2. L.M. Whitby (1988) 256-7 doubts that the 
information provided by Gregory influenced Marcian's dismissal, but this does not deny the 
church's role in providing intelligence.
94 Evagr., 6.11-14; Th. Sim., 3.5.10.
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strategic inform ation concerning the  m ovem ents of the im perial arm y in
Arzanene.95
The b lend ing  of relig ious and  secular evangelisa tion  w as an old  
practice in  the  ancien t w orld , w here  an in tegral d u ty  of every Rom an 
em bassy w as to sp read  the im perial cult and  hence sanctification of the  
Rom an state on a local level th roughou t the empire.96 A  notable feature 
of C hristian  diplom acy w as tha t ecclesiastical leaders perceived it as their 
d u ty  to  e s tab lish  o rd e r  by  'm ed ia tin g ' b e tw een  'a lien  c u ltu re s '.9 2 
F u rtherm ore , the  process of conversion  often  left the  m issionary  host 
people  w ith  feelings no t only of religious, b u t also of political allegiance 
an d  dependency ; it w as in  the  in te res t of the  sta te  to  encourage  the 
continued  evangelisation of regions along and  beyond the frontier.98 One 
could  say  th a t the  d ispu tes in A rm enia w ere often  aggravated  by  the 
success of C hristian  m issionaries, w ho w ere tra ined  and  p rov ided  w ith  
resources by the im perial church and  government.99 M issions established 
a ne tw ork  of contacts th ro u g h  w hich the  fused  C hristian  and  im peria l 
sym bols w ere transm itted; and  just as the converted becam e the clients of 
m issionary churches, so too the m issionary church relied  on the patronage 
of im peria l in stitu tio n s .!00 in  Iberia, N ino w as in close contact w ith the 
A rm enian bishops and  h ad  the  su p p o rt of the G eorgian princes am ongst 
w hom  her early  evangelisation  w as targe ted .!01 These m issions spread  
th roughou t the  region and  converted  the  tribes g u ard in g  the  C aucasian 
passes.!02 M issionaries convinced their secular princes of the  im portance 
of sending  em bassies to  seek im perial assistance in  establishing the  new  
religion. The Iberian king  d ispatched  an em bassy to obtain  priests and
95 Men. Prot., 23.7; Chron. Seert, 2.94
96 D.S. Hill (1905) 18-19; S.R.F. Price (1984) 247-8.
92 J. Der Derian (1987) 61.
98 Compare the successful joint action of the French government and the Jesuits along the 
Ohio and north-west frontier in eighteenth-century America and the problems this caused 
for English expansion, discussed in W.R. Jacobs (1950) 31-34.
99 Certainly Christian support of missions in Persia and amongst the Saracens aggravated 
relations between the two great powers, see Z. Rubin (1986a) 34 and (1986b) 679-81; L.M. 
Whitby (1988) 215, 252-3.
!®® Both Rome and Persia attempted to consolidate their control over Ciscaucasia through 
missions, see L.M. Whitby (1988) 215-18; and J. Kramer (1935/7) 613-18.
!0 ! MX 2.86; Soc., 1.20; Rufinus, 10.11; Toumanoff (1963) 374-7.
102 Agathangelos, 842-3; MX 2.86.
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relig ious instructors for h is k i n g d o m . ! 0 3  This w as necessary because the 
m ission churches w ere under the  jurisdiction of im perial sees, and  d id  not 
have the m echanism  or righ t to  ordain  their ow n pastors.
M issions p roved  a useful base for m ilitary and political operations. 
A n im peria l em bassy sen t to  rec ru it am ongst the  H u n s w as keen  to 
estab lish  contact w ith  a C h ristian  m ission  there . W hen Ju stin ian 's  
am bassadors in form ed the  em peror th a t form er captives an d  A rm enian  
clergy h ad  begun evangelising the H uns, and  w ere transla ting  books into 
the H unn ish  language, the em peror sent a m ule-train  of ecclesiastical gifts 
to  su p p o rt their endeavours and  bo lster the  m ission. K avadh  h ad  th is 
m ission b rough t to his atten tion  by  the  A rm enian Catholicos, w ho, by the 
six th  century , h ad  a position  alongside the M agi as a relig ious adviser. 
K avadh sent funds and  staff to bu ild  a hospital, along w ith  one-hundred  
m ules and fifty camels laden w ith  g o o d s . ! 0 4
§ 7. The Spiritual A uthority  of Ecclesiastical D iplom ats:
C ontinued negotiations th rough  ecclesiastics becam e essential as the  
rela tionship  betw een pa tron  and  client w as C hristianized. The clients of 
king T r'd a t requested  th a t if he  w ish "to rule those lands in  the  true  w ay 
according to this faith, send them  bishops", after w hich they  received the 
em bassy and  presum ably  m issionary efforts of b ishop G rigoris, g randson  
of G regory  the  I l l u m i n a t o r . ! 05 W hen a series of rebellions broke o u t in 
A rm enia  w ith  the  d ea th  of k ing  T r'da t, A rchbishop V rt'anes in itia ted  
negotiations w ith  the  em peror C onstantius. In  his letter V rt'anes rem inds 
C onstantins of the sacred covenant established by C onstantine betw een the 
tw o  C hristian  nations and  of the m ilitary  obligations w hich  the  Rom ans 
should  heed  as a C hristian superpow er:
"Remember the sworn covenant of your father Constantine with our king Tr'dat and do not 
give this country over to the godless Persians, but help us with an army to make Khusro, 
Tr'dat's son, king. For God has made you lord not only of Europe but also of all of the
!03 Theodoret, HE, 1.24.
!04  Zach. Mit., 12.7; see also Procopius, W ars, 1.12.16-19 for Justin's efforts. On the 
importance of recruiting amongst the Huns see A. Vasilev (1950) 313-17.
105 Faust. Buz., 3.5; MX 3.3.
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Mediterranean, and the awe of your power has reached the ends of the earth. And we 
desire that you rule over an ever-greater empire. Be well."!^6
In  response  to V rt'anes ' en treaties C onstan tius sen t a force u n d e r the  
praefectus, A ntiochus, to crow n K husro and  supp ress rebellion. In the  
m id d le  of the  fou rth  cen tury , w hen  in term inable  w ar w ith  Persia  and  
grow ing  rebellion  th rea ten ed  to  w eaken  perm anen tly  A rm enia against 
eastern  and  w estern  im perialism , the  nobility again tu rn ed  to A rchbishop 
N erses to preside over unilateral peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . ! ^ /  A fter the m ajority 
of the  nobility resum ed their royal support, N erses w as d ispatched  to an 
invad ing  Rom an arm y. H e b ro u g h t w ith  him  num erous hostages. H e 
w as conducted  to  C onstan tinop le, w here  his o rthodox  faith  m et w ith  
A rian  disapproval; the A rm enian  nobles and  hostages re tu rn ed  in  peace, 
b u t N erses w as exiled.!^® W ith the  death  of the  em peror, N erses and  
o ther exiled bishops re tu rned  to their homes.!09 Later, w hen  Valentinian 
o rdered  a pun itive  cam paign against the  A rm enians for their neglect in 
p ro v id in g  troops, N erses the  G reat w as sent to m eet and  d issuade  the 
R om an  g enera l from  a ttack ing . H e w as sen t by  th e  R om ans to  
C onstan tinople  w here  he delivered  the A rm enian tribu te  and  add itional 
gifts, and  solidified the  peace by  orchestrating the m arriage betw een the 
nob lew om an  O lym pias an d  k ing  A rshak .!!0  Bishops h ad  becom e the 
delegates m ediating betw een client kings and  their patrons.
Ecclesiastical am bassadors w ere  recognised  as h av in g  sp iritu a l 
au th o rity  w hich  could  be u sed  to  p ressu re  civil and  m ilitary  leaders. 
W hen in  A.D. 451 a Persian marzpan su rrendered  his force to a victorious 
rebel detachm ent, he negotiated  th rough  the A rm enian bishop, w hom  he 
hoped  w ould  be able to convince the A rm enian com m anders to be lenient 
in  the ir p u n ish m en t.!!!  Joseph, p resid ing  A rm enian b ishop du rin g  the
!^6 MX 3.4-5; compare letter to unknown emperor in Faust. Buz., 3.21. For the perception of 
the Roman emperor as patron of a universal Christian community see Constantine's letter to 
Sapor and Theodoret's commentary at HE, 1.25.
!07 Faust. Buz., 4.51; MX 3.29.
108 Faust. Buz., 4.5; MX 3.19-30. Concerning this second mission both N.H. Baynes (1955a) 
187, and N. Garsoïan (1969) maintain that the emperor "Valens" is confused with 
"Constantius", botlr accept the events as factual, but differ on the dating.
!09 Soc., 5.2; Faust. Buz 4.13; MX 3.33.
!!0  MX 3.21; Amm. Marc., 20.11.1-3 
! ! !  Elishe, 66.
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rebellion , issued  a le tter to  th e  em pero r T heodosius, s ta ting  th a t the  
A rm enians w ere old  clients of Rome and  fellow Christians, and  w ere now  
in need  of, and  entitled to, m ilitary assistance.Ü2 Persia likewise m ade use 
of clerical em bassies in  ru ling  their clients. T hrough an  A rm enian priest 
loyal to  Persian  suzera in ty  Persarm enian  generals nego tia ted  w ith  the 
rebels; their presence, in  spite of Elishe's protestations tha t they w ere "false 
priests" indicated  th a t such an em bassy w as official an d  trustw orthy.!!®  
But at tim es, even though  the  church hierarchy m ight facilitate dialogue 
betw een opposing  cam ps, they  could  no t guaran tee  tha t talks w ou ld  no t 
b reak  dow n am idst accusations of m is tru s t and  endanger c lien t-patron  
relations, as w as the case w hen bishops Joseph and  Lew ond parleyed w ith  
V asak, a noble Persian  loyalist, b u t w ere unable to  b ring  either side to 
agreem ent.! !4
Both th e  R om ans an d  Persians a ttem p ted  to  score d ip lom atic  
v ictories e ither by  app ly ing  sp iritu a l leverage or sp read ing  C hristian  
p ropaganda. The m onk M oses w ho dw elt a sho rt d istance from  D ara 
supposed ly  m et and  cured the  w ife of K avadh, w ho w as sym pathetic to 
C hristian ity . This friendsh ip  w as he lp fu l in p u ttin g  p ressu re  on  the  
Persians w hen in  A.D. 532 Justinian w as negotiating peace w ith  the young 
K husro .!!®  The Persian  general of Persarm enia  d ispa tched  G regory, 
bishop of Dw in, to try  to obtain an im m ediate peace after his troops w ere 
crippled by  a pestilence. The bishop w as chosen to p u t m oral p ressure  on 
the Rom ans for peace and  to chide them  for their delays in com ing to 
negotiations, b u t to ensure  their em bassy safe conduct th rough  P e r s i a . ! ! 6  
K husro I perceived the w eight a holy m an could lend  to an  em bassy, w hen 
he sent Sebukt to the im perial court, hoping  tha t the Rom ans m ight find 
convincing , o r fam iliar, th e  a rg u m en t th a t fellow  C hristian s sh o u ld  
refrain  from  w aging w ar against one a n o t h e r . ! ! 2  It is possible that Khusro
! !2  Elishe, 71.
!!3  Elishe, 106.
!!4  Elishe, 122-3.
!!5  Zach. Mit. 9.6-7.
116 Procopius, 2.24.6-7; see Elishe, 83 on this privilege. Procopius asserts the bishop of 
Dwin was the Catholicos, 2.25.4, this is confirmed in Zach. Mit., 12,7.
! !2  Men. Prot., 16.1, a reversal of the logic used by the Romans in the Red Sea and amongst 
the Arabs, L.M. Whitby (1988) 251-2.
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II ob tained  the  em peror M aurice 's a tten tion  via ecclesiastical assistance. 
C ertainly he took every advantage to publicise his alleged conversion, and  
it w as only after his tu rn ing  tow ard  C hristianity  th a t the Persian obtained 
an  aud ience,I!8  In  his flight he h ad  inv ited  M ar Isho-Yabh, the  form er 
b ish o p  of C hlom aron  an d  now  Catholicos, to  jo in  h im , a n d  a im ed to 
tem pt M aurice w ith  the prospect of resolving the N estorian  split w ith  the  
im perial c h u r c h .  119 Bishop Isho-Yabh had  been earlier sent by  the Persian 
com m ander besieged at C lom aron "in the  belief that the leaders of C hrist's 
priests w ould  gain the respect of the Rom ans since they  w ere C hristians" 
and  th a t the Rom ans assaulting the city w ould  no t allow  fellow Christians 
to  d ie n e e d l e s s l y . l 2 0  The im perial governm ent w as also capable of m aking 
its ow n p rofit from  K hurso 's adop tion  of C hristian  diplom acy. A t the 
Rom an siege of M artyropolis, b ishop Dom itian, in  add ition  to negotiating 
w ith  the  inhabitan ts, rebuked  K husro for being unfaith fu l to  his Rom an 
b en efac to rs .!21 After K husro w as restored, M aurice continued the gam e, 
sending  a Chalcedonian b ishop as am bassador to the Persian court to help 
superv ise  the ‘C hristian’ K husro in  m atters of the f a i t h . ! 2 2
§ 8. Conclusion:
In  conclu sion , local ch u rch  lead ers  p ro v id e d  ce rta in  h a n d y  
m echanism s for p u rsu in g  political goals. By the fou rth  cen tury  bishops 
w ere  w id e ly  recogn ised  as tru s tw o rth y  ju d g es , an d  the  law s an d  
in stitu tions of the  church  p ro v id ed  a skeleton fram ew ork  for overseas 
operations. O ne shou ld  no t be overly cynical about this. There is little  
d o u b t th a t the  im peria l governm en t believed  in  its m ission  to act as 
pa tron  over the scattered C hristian com m unities, b u t this earnestness does 
n o t change the  fact th a t the church  becam e a vehicle for p rom oting  and  
safeguard ing  im perial am bitions. There is a certain  irony  in  th a t as the 
church becam e m ore involved  in  shaping  im perial d iplom acy, it lost the
!!8  Evagr, 6.17; Th. Sim., 4.10.4.
!!9  Anon. Guidi, 2; L.M. Whitby (1988) 295 and 297 n. 31.
!20 Men. Prot, 23.7.
!21 Th. Sim., 4.15.8-16.
!22 Th. Sim., 5.15.8 where the bishop is named Probus; also Chron. Seert 67 - 68, where he is 
named as Marutha. Dated by Whitby (1988) at 241 to A.D. 596 or later.
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in itia l credib ility  w hich  h ad  w on  it a p riv ileged  position  as an  honest 
negotiator am ongst rival parties. A long the  frontier ecclesiastical figures 
becam e difficult to  d istingu ish  from  civil. As the  church garnered  m ore 
la n d  a n d  g rea te r p riv ileg es , e lite  fam ilies concom m itan tly  m erg ed  
re lig ious an d  secu lar in terests; such  w as clearly  th e  case th ro u g h o u t 
A rm en ia , w h ere  p rin ce ly  a n d  secu la r e sta tes  w ere  m ixed  even ly  
th ro u g h o u t the  coun try  and  noble fam ilies supp lied  b o th  political and  
s p ir i tu a l  l e a d e r s .  1 2 3  A rm en ian  c lergy  h a d  p ro v e d  in flu e n tia l in 
convincing m ilitary com m anders th a t their rebellion w as a necessary and  
sp iritu a l s t r u g g l e , ! 2 4  b u t this action w as largely in reaction to Persian 
in to lerance. H ow ever, by  the  end  of the  six th  cen tu ry , the  church  
h ierarchy appears to be instigating im perial aggression. The clergy w ere 
in s tru m e n ta l in  th e  A.D. 572 neg o tia tio n s w ith  th e  P ersarm en ians. 
R eligious grievances in sp ired  th e  A rm enians to send  a de legation  to 
Justin  II, C ertain ly  w hen  K husro h ad  discovered th a t the  em peror h ad  
o b ta in ed  p ledges from  the  A rm en ians to  rebel ag a in st th e ir P ersian  
governors, Justin  rep lied  th a t it  w as im possible to s tan d  in  the  w ay  of 
re lig ious d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  12 5  im peria l and  orthodox  C hristian  am bitions 
w ere  nearly  indiv isib le, and  as the  im perial governm ent becam e m ore 
confrontational, so d id  the  c h u r c h . I 2 6  w h e n  K husro received  m ilitary  
assistance from  M aurice, B ishops G regory and  D om itianus w ere sen t to 
oversee diplom atic transactions and keep an eye on the s i t u a t i o n . I 2 7  Both 
b ishops w ere h igh ly  tru sted  by  the  em peror, D om itianus as a k insm an, 
and  G regory as a loyal friend fam iliar w ith  the m ilitary transactions of the 
frontier. W hen the p ious em peror M aurice arrested  M ar Isho-Y abh, a 
conservative m ove can be detected. The em peror v iew ed the N estorian  
bishop as acting in an  abnorm al m anner. W hen the  interests of the  tw o, 
civil and  ecclesiastical au thority , m erged, the clergy began to  forfeit their 
role as m ediators. But action such as M aurice's h ighlights the fact tha t as
123 On the general fusion of church and state interests see J. Der Derian (1987) 70; on 
Armenia in particular see N. Adontz (1970) 100.
124 Elishe, 99.
125 Evagr., 5.7.
126 R.c. Blockley (1985) 73-4 , and L.M. Whitby (1988) 250-1, 276 on Justin II and Maurice's 
return toward an aggressive foreign policy,
!27 Evagr., 6.18; Th. Sim., 4.14.5-6; L.M. Whitby (1988) 299.
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local interm ediaries b ishops could only be effective if they w ere perceived 
as m aintain ing  a h igh  degree of honestas.
Frontier Policy 
§ 1. Introduction:
Two recent studies in particu lar have provoked discussion concerning the 
developm ent of a theory  of frontier m echanics: E.N. L u ttw ak 's The Grand 
Strategif of the Roman Empire and  B. Isaac 's The Limits of Empire. A ny 
a ttem p t to  ou tline , even  in  genera l te rm s, the  m echanics o f R om an 
fo re ign  po licy  a long  th e  N o rth -E ast fro n tie r m u s t re sp o n d  to  the ir 
argum ents. To begin, it is necessary  to  m ake a few  general statem ents 
abou t these tw o w orks before m oving  on  to exam ine o u r section of the 
frontier. M ore atten tion  w ill be given to Isaac as his s tu d y  is specifically 
concerned w ith  the  Rom an east. H ow ever, as m uch of Isaac is a reaction 
to Luttw ak, w e m ust first exam ine pertinen t elem ents of L uttw ak 's thesis.
§ 2. Luttw ak's Thesis and  Isaac's Response:
Luttw ak undertakes a general study  of the Rom an frontier from  the 
tim e of A ugustus to the end  of the th ird  century, w ith  som e discussion of 
fou rth -cen tu ry  developm ents. In brief, h is observations are as follows. 
Rom an strategic p lanning  passed  th rough  three phases.! The first phase, 
effective u n d e r the  Julio-C laudians, involved keeping  troops in  central 
locations as a m obile strike force, either against the final stages of rebellion 
w ith in  provinces o r to su p p o rt client kings w ho undertook  the bu lk  of 
fron tie r security . U n d er th is system , the em perors could  exert the ir 
au thority  w ithout expending a large degree of force. C lient states, foreign 
tribes, and  im perial opponents such as Parthia, v iew ed the  to tal reserves 
av a ilab le  to  Rom e as im m ense , a n d  w ere  u su a lly  d e te rre d  from  
aggression. The creation of such an  im age w as on ly  possible because 
Rom an forces w ere no t sp read  o u t along the frontiers. From  the Flavians 
to the  Severi, a "scientific frontier" w as developed  w here in  the Rom an 
A rm y defended a defined frontier against external threats, relying less on 
clients. W here possible, na tu ra l boundaries w ere sought an d  efforts w ere
! E.N. Luttwak (1976) 7-50; 51-126; and 127-190, respectively.
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m ad e  to  d e lin ea te  w h e re  R om an  co n tro l b eg an  a n d  en d ed : th e  
"disposable" m ilitary  pow er of large garrisons and  allied client kingdom s 
w as exchanged for d irect control. The final phase  is a reaction  to  the 
invasions of the th ird  century. Small m ilitary sites w ere spread  along the 
com m unications ne tw ork  of the  em pire  to stall invaders  u n til a now  
separate field arm y could eventually confront the threat.
Isaac's objections to Luttw ak, and  an  overview  of his ow n ideas on 
the  subject w ere hera lded  by his article 'L uttw ak 's "G rand  Strategy" and  
the  Eastern Frontier of the Rom an E m pire', w hich appeared  a year before 
L im its  w as pub lished . In  th is critique he  ind icated  th a t theories of a 
un ified  frontier stra tegy  relied  on  a num ber of specific assum ptions, b u t 
attacked one in  particular. The greatest pillar of any 'g rand  strategy ' theory 
is th a t the  im peria l governm en t m u st be  m otivated  by  a  concern for 
"m ain tenance  of o rd e r in  the  fron tie r zo n e" .2 This "m ain tenance of 
o rder" for Isaac m eans developing civic life so as to  w in  the  goodw ill of 
provincials. Isaac contends th a t such activities w ere no t undertaken  by the 
R om an em perors w ho, in stead , d ep en d ed  on m ilita ry  coercion, ra th e r 
th an  their subjects' loyalty. The pu rpose  of Rom an garrisons in  the  East 
w as largely twofold: first, to  crush all resistance to Rom an ru le  in  subject 
territories, and  second, to stand  ready for fu ture cam paigns against oriental 
kingdom s. Isaac is sceptical about attribu ting  to R om an p lanners a high 
degree of rationality , contending  tha t m ilitary activity w as influenced less 
by  a desire to construct a secure fron tier than  by an  im pulse  to  acquire 
attractive lands. This chapter will instead suggest tha t a "secure" frontier 
w as an  objective of the  im peria l governm ent, and  th a t the  sta te  relied  
heavily  on local agents to  achieve this security.
A  central prob lem  in  Isaac 's w ork  is th a t desp ite  Lim its' claim  to 
encom pass the entire eastern  frontier, the  evidence is largely  d raw n  from  
Judaea  an d  Palestina.® Isaac states th a t it is his in ten tion  to  analyse the 
entire  East: "It is an  a ttem pt to  clarify various aspects of Rom an aim s in 
the East, from  the Caucasus to Sinai" and  "The book attem pts to trace the 
lim its of Rom an physical involvem ent in the eastern  fron tier provinces, 
from  th e ir acquisition  a t the  end  of the  repub lic  age till th e  Islam ic
2 See esp. B. Isaac (1989) 233 and (1990) conduding statements 424-26.
3 Isaac's "Jewish perspective" is noted, but not quantified, by A.R. Birley (1991) 412.
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c o n q u e s t."^  To no te  exhaustively  how  sites in  or near m odern  Israel 
receive the  lion 's  share  of a tten tion  w ou ld  requ ire  considerable space. 
T here  are a few  sim ple  m ethods, how ever, w h ich  m ay  be u se d  to  
h igh ligh t the skew ed n a tu re  of the  w ork 's  evidence. By tu rn ing  to the  
in d ices  a n d  ca lcu la tin g  th e  n u m b er of en tries  a n d  pages u n d e r  
geographical or provincial areas, one can gain a ro ugh  overv iew  of the 
book 's contents. Judaea an d  Palestina have betw een  them  tw en ty-tw o  
entries and  seventy-one pages cited.® If one adds the  entries and  pages 
cited for A rabia, A rm enia, C appadocia, Egypt, M esopotam ia, and  Syria in 
the  sam e fashion, tw en ty -th ree  en tries and  six ty-four pages are cited. 
Follow ing the  sam e general p rocedure  for the eastern  legions, the  th ree  
un its  associated w ith  the  area su rround ing  Judaea, legiones III, VI, X  are 
g iven  tw en ty -th ree  pages of citations. W hile th e  rem ain in g  tw elve 
legions w hich  saw  service in  the East are accorded tw en ty -n ine  pages. 
Effectively th ree  tim es the atten tion  is devoted  to troops associated w ith  
one particu lar p a rt of the eastern  frontier. The sam e can be said of cities, 
w here  Jerusalem  is g ran ted  n ine  en tries, C aesarea th ree , B erytus tw o, 
w hile  A m ida receives tw o, and  N isibis, M artyropolis, and  M elitene one 
each.6 This does no t detract from  the m erit of Isaac's analysis of Judaea, or 
even sou thern  Syria and  A rabia, b u t in  a study  w hich  p u rp o rts  to  cover 
the  entire  eastern frontier, the au tho r's  judgem ents m ay have been overly 
influenced by one area, w hich is arguably  very different from  others, and  
clearly  far rem oved  from  the  b o rd ers  w ith  P ersia  a n d  C iscaucasia. 
Therefore it will be helpful to  test som e of Isaac's ideas on  the north-east 
in  greater detail.2
4 B. Isaac (1990) 4 and 419.
5 These statistics include the entry "Jews" which Isaac refers the reader to under "Judaea". 
For the purpose of quick calculations I have not counted all the pages listed with a "f." or 
"and following" symbol. For example, "Herodian building enterprises in 340f." is counted as 
one entry and one page of citation, even though the actual total amount of pages would be 
far greater.
6 The difference in page numbers is even greater, but difficult to calculate since most pages 
cited under Jerusalem entries have an "f" attached.
7 To avoid confusion it should be noted that Isaac's work and this thesis do not share the 
same definition of "North-East". B. Isaac (1990) 43-50 defines the area as Caucasus, and 
does not include Armenia or northern Mesopotamia.
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§ 3. Soldier and  Civilian on  the N orth-East Frontier:
Isaac  d ep ic ts  th e  R om an a rm y , a n d  by  asso c ia tio n  th e  im p e ria l 
governm ent in the  East as one w hich "spent no tim e on  certain  activities 
w hich m odern  states consider elem entary  duties tow ards their citizens", 
an d  th a t "in  the  eastern  provinces a t least, the subjects of the provinces 
w ere  considered  irrelevant".® H ow ever, if w e exam ine how  the Rom an 
arm y trea ted  the civilian population  of the  north-east frontier, and, w here 
possible, how  the subject and  non-R om an popu lation  view ed the Rom an 
state, a less negative p ictu re  m ay be form ed. The defence of the frontier 
dep en d ed  on  either the  obedience or the  loyalty  of local com m unities.
Isaac has em phasised  the  coercive n a tu re  of the  R om an state. The 
rem a in d e r o f th is  ch ap te r w ill a tte m p t to ba lance  th e  p ic tu re  by  
h ig h lig h tin g  th e  in te re s t  sh o w n  fo r p ro v in c ia ls  b y  th e  im p e ria l 
governm ent and  its agents. First, I w ill argue th a t the  presence of the  
Rom an arm y b rough t certain  benefits to u rban  and  ru ra l areas, and  tha t 
the  a ttitude  of arm y and  civilian tow ard  one another, w as co-operative. 
Second, in  re-exam ining the  frontier cities, I w ill argue tha t the  im perial 
g o v e rn m e n t a im ed  to  e s tab lish  a secu re  e n v iro n m e n t, an d  th u s  
in ten tio n a lly  cu ltiva ted  the  loyalty  of fron tie r com m unities in  w ays 
usually  best su ited  to  each locality. Finally, I w ill argue tha t the  im perial 
governm ent's dependence on local leaders and  local com m unities attests a 
unified policy sim ilar to L uttw ak 's suggested 'g rand  strategy '.
The presence of a m ilitary  force undoub ted ly  caused  problem s for 
bo th  large and  sm all com m unities. As Isaac points out, taxation, billeting, 
occasional looting and bru tality  m ade for poor relations betw een arm y and 
subjects.9 W ithout overturn ing  these conclusions, I w ould  like to p resen t 
evidence w hich indicates tha t the presence of the im perial arm y w as also 
beneficial to  fron tier com m unities in offering recognised  centres w hich 
p rov ided  technical assistance and  m ilitary em ploym ent.
P erhaps m ore th an  any  o th er peace-tim e benefit of the  a rm y 's  
presence, local com m unities p rofited  from  im perial egineers. Evidence of
8 B. Isaac (1990) 158 and 305
9 B. Isaac (1990) 268-310. The present chapter adheres to the "mixed blessing" stance of R. 
MacMullen (1963) 77-98.
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m ilitary  construction in  the large u rb an  centres w as discussed  in  chapter 
tw o, and  shall be re tu rn e d  to  briefly  la ter on. But the  arm y w as also 
responsible for civilian w orks in  the sm aller settlem ents and  the country. 
A lthough field w ork  along the north-east frontier is in  its early stages and  
m ateria l evidence is still being  sought, exam ples do  exist from  adjacent 
p rov inces th a t illu stra te  the  poin t. A  G reek inscrip tion  from  Batnae 
describes how  w hen the  praefectus of O srhoene w as m aking repairs to  the 
city w all, he ad d ed  shelter to p rov ide  citizens w ith  som e shade.H  In 
m inor Syrian villages sentim ents of g ra titude  are expressed  on  a stone, 
one from  the late th ird  century  and  one for Justinian. 12 A  road  netw ork  
im proved  w ith  w ell an d  shelters by  a local m ilita ry  com m ander w as 
p raised  by  a w ayfarer in Syria. 1® O ur literary evidence for the north-east 
d isp lays an  obvious bias to w ard  ecclesiastical bu ild ing , b u t supports the 
v iew  tha t the arm y w as involved in civilian bu ild ing  projects. Reflecting 
the activities of the Rom an arm y, client troops w ere em ployed to advance 
the interests of pro-R om an allies in  Arm enia. In the early fourth  century, 
so ld iers d ism an tled  fire tem ples in the  coun tryside  and  he lped  in  the 
construction of churches. Such action illustrates the m ethods used  by pro- 
R om an an d  p ro-P ersian  factions in  A rm enia. U ltim ately , the  Persians 
failed  to p rom ote  the Z oroastrian  relig ion th rough  bu ild in g  schem es. 14 
Im perial and  local craftsm en w ere lent to  nearby m onasteries and  villages 
in  the T ur 'A bdin  du ring  the  construction of Dara.l® In the fifth century  
th ree  churches w ere  b u ilt in  the  v icin ity  of M arty ropo lis  u n d e r the  
gu idance of Rom an officers. A lthough  non-m ilitary  bu ild ings, it is clear 
th a t such churches could never be  disassociated from  im perial pow er and
10 E.W. Gray (1973) 29 and J. Crow (1986) 87 on the difficulties of collecting archaeological 
data in this region.
11 H. Petersen (1977) 267.
12IGR III 1186, M.H. Dodgeon and S.N.C. Lieu (1990) 5.1.4, a Greek inscription wishing the 
emperor Probus victory. IGLS 4.1809 to "our most pious and beloved emperor", cited in 
Whitby (1986a) 723.
13 CIL III 6660, M.H. Dodgeon and S.N.C. Lieu (1990) 5.6.1, dated to the late third or early 
fourth century.
14 Agathangelos, 811-2. This is only the beginning of a long history of attempts by Roman 
and Persian powers to sway the civilian populace by non-military construction. See E.W. 
Gray (1973) 32; G. Fowden (1970) 56-7 and 77-8; and Chp. 3 § 4 above.
15 Zach, Mit., 7.6; E.J.W. Hawkins and M.C. Mundell (1973) 279-96; A. Palmer (1990) 123.
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w ere the  object of Persian Injury in  the late sixth century. 16 This helpful 
action agrees w ith  w ha t is know n about the  non-m ilitary  du ties of the 
Rom an arm y th roughou t m ost of the empire.12
The late Rom an State becam e increasingly dep en d en t on  A natolia 
an d  A rm enia  as pop u lo u s recru iting  zones. 1® The local fron tier cities 
benefited  the  im perial governm ent in  a ttracting  m en to  the  ranks, and  
benefited  them selves from  the  contributions these ind iv idua ls and  their 
fellow  foreign conscripts w ith in  the  com m unity  m ade. R ecruiting from  
the local com m unities in  the  north -east is attested  early. Shortly after its 
arrival a t Satala, the legio X V  ApolUnaris began recru iting  from  the native 
p o p u la tio n . 19 The sam e w ou ld  have held  true  for o ther garrisons along 
the  north -east frontier, and  by  the  late  th ird  century, the  fam ilies of the  
so ld iers w ere  expected  to  p rov ide  conscripts.20 M anpow er shortages, 
com pounded  by the  need  to  keep  peasan ts on the  lan d , increasing ly  
encouraged  the im peria l governm ent to recru it m en  for the  field arm y 
from  outside Rom an settlem ents w here cash w ould  be accepted instead.21 
N o n e th e less , rec ru itin g  w as still o rg an ised  on  a v e ry  local level. 
Settlem ents close to the  frontier w ere a na tu ra l centre  to w hich foreign 
volunteers gravitated. Large num bers, for exam ple, w ere d raw n  from  the 
T ranstigritane satrapies and  form ed the sagittarii Zabdiceni, recru ited  and 
sta tioned  a t Bezabde. Even after the  satrapies w ere lost, service in the 
R om an arm y m ay  have rem ained  an  op tion  for T ranstig ritane  locals. 
Several u n its  from  th e  reg ion  are  a ttested ; the  cohors quartadecima 
Valeria Zahdenorum, the  ala quintadecima Flavia Carduenorum, and  the 
équités sagittarii Cordueni, w ho  se rved  in  the  west,22 a lthough  it is 
possib le  these  a re  redundancies. M oreover, the  fron tie r com m unities 
o ffe red  a recogn isab le  locus fo r n eg o tia tio n s b e tw ee n  th e  R om an
16 El (2) 929. for example, in A.D. 585 Persian troops burnt down the convent of the prophet 
John outside Martyropolis, Th. Sim,, 1.14.7.
17 R.W. Davies (1974) 321-331; R. MacMullen (1963) chps. 2 and 3 esp..
18 J.L. Teall (1965) 312; E.W. Gray (1973) 37; J.H.W.G. Llebeschuetz (1990) 11-25; P. 
Charanis (1963) 12-28.
19 T.B. Mitford (1974a) 164.
20 A.H.M. Jones (1964) 614-619.
21 A.H.M. Jones, ibid; J. Matthews (1989a) 281.
22 Not. Dig., Or. 36.36 and 34, Dec. 6.40.83; see E. Winter (1989) 560.
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authorities and  h igh-ranking locals.23 W hen N arses and  A ratius deserted  
to Belisarius, the ir youngest b ro ther Isaac and  his en tou rage  p resen ted  
th e m se lv e s  to  R o m an  o ff ic ia ls  a n d  fe llo w  P e rs a rm e n ia n s  a t 
T heodosiopolis,24 Like som e barbarian  volunteers, the  Umitanei and  the 
city m ilitia w ere largely d raw n  from  the frontier population  and  organised 
around  regional bases. Even if the  Umitanei w ere capable of jo ining the  
im perial field arm y on cam paign, they  norm ally  rem ained  in  fixed areas 
and  w ere p a rt of a reg ional com m unity .25 The Umitanei, w hose w ealth  
exceeded  local s ta n d a rd s , m ad e  tan g ib le  co n trib u tio n s to  the  ru ra l 
com m unities. A long  th e  R om ano-Persian  b o rder, n ea r C ephas, they  
p ro v id ed  m oney for nearby  m onasteries, an d  even fo u n d ed  villages of 
the ir own.26 Hence w e see th a t the  d raw ing  of resources aw ay from  the 
com m unities w as only  one side of the  relationship  betw een  subjects and  
im perial agents. It m ust be rem em bered that resources w ere injected back 
in to  the  frontier.
W hether the  R om an arm y  h a d  a h igh  reg a rd  for the  average  
R om an subject is difficult to determ ine. Isaac presen ts ev idence w hich 
ind icates th a t the  arm y often abused  the ir pow er over those  peasan ts 
w ork ing  the land  an d  those in  settlem ents.^^ But there  is also evidence 
indicating that som e concern w as show n for the em peror's subjects by both  
the  officers and  the rank  and  file. D uring  the siege of A m ida, the  Gallic 
legionaries, un influenced  by  local ties, w ere ou traged  w hen  the Rom an 
captives from  Z iata w ere p a rad ed  before the wall.28 This reaction cannot 
be view ed as unique, for the Persians in tended  the cerem ony of m arching 
th e  captives before the w alls for a specific effect. H ad  the  arm y been 
w ithou t regard  for the civilians, a m ore callous response w ould  have been
23 Although according to Amm. Marc., 19.9.2, Sapor apprehended and executed the 
Transtigritane recruits.
24 Procopius, Wars, 1.15.31-2; J.L. Teall (1965) 298.
25 A.H.M. Jones, (1964) 651. Despite the impression Isaac (1990) 208-211 gives that the 
Umitanei were regular soldiers, little different from the comitatenses, two of his main 
sources, Mai., 18.16 and Procopius, Wars, 2.16.17-19 indicate that the Umitanei initially 
responded to a local security problem, and that fighting away from their homes was 
something extraordinary.
26 Source and discussion of fifth-century examples in A.N. Palmer (1990) 54-5.
27 See for example B. Isaac (1990) 282-9, 297-8, which relies heavily on Talmudic evidence.
28 Amm. Marc., 19.6.1-4; J. Matthews (1989) 61.
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expected. A m m ianus' ow n  reg re t em erges in  h is descrip tion  of how  
elderly  and  feeble captives w ere ham strung  if they  could n o t keep pace 
w ith  the  slave colum n. H e could no t have  w itnessed  th is event a t the 
tim e, b u t it w as incorporated  later in to  his narrative for a certain em otive 
effect.29 If w e accept A m m ianus' opinion as an accurate reflection of the 
officer class from  w hich the em perors them selves w ere drawn,30 then  w e 
m ay  believe  th a t h is sen tim en ts to w ard s  R om an subjects w ere  n o t 
unusua l w ith in  the im perial governm ent. This is far from  saying tha t the 
arm y consistently  felt w arm th  tow ards Rom an subjects. N onetheless, as 
g a rrisons becam e little  m ore  th an  a skeleton  of th e ir fo rm er selves, 
efficient defence w as re lian t on  n o t sim ply  acquiescence from  R om an 
subjects, b u t their full-hearted support. There w as occasional friction. In 
the A.D. 540 sack of Antioch, a g roup  of soldiers w ere the first to ru sh  ou t 
of the city gates, tram pling citizens underneath.31 But again, the narrative 
of this siege brings o u t tw o  im portan t points: first, w hen  the citizens, the 
local defenders of Antioch, are finally reinforced by six thousand  im perial 
troops, they are brave in  their actions. It is the troops hastily d ispatched by 
Justin ian  and  the em ergency force ru sh ed  u p  from  L ebanon w ho  act 
inappropriately . Second, Procopius him self is d isgusted by  their abnorm al 
b e h a v io u r .52 in  his historia, P rocopius rarely  doub ts the  loyalty  of the 
local m ilitia  and  Umitanei. The defenders of a city like M artyropolis 
fought m anfully, despite  w eaknesses in the fortifications and  the tardiness 
of the field army.55 Loyal subjects m ight even take it upon  them selves to 
h ide  Rom an troops from  the Persians if the situation  offered no hope.54
29 The siege of Amida is at the same time one of the most personal and conventional, J. 
Matthews (1989) 288. It was a literary convention to describe the fate of a sacked city's 
populace in heart-rending terms; see K. Bradley (1992) 130-32, although evidence for this 
topos is derived from descriptions of barbarian captives.
30 F. Millar (1982) 3. Ammianus' intended audience was probably the imperial court, see J. 
Matthews (1989a) 8 and 446.
31 Procopius, Wars, 2.8.17-19.
32 A. Cameron (1985) 145; 14-5, although I disagree with Cameron's interpretation that 
Procopius is surprised by the resistance offered by the Antiochenes after the imperial army 
fled.
33 Procopius, Wars, 1.20.6-7.
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C learly, desp ite  the occasional abuse, norm al relations betw een  soldiers 
and  subjects w ere m ore co-operative than  coercive.
If w e tu rn  to  the  c iv ilian  v iew  of the  a rm y , th is  sym bio tic  
relationship  is reiterated. G iven the fact tha t literary evidence is v irtually  
non-ex isten t for the  m ajority  of R om an subjects, w e m u st accept tha t 
w ritings produced by  non-m ilitary elites can be used  to detect the tone of a 
b roader base of the population . O ne could argue th a t the  h igh-handed  
m an n er w ith  w hich  Julian  trea ted  N isibis before h is Persian  cam paign, 
and  the city 's abandonm ent by  Jovian, po in t to an im perial d isregard  for 
subjects. But the case of N isibis illustrates w hat civilians though t about 
their com m unity 's place in the em pire. After the city 's surrender, Ephrem  
the Syrian lam basted the dead  Julian. U nder a good C hristian em peror the 
city h a d  stood firm  an d  w ou ld  never have fallen  h a d  it  no t been  for 
Julian 's excesses: "The king by  his sackcloth had  preserved it, the ty ran t by 
his paganism  debased  the victory of the city w hich p rayer h ad  crow ned 
w ith  trium ph."55 Ephrem  felt th a t the  em perors' du ty , previously  upheld  
by  C onstan tine  and  C onstan tius, lay  in  p ro tec ting  R om an subjects and  
figh ting  defensive w ars: "to  shepherd  M ankind, care for the  cities, and  
drive aw ay w ild  anim als".56 Nisibis w as view ed not as a city pressed into 
defending the pow er of far-aw ay em perors, b u t as an  essential com ponent 
of th e  w ho le  em pire: "The city  w as the  cap ita l of th e  co u n try  of 
M esopotam ia... the  city w as the  capital of the w hole W est."57 jsjor w ere 
p rov incia ls  the  on ly  ones ap p a lled  by  the  a rm y 's  behav iou r. John 
C hrysostom  states tha t for its ow n safety the arm y w as w illing to trade  a 
city w hich "had  acted as an unbreachable circuit wall to ou r em pire.... the 
inhab itan ts of the  city w ere  trea ted  w ith  hostility  by  those from  w hom  
they  w ould  expect to receive favour... for, like a bulw ark , they had  always 
p u t them selves fo rw ard  on behalf of everyone else in  the  face of all 
d a n g e rs ."55 it  w as the expectation of local com m unities tha t they  w ould
34 Procopius, Wars, 2.12.1-2. Chalcis is beyond the geographical bounds of this study, but 
illustrates not only the relationship between garrison and civilian, but what a Roman 
officer, like Procopius, believes is proper behaviour.
35 Ephrem, Hymns, 2.19.
36 Ephrem, Hymns, 1.1.; S.H. Griffith (1987) 252.
37 Ephrem, Hymns, 2.25, 80-1; S.H. Griffith (1987) 252-4.
38 John Chrysostom, de s. Bahyla, 22,124.
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faith fu lly  defend  th e ir territo ries and  the im perial governm en t shou ld  
n ev e r a b an d o n  them . W hen  abuses d id  occur th ey  e lic ited  such  
com m ents.
§ 4. The Creation of a Secure Frontier:
The defence of the N orth-E ast u ltim ately  h inged  on  the possession 
of large fortress-cities, b u t the  im perial governm ent still m ade continuous 
efforts to fortify m edium -sized settlem ents and rural sites.59 A m ida, itself 
an  in itia lly  sm all site , an d  lesser se ttlem en ts n ear th e  T ranstig ritane  
satrapies w ere designed by  C onstantius as refuges for the surround ing  area 
in  response  to P ersian  raids.^^ Even insignificant coun try  settlem ents 
w ere fortified, although it w as unim aginable that they could be expected to 
resist a concerted siege, regardless of the am ount of im perial investment.41 
W hen Justin ian w as im proving  the defences of the u p p e r E uphrates, no t 
on ly  d id  he  a tten d  to  fortress-cities like T heodosiopolis, an d  sm aller 
settlem ents like Bizana, b u t also to refuges in  the  countryside.42 These 
ru ra l forts m ay have been sim ilar to those identified  along the A rsanias 
valley and  a round  Amida.45
T hat such fortified points w ere bu ilt only to control strategic points 
is unlikely. Jacob the Recluse corroborates A m m ianus' claim tha t the  forts 
w ere  designed  as shelters for R om an subjects. R egard ing  the  u p p e r 
Euphrates defences, Procopius states clearly that m oney w as given directly 
to the inhabitants and  th a t they w ere responsible for the  construction. H e 
is m ore  explicit on  the  subject of the  strongho lds created  in  the  T ur 
'A bdin:
"there are numerous villages along the foot-hills of the mountain, inhabited by people who 
are indeed happy in their possession of the necessities of life, but would be easy to capture 
if anyone should attack them. This situation the emperor Justinian corrected for them by 
building a fort on the very tip of the mountain, so that they might store their most valuable
39 Contra B. Isaac (1990) 254.
40 Amm. Marc., 18.9.1, and The History of Jacob the Recluse, 7.1-13.
41 See for example the fortified villages of Reman and Busan from Constantius' reign, Amm. 
Marc., 18.10-1-4.
42 Procopius, Buildings, 3,4.8-9.
43 J. Howard-Johnston (1989) 223; Procopius, Buildings, 2.4.19.
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property there and also fleeing thither, save themselves whenever the enemy should come 
against them ."44
Furtherm ore , late  Rom an forts such as R abat Kalesi, Z erzevan, Sem reh 
Kalesi, w hose ancient nam es are no t know n, are filled w ith  the rem ains of 
considerable civilian occupation: a w arren  of hom es, storage pits, cisterns, 
g ranaries, chapels, and  at Z erzevan  a stone cu t channel for b ring ing  in 
additional w a t e r .^5 There can be no doubt as to the strategic location of the 
la tte r tw o; Sem reh Kalesi overlooks the  N ym phius approxim ately  tw enty  
k ilom etres u p s tre am  from  the  rem ains of a B yzan tine  b rid g e , a n d  
Z erzevan  m on ito rs the  ro ad  ru n n in g  n o rth  from  M ard in  to  A m ida. 
H ow ever, civilians appear to  have occupied a large p o rtion  of the  sites' 
in te rio rs . These forts clearly  d ep en d ed  on  the su p p o rt of th e  local 
popu lation , w hereas if insurrection  w ere a problem , the local popu lation  
w o u ld  n o t have  been  so in term ixed  w ith  the  m ilitary . Such fortified  
se ttlem en ts w ere  responsib le  for defend ing  th e ir in d iv id u a l reg ions, 
inc lud ing  strategic po in ts such as roads, b ridges, an d  passes, b u t also 
prov ided  shelter for Rom an subjects, w ho, after all, en du red  the b ru n t of a 
siege or filled the ranks of the  local m ilitia and  Umitanei.
The m ention  of Persian and  H u n  raiders in  certain  sources w hich 
describe the north -east frontier has prom oted  the in te rp reta tion  th a t the  
Rom ans w ere incapable of p rov id ing  security for the  ru ra l v i l l a g e s . ^ 6  Yet 
the  w idespread  presence of m onastic com m unities th roughou t the  u p p er 
Tigris basin  from  the fourth  century  on  casts doub t as to how  ineffective 
R om an pro tection  of the countryside was.^^2 Furtherm ore, it w as in  the 
in terest of bo th  the  Rom an and  A rm enian  clergy to ensure  efforts w ere
44 Procopius, Buildings, 2.4.17-18.
45 In June of 19911 visited these sites with C.S. Lightfoot and D. French. What A. Cameron 
(1985) 94 perceives as "stock attributes of a late antique city" in Procopius* descriptions, are 
so because they were some of the normal facilities provided. B. Isaac (1990) 256 claims, on 
the other hand, "very few genuine Roman forts have been found".
46 Most recently S.A. Harvey (1990) 61, 65-6. B. Isaac (1990) 68-100, largely examining 
Syria, Judaea, and Arabia, does not believe banditry or nomad raids seriously threatened 
Roman rule, but contends that the imperial government did not take significant steps to 
ensure the safety of the provinces, especially in the countryside.
47 A. Voobus (1960) 321-7; see above chp. 2 § 2.
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m ade  to p ro tec t th e ir ru ra l h o l d i n g s  48 E m perors h ad  so lid ified  the 
in terests of the  countryside and  the  city in  g ran ting  estates and  w hole 
villages to the urban-based church. Likewise, the A rm enian hierarchy w as 
ind istingu ishab le  from  the secular aristocracy in anchoring  its pow er in  
feudal dom ains th roughou t Arm enia. Even if one is n o t w illing to accept 
th a t the  clergy felt an d  acted  u p o n  a d u ty  to w atch  over the ir ru ra l 
parishes, it is unlikely tha t either Rom an or A rm enian ecclesiastics w ould  
allow  their economic base to be threatened.^^
Im p eria l in v es tm en t in  th e  evange lisa tion  of th e  co u n try s id e  
fu rther underm ines the no tion  tha t the cultivation of ru ra l com m unities 
w as n o t an  in te rest of the  State. M issions req u ired  som e deg ree  of 
o rganisation  and  m anagem ent, and  m uch of their financial backing was 
p ro v id ed  by  the im peria l court. Take for exam ple C orduene, w hich  
D iocletian h ad  b rough t under Rom an hegem ony w ith  the  trea ty  of A.D. 
298. The territory  cam e into Persian control in A.D. 359, w hile the m ighty  
fortress a t Bezabde fell in  A.D. 360. W ith the trea ty  of N isibis, fu rther 
R om an in sta lla tio n s  a n d  five  of th e  T ran stig ritan e  sa trap ies  w ere  
su rren d e red . Soon th e  p ro -P ersian  fam ilies began  to  rea sse rt th e ir 
in fluence , p rec ip ita tin g  th e  p a rtitio n  of Armenia.^O E vangelisa tion  
p ro v id ed  one w ay  in  w hich the  R om ans, w hen  p rev en ted  from  direct 
m ilitary  in tervention, could use local com m unities no t only  to  secure the 
frontier, b u t to exert their influence beyond the border. By the  end of the 
fo u rth  cen tury  H onorius and  A rcadius are p rov id ing  go ld  for bu ild ing  
pro jec ts , g ifts of food  an d  litu rg ica l supp lies a n d  yearly  g ran ts  to  
m onasteries in the Tur ‘A bdin. From  here m onks crossed the Tigris into 
C orduene converting new  areas and  bolstering  non-R om an Christians.51 
Such m issionary  activity  has parallels elsew here along the  north-eastern  
fro n tie r. W e fin d  M aru th a  co n d u c tin g  sim ila r effo rts across the  
N y m p h iu s from  the  sta te -fu n d ed  relig ious centre a t M artyropolis. It 
seem s likely th a t sim ilar penetration  of the country w as expected from  the
48 See above chp. 2 § 2.
49 See above chp. 3 § 5.
50 Amm. Marc., 18.9.2 (loss of Corduene), 20.7 (Bezabde), 25.7.9. (Treaty of Nisibis); Faust. 
Buz., 4.16-18 and MX 3.15 (diminution of Roman influence in Armenia); C.S Lightfoot (1986) 
521.
51 See sources and discussion in A.N. Palmer (1990) 49-52, and 80-1.
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ex p an d ed  fortress-city  constructed  a t T heodosiopolis, an  old  A rsacid  
ho ld ing  w here G regory the  Illum inator h a d  o rdained  b ishops, b u t which, 
after the  A.D. 387 partition , cam e u n d e r the ju risd iction  of the  im perial 
church.52
C hapter II, and  to a lesser extent Chapters III and  IV of Isaac's Limits 
exam ine the  function the  Rom an arm y p layed  in  p u ttin g  dow n  revolts 
and  rebellions.55 D espite the atten tion  given by Isaac, the  Jew ish revolts 
w ere un ique, and  usually  a resu lt of very  localised tensions sparked  by  
relig ious difficulties.54 The life of a peasan t under Rom an, A rm enian, or 
Persian ru le  w as undoub ted ly  h ard , and  the classes w ho held  pow er w ere 
susceptible to abusing th a t pow er. But the  disposition of fortifications in 
the  N orth -E ast does n o t seem  to  have  been  de te rm ined  by  a need  to 
su p p ress  the  na tive  p o p u la tio n . In  o u r s tu d y  of the  fro n tie r cities, 
ind iv idual cases of treachery have been discussed, and  clearly local ru lers 
w ere  conscious of th e  need  to  en su re  at least the  loyalty  of u rb an  
governors. H ow ever, it is difficult to find  m any cases in  the  area w here  
d isaffection  to w ard  R om an ru le  b u rs t  in to  revolt. O ne of th e  m ost 
in tractable sectors of the  north-eastern  frontier w as the Pontic A lps, to the 
east of Trapezus. Yet, in  spite of the un ru ly  tribes and  the insurrection in 
A.D. 69, the  city d id  n o t receive a leg ionary  garrison  un til th e  th ird  
century, w hen  Gothic m arauders increased their raids after the collapse of 
th e  B osporan  kingdom .55 O n the  o ther hand , w hen  the  bdeashkh  of 
A ldznik , or A rzanene, shifted his loyalty  to  Persia, C onstantius d id  send  
troops to help  the A rm enian  k ing  K husro p u t dow n the  rebellion.56 The 
loyal T ranstig ritane satrap ies w ere  an essential buffer against sou thern  
advances against A rm enia, or n o rth ern  advances against M esopotam ia, 
b u t the satrapies them selves do no t appear to have been occupied, and  the
52 N. Garsoïan (1989) 470-1.
53 B. Isaac (1990) 55 admits a concentration on Judaea, but implies at 67, 99, 421-2 his 
conclusions may be applicable in other areas. However, at 422, he does not deny that 
certain areas "accepted Roman rule with comparative ease."
54 See M. Mor (1989) 335,343-5; and U. Rappaport (1989) 374.
55 T.B. Mitford (1974) 164; on the Bosporan role in controlling barbarian incursions see Zos. 
1.21, discussed in D.H Braund (1984) 93.
56 Faust. Buz., 3.9; MX 3.4-6; C.S. Lightfoot (1986) 519 believes this tension may have 
prompted the construction of small installations such as the équités fort at Tilli.
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sm all forts constructed  along the  Tigris sim ply  rein forced  the  satrapies 
u p o n  w hich  th e  responsib ility  for defence devo lved .57 A n argum en t 
could also be m ade th a t the  opposition  of the A rm enian  satrapies to  the 
em peror Zeno in  A.D. 485 is evidence for a rebellion.58 The action by  the 
local A rm enian  leaders w as no t a dem onstra tion  against Rom an pow er, 
b u t su p p o rt for better-know n Rom an leaders; Ulus had  been the  magister 
m ilitum  per Orientem  since A.D. 483, an d  w on  th e  su p p o rt of the  
A rm en ian  c lien ts.59 A fter Ulus and  Leontius h ad  been p u t dow n, the 
A rm enian satrapies underw en t m inor changes. They w ere still controlled 
by  A rm enians, b u t hered itary  accession w as abolished, and  som e form  of 
taxation  m ay have been imposed.60 Traditional m ethods of local control 
rem ained, b u t a greater degree of accountability w as in troduced. By and 
large, rebellions do no t appear to have been w idespread  or a serious th reat 
in  the region.
Isaac correctly states th a t cities w ere  the coveted  p rize  betw een  
Rom e and  Persia along m uch of the north-east frontier.61 But contrary to 
Isaac's conclusions, im perial expenditure w as quite heavy for bo th  m ilitary 
an d  civilian p r o j e c t s . ^ 2  v a s t  sum s of m oney m ust have been invested  in 
th e  dev e lo p m en t of such  se ttlem en ts as A m ida, D ara , M arty ropo lis, 
M elitene, Satala, and  T heodosiopolis. A dditionally , the  exam ination  of 
cities in  chapter tw o indicates th a t the em perors frequently  targeted  funds 
fo r n o n -m ilita ry  p ro jec ts  su ch  as a q u e d u c ts , p u b lic  g ra n a r ie s , 
am phitheatres, churches, m arty r reliquaries, convents. These findings do 
n o t deny  the  obvious p ro p ag an d a  value gained  in  b u ild in g  any so rt of 
struc tu re  w ith  an inscrip tion rem inding  Rom an subjects of their patrons 
and  m asters. The personality  of em perors and, m ore im portan tly , local
57 J. Matthews (1989) 53; E. Winter (1989) 560-1.
58 On the rebellion see Procopius, Buildings, 3.1.17-27, and A.H.M. Jones (1964) 228-9.
59 Mai., 387-8; J. Ant., 214.2; A.H.M. Jones (1964) 228.
60 A.H.M. Jones (1964) 229 maintains that the comes Armeniae was introduced at this time 
and that he governed the area with troops. But as N. Adontz (1970) 93,95-6 points out, the 
comes at this time held no military power, but functioned in the same manner as the old 
marspan.
61 B. Isaac (1990) 252. However, as has been argued above the massive fortifications built 
by the Romans do not indicate an abandonment of the countryside, as Isaac claims at 253.
62 See for example B. Isaac (1990) 367-9.
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leaders , h a d  g rea t influence on  the  am oun t of generosity  show n  to a 
com m unity. H ow ever, local patrons and  im perial governors concentrated 
on  bu ild ing  m onum ents w hich w ould  be visible to the  subjects; w h a t w as 
visible in  the daily lives of Rom an subjects w as norm ally w hat w as held  as 
beneficial to the  community.53 O ne should  no t then say th a t because the 
im perial governm ent w on p ropaganda  victories in its construction policy, 
local com m unities lost in  the  process. Furtherm ore, the  level of w ealth  in 
the East rose steadily  th roughou t the  period , and  archaeological evidence 
indicates continued civic e x p a n s io n .6 4  W hether the  accom panying u rban  
expansion  is to  be a ttrib u ted  to  im peria l in itiatives, is d ifficu lt to say. 
W hat has been suggested is tha t the im perial governm ent w as stim ulating 
g row th  on  a local level sim ply  by  p rov id ing  centres of adm in istra tion , 
w o rsh ip , and  econom ic and  cu ltu ra l exchange, and  from  th e  fo u rth  
cen tury  on such im provem ents w ere  often the resu lt of the  jo in t action 
b e tw een  th e  R om an em p ero rs  an d  th e  local ecc lesiastical leaders . 
Concessions could be m ade to Isaac's thesis in recognising tha t the church, 
n o t the  cen tral g overnm en t w as red is tr ib u tin g  w ealth , an d  show ing  
concern for the poor. But after the fourth  century, one can rarely divorce 
the actions of the church from  the state. The reason tha t C hristian leaders 
w ere  effective in  add ressing  the  needs of their com m unities is because 
they  w ere  w ork ing  in conjunction w ith  the  im peria l governm en t on  a 
local l e v e l . 65 P atronage by  th e  im peria l governm en t g u a ran teed  the 
church 's sp iritua l claim s to  m anage their flock. C hristian  au tho rity  w as 
effective because the  ecclesiastical leaders w ere inevitably  local m en and  
w om en, know n to their com m unity, b u t w hose sta tus an d  office allow ed 
them  to  travel th ro u g h o u t the  em pire  an d  exert a certain  am oun t of 
sp iritu a l p ressu re  on b o th  civic governors and  im p eria l c o u r t s .66 If 
n o th in g  else C hristian ity  h e lp ed  foster a no tion  of com m unity  w hich  
perhaps d id  create a rem arkable change in  people 's attitudes. The church 
p ro v id ed  constan t a tten tio n  to the  m inor deta ils of a p e asa n t's  life:
63 Contrast B, Isaac (1990) 304-9 with the conclusions of M.K. and R.L. Thornton (1989) 120- 
1 .
64 See above chp. 3 § 3.
65 See above chp. 3 § 5.
66 See above chp. 4 § 5 and § 7.
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w hether he  w as fed, cared for w hen  ill, had  a suitable burial, etc.. W hether 
the em peror believed in  adorning  his cities or not, as is contested by  Isaac, 
m ay still be debatable, b u t clearly his local agents did.
D id the Rom an State have a g rand  strategy along the north-eastern  
frontier? It is helpful to keep in  m ind a com m ent m ade by an  au thor w ho 
has influenced the th inking  of bo th  L uttw ak and Isaac: "w hile the horizon 
of strategy is bounded  by  the w ar, g rand  strategy looks beyond the  w ar to 
su b se q u e n t p e a c e . " 6 7  Isaac does no t believe the  R om an State looked 
beyond to  the peace, b u t perpetually  geared  itself for w ar, the  glory of the 
em pero r an d  his arm y. A crucial p rob lem  w ith  th is  stance is th a t, 
d iscounting raids, large areas of the frontier saw  long periods of peace. Yet 
the  arm y w as ever presen t, subjects h a d  to be ru led , and  the  em pero r's  
a tte n tio n  w as o ccu p ied  w ith  m u ch  m ore  th a n  m a rtia l v e n tu re s . 
Furtherm ore, Isaac is decidedly against a theory of defence in  depth , w hich 
is th e  essence of effective local d e f e n c e . ^ 8  Exam ples have  been  given 
above to su p p o rt a view  tha t the im perial governm ent d id  seek to create a 
secure frontier. To end , let us tu rn  to the ancient sources to see if any 
fron tier policy is vocalised w hich  m ight su p p o rt a theo ry  of defence in 
dep th  in  som e m odified  f o r m . ^ 9
There are tw o incidents w here  ancient au thors p u t a stra tegy  in to  
the  m ouths of R om e's enem ies w hich  seem  to ind icate  R om an aim s, if 
on ly  because p lans are suggested  to cope w ith  frontier defences. W hen 
A ntonius defected to the  Persians he advised Sapor to avoid lengthy  siege 
opera tions an d  strike  deep  in to  the  Syrian  in terio r. The sam e basic 
strategy  w as suggested to  K avadh by  the A rab chieftain Alam oundaras.70 
Both accounts, w ritten  by  fo rm er im peria l officers, illum inate  R om an 
aim s in  explaining how  to avoid them . The frontier zone w as thick w ith  
fortified sites w hich w ould  independently  resist the Persians and  pro tract 
cam paigns. A m m ianus claims elsew here that D iocletian h ad  reorganised
67 B.H.L. Hart (1953) 188; see also 202-6.
68 B. Isaac (1990) 374-77.
69 B. Isaac (1990) 170 holds that the Romans were not "capable of realising in practice 
what they could not verbally define". There was no defence in depth as defined by 
Luttwak, if only because large concentrations of troops remained close to the frontier during 
periods of war; see L.M Whitby (1986a) 727.
70 Amm. Marc., 18.5.1-7; Procopius, Wars, 1.17.34.
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the eastern frontier to achieve this effect, b u t this is as close as one gets to a 
L u ttw ak ian  defence in  dep th ; as Isaac po in ts ou t, there  is no  m assive 
reta lia to ry  fo rc e / l  N onetheless, literary  evidence upho lds the suggestion 
th a t  local defences p e rfo rm ed  functions w hich  rem a in ed  consisten t 
be tw een  the  late  th ird  an d  late  six th  centuries. Fortified  settlem ents 
slow ed  Persian  advances to  allow  the larger field arm ies to  even tually  
confront the  invaders,72 and  den ied  them  supplies.73 Should the enem y 
approach  the frontier "he will m eet w ith  the strategy of generals w ho will 
teach him  that it w ou ld  be better to fight w ith  deer. Should he cross the  
Tigris, he  w ill be defeated by city walls and  will be able neither to ravage or 
h a rv est th e  land ..."74 This is n o t to  deny  the  obvious offensive value 
offered by  fortified settlem ents so close to the Rom ano-Persian border. A 
fru itfu l offensive, how ever, still requ ired  th a t Rom an subjects m an  the  
walls, w hile the  Rom an arm y conducted raids across the frontier. Should 
an y th in g  go  w rong , im peria l forces re lied  on fo rtified  se ttlem en ts to 
p rov ide  refuge.75 It seem s evident th a t the  im perial governm ent d id  rely 
on  local in itia tive  to  confron t incu rsions of every  scale. T hat the  
em perors w ere w illing to back such local efforts over a th ree-hundred  year 
pe riod  indicates a level of consciousness even if it  is n o t expressed  in 
system atic term s. Local defence need  no t be view ed as defence in dep th , if 
the term  is too anachronistic for scholars. It is rather, on  a sm all scale, not 
un like  th e  policy  em ployed  d u rin g  the  early  p rin c ip a le  w here  in itial 
fron tier stability  and  security  w ere the  responsib ility  of client kings.76 
Fortified settlem ents, like so m any client kingdom s, acted as the first line
71 Amm. Marc., 23.5.2. J.C. Mann (1979) points out that the lack of a large number of troops 
in the interior prevents this from being defence in depth as Luttwak would have it. B. 
Isaac (1990) 374 points out NATO's influence on Luttwak.
72 Libanius, Or., 59. 76-82, 99-120. Procopius, Buildings, 2.2.19-21: Dara is a place where 
the Persian will waste his time on sieges, and 2.4.14-21speaks of the thick line of forts from 
Dara to Amida as a "bulwark to shield the land of the Romans".
73 Julian, Or., 1.22d-25b. Most sieges seem to have been risky for the Persians who could not 
maintain their supplies indefinitely.
74 Libanius, Ep., 49.
75 For this combination of local defence and regional offence see Zach. Mit., 9.6 
(Martyropolis); Th. Sim., 1.14.1-7 (Martyropolis), and 1.13.4-5 (Tur 'Abdin sites).
76 This similarity is suggested in J.C Mann (1979) 182-83; on the clients' duties see D.H. 
Braund (1985) 91-104.
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of defence, and  efficiently su p p lied  the Rom an arm y w ith  intelligence, 
m ilitary, and  logistical support.
§ 5. Conclusion:
It is som ew hat paradoxical th a t the im peria l governm en t w hich  
expected  in d iv id u a l com m unities to  conduct th e ir ad m in is tra tio n  and  
defence w ith  a high degree of independence, thus creating a patch-w ork of 
sem i-au to n o m o u s reg io n s , h a d  an  u n d e rly in g  o r g ra n d  s tra teg y . 
H ow ever, the  Rom an state  seem ed to be aw are of the  lim its of its ow n 
efficiency. G reater loyalty  an d  security  could be gained  if the fron tier 
se ttlem ents w ere  a llow ed  to  adm in iste r and  contro l th e ir im m edia te  
locality. This policy  could  only  succeed if the  m orale  of the  subjects 
rem ain ed  h igh . To achieve th is the  im peria l g o v ern m en t sk illfu lly  
com bined bu ild ing  projects w ith  a rhetoric firm ly expressing the  vitality  of 
the  empire.77 Except in  cases w here  local com m unities failed to defend 
the ir territo ries, the  im peria l governm en t p laced  the  responsib ility  for 
defend ing  the frontier on  their subjects in the cities and  villages of the  
frontier. Even w here the  governm en t in tervened  directly , the g reatest 
changes w ere  m ade in  m aking  the leadersh ip  of each com m unity  m ore 
accountable, and  p rov id ing  im proved  frontier security  th ro u g h  bu ild ing  
projects. Such a policy of integration has parallels in the Rom ans' a ttitude  
tow ards the  em pire 's  d iverse  cu ltures, w here  it has been  said  th a t the  
em pire  "en d u red  so long because it  succeeded in  m aking m ultitudes of 
citizens in  far-flung  reg ions feel close to  the  p o w er th a t con tro lled
them ." 78
77 L.M. Whitby (1986a) 723.
78 G. W. Bowersock (1982) 299 n. 6.
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C onclusion
N o rth e rn  Syria an d  M esopo tam ia  w ere  effectively  lo s t to  the  
Rom ans after the  com ing of the  Arabs. H ow ever, m uch of the north-east 
fron tier p roved  effective w ell in to  later Byzantine periods. The M uslim  
conquerors advanced  to  M elitene a t the  foot of the  T aurus m ountains. 
C en tu ries passed  w hile  A rab  an d  B yzantine troops engaged  in  harsh  
guerilla  w arfare, du ring  w hich the  frontier lines m oved little. The earliest 
ad v an ce  ag a in st A rm en ia  w as h a lte d  by  com bined  B yzan tine  an d  
A rm enian  forces. Satala and  m any of the  settlem ents on the A rm enian 
p la teau  found  them selves in  a  no-m an 's lan d  betw een  various regional 
pow ers. T rade rou tes changed  an d  th is area  fell in to  decline  in  the  
seven th  century. Conversely, T rapezus expanded  its influence over the  
su rro u n d in g  h in te rlan d  an d  experienced  a go lden  age of im portance. 
A rm enia, itself, w as overrun . Yet, even after an energetic  p u sh  to  the  
C aucasus, A rab forces w ere faced w ith  the  constant counter-attacks of the 
Byzantines and  an in tractable A rm enian population. A rm enia continued 
to be ru led  by local nobles, b u t now  usually  in  the nam e of the  Caliph. 
M any of the  cities of th e  reg ion  co n tin u ed  to enjoy h ig h  levels of 
p ro sp e rity , an d  A rm enian  lite ra tu re  an d  arts flourished . C h ristian ity  
rem ained at the centre of C iscaucasian society, and, until the early years of 
th is cen tu ry , rem ained  the  m ajority  re lig ion  in  m uch  of C iscaucasia. 
A natolia, the  heart of the  Byzantine em pire w as not penetra ted  un til the 
m idd le  ages. The achievem ent of local defence on the north-east frontier 
du ring  the  period  explored  in  th is thesis w as to give the em pire  several 
m ore  cen tu ries of stab ility  on  he r easte rn  fron tier, d esp ite  a loss of 
in fluence.
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